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THE GERMAN FREE TRADE UNIONS DURING THE RISE OF NAZISM

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A DEMOCRATIC nation, especially if faced with powerful extremist forces of the political Left and Right, ought to have a free and dynamic trade union movement to help safeguard the liberties of its citizens. For the sake of survival alone, labor not only should make its members aware of the political problems of the day, but also should participate in those national and international affairs which affect its broader interests. If the movement in an hour of political crisis withdraws from this participation, there is grave danger that it will be unable to resist the onslaughts of totalitarianism. This is precisely what happened in Germany in 1933. Therefore, it seems appropriate to make a case study of the attitudes and policies of the German free trade unions during the crucial period of transition from the Weimar Republic to fascism.

Three independent and competing organizations represented organized labor in Germany at the end of the nineteenth century. These were based on ideological and political differences. The Socialist unions adhered to the concept of Marxist revisionism, the Christian unions to Catholic social action and the Hirsch-Duncker unions to Manchester liberalism. Of the three, the Socialist unions were by far the largest and politically the most active. Consequently, this article will be concerned only with these unions. By the end of the Weimar period, they had become constituent members of three national federations working in close cooperation: (a) the German Federation of Trade Unions, ADGB (*Allgemeiner Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund*), composed of national industrial and craft unions, with a membership of nearly 5 million; (b) the Free Federation of Salaried Employees, AfA (*Allgemeiner freier Angestelltenbund*), with almost 500,000 members; and (c) the German Federation of Civil Servants, ADBB (*Allgemeiner Deutscher Beamtenbund*), numbering approximately 170,000 members.¹

The three federations, representing about twenty-five per cent of the total labor force, were closely allied with the Social Democratic Party (SPD

¹The three federations will be referred to hereafter as Socialist unions or by name. The term 'Union' will refer to the ADGB. The federations were also known as 'free' unions due to lack of religious affiliation.

or Party) and rather consistently espoused its aims. Unlike American organized labor at that time, the German unions were committed to political parties and directly involved in the affairs of the nation. German labor upheld the democratic regime on many occasions, and most notably at the time of the right wing Kapp Putsch in 1920 when a prompt general strike call contributed to the failure of the uprising. It must be emphasized that for most part both the members and leaders of the "free" unions were Socialists and staunch opponents of the Communists and Fascists.

Yet, when democracy was threatened in the latter period of the Weimar Republic, the movement had lost its élan and was close to paralysis. With the Depression organized labor confronted crucial problems: unemployment had risen steeply, and the economic survival of the nation was at stake. Was it not, however, important also that labor realize the danger of pursuing a politically sterile and negative course of action in the face of imminent danger to the organization as well as to the nation?

In order to understand the attitudes which actually prevailed and the decisions which were made, the role played by the Socialist unions during the authoritarian régimes of von Papen, von Schleicher and Hitler must be reviewed.

The Papen Coup

On July 20, 1932, Chancellor Franz von Papen dramatically ousted the legitimate Prussian coalition government headed by Otto Braun, Social Democrat. The conservative Chancellor held no brief for Socialists and trade unionists. On the pretext that law and order were not being preserved in Prussia, long a stronghold of the Socialists, Papen had himself appointed Commissioner for Prussia by Presidential decree. Then, on the broad authority given him, he dismissed the eight Prussian cabinet ministers, who forthwith appealed to the Supreme Court, on the grounds that an outright dismissal of ministers by federal decree was unconstitutional. But it was too late. The court decision, generally in their favor, was not rendered until October 25, when it could no longer be of significance.² This coup d'état undoubtedly was one of the chief factors in bringing about the rise of fascism, and was the first of numerous illegal acts performed by irresponsible German governments.

How did the Socialist trade unions react to Papen's dramatic move? On the part of the rank and file, the response was an immediate work stoppage in a few plants, followed by a pause for instructions. Berlin workers in the sprawling Siemens and I. G. Farben plants assembled to hear their leaders speak.³ Small formations of the Iron Front, a semi-military, Socialist-led defense organization, gathered in various sectors of Berlin to wait for directions. But no call for a general protest strike or even a token demonstration came from their chiefs.

The ADGB Board and Executive met immediately on the afternoon of

²Brecht, Arnold, *Prelude to Silence* (New York, Oxford University Press, 1944), p. 65.

³Interview of author with Siegfried Aufhäuser, former AfA President, in New York, 1950.

the 20th and decided not to take any action. Their reasons were similar to those voiced by SPD leaders on the following day: unemployment and increasing defeatism among the workers rendered immediate action impracticable, but cautious preparations for a possible future general strike should be made. A spokesman for the Railroad Workers Union claimed that his men had no wish to strike as many unemployed workers were ready to step into their jobs. Also, reportedly, it was argued at the meeting that Papen had acted within the limits of his constitutional powers and that consequently the unions must reject any strike call.⁴

The SPD called on its Executive Committee and Board members to attend an emergency meeting in Berlin on July 21. At this conference it was decided to bring all organizations to a state of readiness, but to refrain from immediate action. Three main considerations led to these decisions: the hope that the July 30 election, then ten days off, would turn the tide against fascism by increasing the vote for the Left; the desire at all costs to avoid a civil war, with the Reichswehr fighting the workers; and the belief that Papen was still attempting to prevent Hitler's assumption of power. The SPD moreover rejected the proposal of the Communist Party for a general strike, declaring that, in view of the collaboration between Communists and Nazis in a plebiscite against the Prussian government the previous year, it preferred to act on its own.⁵

Once immediate action was ruled out, Otto Wels, Party Chairman, systematically sounded out trade union, Party and Iron Front leaders on the feasibility of future resistance. Fearing bloodshed, they responded negatively. The Chairman of the Frankfurt trade union council, Otto Misbach, in a typical reply to the query, categorically refused to engage in any "experiments" which were doomed to failure. The spokesman of the Metal Workers Union and Reichsbanner Council in Frankfurt, Mulanski, declared that the Reichsbanner did not even have sufficient equipment at its disposal to transport workers to a possible scene of action.⁶

The Iron Front Executive members also held a caucus at which most Party and Union spokesmen stressed their fear that an immediate general strike would lead to civil war. They decisively rejected a proposal by Karl

⁴Interview of author with Fritz Tarnow, former President of the Wood Workers Union, in Frankfurt, Germany, 1949. He revealed that, at this meeting, agreement was reached with regard to one plan. Certain key industries and services were to prepare for a future strike by appointing trusted agents (*Vertrauensmänner*) to inquire of workers whether they would cooperate with a strike call should one be issued.

None of the leading West European newspapers urged an immediate general strike. An editorial in *Journal de Genève*, Geneva, July 23, 1932, commented on the collapse of the workers' movement and the resigned attitude of the Socialists resulting from the Depression. *Le Temps*, Paris, July 22, 1932, declared that the Union and Party were afraid to take action for fear of reprisals. French Socialist leader, Léon Blum, writing in *Le Populaire*, Paris, July 22, 1932, backed the action of the German Socialists.

⁵*Vorwärts*, Berlin (SPD daily; evening edition *Der Abend*), July 21, 1932.

⁶Severing, Carl, *Mein Lebensweg* (Köln: Greven Verlag, 1950), II, 355. Interview of author with Richard Seidel, German labor historian, in St. Märgen, Germany, 1951.

In 1931, the Reichsbanner, a Social Democratic defense organization, and other groups jointly set up the para-military Iron Front to combat the enemies of democracy.

Höltermann, head of the Reichsbanner, and Siegfried Aufhäuser, AfA President, that, at the very least, a demonstration strike be held.⁷

Though the no-strike decision reached at the three meetings was revealed without delay, it was followed by supplementary declarations. On July 20 and 21, the Berlin locals of the national unions issued two appeals warning workers of *provocateurs* who, in the name of the Iron Front and without authorization, were agitating for a general strike. The appeals asked the workers to follow only the legitimate union leadership.⁸ Another official declaration asserted that, despite the excitement of the workers, exemplary discipline must be maintained, especially since no solution could be reached in Prussia until the Supreme Court had rendered its decision.⁹ These releases once more clearly demonstrated that labor was not ready to risk a civil war, but preferred to await developments. The first setback to the Party and Union occurred on July 31, when the National Socialists registered further gains in the nation-wide election, thus becoming an increasing menace to the fragile structure of the Weimar Republic.

In retrospect, whether the no-strike decision was the correct one remains a matter of debate. Had the trade unions decided on a general strike or token demonstration, the Party would have backed them up. Conversely, the Party could not possibly have initiated a strike with the unions opposing it. Which organization made the original decision remains a moot question, although all indications are that the unions were primarily responsible.¹⁰

Certain differences in political outlook within the Party and within the Union which were never overcome in the Weimar period stood out clearly in the 1932 crisis. As the danger of fascism grew, the ideological split between the minority who wanted more militant action and the majority who feared any hasty action was intensified within each organization.

Whatever one may have thought of the feasibility of calling a general

⁷Interview of author with Aufhäuser, in New York, 1950. The date of the Iron Front meeting could not be ascertained.

⁸*Vorwärts*, July 21, 1932; July 22, 1932.

⁹*Ibid.*, July 21, 1932.

¹⁰No substantiation can be found for the thesis of the British historian John Wheeler-Bennett that the SPD wanted a strike, but was overruled by the Union. *Hindenburg, The Wooden Titan* (London, Macmillan, 1936), p. 405. In an interview with the author of this article, in New York, 1950, Aufhäuser contended that ADGB President Theodor Leipart was undecided at first on the course of action to take, but that he then agreed with the majority of Party and Union leaders not to call a general strike. Friedrich Stampfer, SPD editor, stated: "No other decision was possible taking into consideration the SPD mentality and history; the knack for bloody adventures was not theirs." *Die Vierzehn Jahre der Ersten Republik* (Karlsbad, Verlagsanstalt 'Graphia', 1936), p. 579. Otto Braun, ousted Prussian Prime Minister, writes in his memoirs that his position in those days was based on the actual power constellation, and that he had no desire to sacrifice thousands of true republicans in a completely hopeless struggle. *Von Weimar zu Hitler* (New York, Europa Verlag, 1940), p. 410. Although agreeing with Braun that the struggle would have been lost, Adolf Sturmthal, former Austrian economist and supporter of the minority view, arrived at an antithetic conclusion: "The German Laborites, bewildered by events . . . failed to see that the present was definitely lost and that only the future mattered." *The Tragedy of European Labor* (New York, Columbia University Press, 1943), p. 205.

strike, the decision of the Union and the Party not to act weakened any hope of further resistance to fascism. Symptomatic of the passive mood of the two organizations was their refusal even to consider a demonstration strike to rally the masses. Thus the only major forces available at that critical hour which could perhaps have saved the deteriorating situation failed to make the attempt.

The Schleicher Régime

General Kurt von Schleicher, Reichswehr leader and War Minister in the cabinet of von Papen, succeeded his chief as Chancellor on December 3, 1932. Before forming the cabinet, Schleicher, who lacked an organized party following of his own, considered different combinations of the various political and trade union groups.

One plan called for the creation of a labor government led by German generals.¹¹ Apparently, Schleicher believed that such a coalition would prevent the rise of Hitler. But, of course, no such collaboration was possible then since the two groups had no basis for agreement. The General reportedly also toyed with a Rightist combination of the Reichswehr, allied with Papen, Göring, and Hitler, but the Nazi chiefs refused to enter into any cabinet in which Schleicher would be chancellor.¹² In another move, the General held conversations with the "moderate" group of Nazis headed by Gregor Strasser and with the trade union leaders, in an attempt to reconcile the major social forces.¹³ He intended to split the Nazi movement by offering Strasser the twin posts of vice-chancellor and Prussian prime-minister, but the negotiations crumbled when Strasser's prestige and mass support in the Nazi Party declined.¹⁴

In his parleys with organized labor, Schleicher seemed to have short-range and long-range goals in mind. He often expressed the hope in private conversations that all trade union organizations would sever their links with the political parties, unite in one labor front, and counteract the Nazi menace by exercising more power in the state.¹⁵ He also envisioned the eventual organization of the economy into guilds, and the institution of a corporative government based largely upon the trade unions.¹⁶

¹¹Rosenberg, Arthur, *A History of the German Republic* (London, Methuen, 1936), p. 315.

¹²Loebe, Paul, *Erinnerungen eines Reichstagspräsidenten* (Berlin, Arani Verlag, 1949), p. 140.

¹³A meeting on August 24, 1932, already gave evidence of Schleicher's strategy. Dr. Luebbert, Director of the *Verkehrsgesellschaft A. G.* and a friend of Schleicher and Gregor Strasser, came to ADGB headquarters on the recommendation of an Executive member of the Reichsbanner. Luebbert asked that Nazis and trade unionists join hands, but the three ADGB leaders (Eggert, Schlimme and Erdmann) declined on the ground that the unions and the SPD could not be played against each other. Letter of August 29, 1932, by Lothar Erdmann, Union editor, to ADGB President Theodor Leipart, in the ADGB Correspondence File. The author wishes to thank the Departmental Records Branch, U. S. Army, Washington, D. C., for making this file available to him.

¹⁴Braun, *op. cit.*, pp. 430-433.

¹⁵Meissner, Otto, *Staatssekretär unter Ebert-Hindenburg-Hitler* (Hamburg, Hoffman und Campe, 1950), p. 257.

¹⁶Wheeler-Bennett, *op. cit.*, p. 404.

With some of these goals in mind, Schleicher paid compliments to ADGB President Theodor Leipart at a Berlin assembly of works council representatives in October, 1932.¹⁷ On November 28, five days before he assumed the chancellorship, Schleicher invited Union representatives to a personal conference. Their acceptance, however, aroused particular controversy in some Party and labor circles where it was feared that the Union would make a deal with the General.¹⁸

Gustav Noske, former SPD War Minister, describes in his memoirs an episode which supposedly occurred immediately after Schleicher's request for such a conference came to the notice of the SPD Executive members. "At once Leipart was asked to come to Party headquarters. . . . There Breitscheid told him that the Party rejected any collaboration with reactionary Schleicher, and expected the same attitude from him (Leipart). Leipart, who described this conversation to me, yielded to the Party pressure."¹⁹ The conversation nevertheless took place. Leipart and Wilhelm Eggert, Union heads, participated and, as reported by the official Union and Party organs, stressed the need to initiate an employment policy and render void Papen's unpopular wage-slashing decree of September 5. Schleicher asked Leipart to submit these demands to him on the following day in written form.²⁰ According to another source, the General made a favorable impression on Leipart and Eggert at the meeting when he told them that Papen had donated too much money to Prussian Junker estates, and that Papen's wage cuts were too drastic. The two labor leaders thereupon dropped their demands for socialization of key enterprises, but demanded a large public works program as a condition for supporting Schleicher.²¹

After several days of negotiations with the various parties and trade union organizations, Schleicher finally formed his cabinet on December 3, retaining, with only two exceptions, the same conservative ministers who had served under Papen. The SPD and other parties, for conflicting reasons, did not support the new government, which thus rested on precarious foundations.

Once in office, the new Chancellor maintained further contact with the trade unions, ostensibly in order to obtain their full support. The reaction of the Union to his maneuver is difficult to assess. A multitude of assertions and denials sheds little light on Leipart's attitude to Schleicher.

¹⁷Heiden, Konrad, *Geburt des Dritten Reiches* (Zürich, Europa Verlag, 1934), p. 89.

¹⁸Schleicher scheduled meetings with many party leaders in an attempt to form a cabinet. The Socialist official Breitscheid informed him, in a conference immediately following the parley with the Union, that the Party would continue its unequivocal opposition role. *Vorwärts*, November 28, 1932.

¹⁹Noske, Gustav, *Aufstieg und Niedergang der deutschen Sozialdemokratie* (Zürich, Aero Verlag, 1947), p. 311. Noske believed it was a mistake not to cooperate with Schleicher against the rise of Hitler.

²⁰*Gewerkschafts-Zeitung, Berlin* (ADGB weekly, hereafter referred to as G-Z), December 3, 1932, pp. 769-770; *Vorwärts*, November 29, 1932. *Le Temps*, November 30, 1932, asserts that Schleicher also promised, at the behest of the labor chiefs, to distribute some land holdings to the unemployed.

²¹Merker, Paul, *Deutschland—Sein oder nicht sein?*, Vol. I, *Von Weimar zu Hitler* (Mexico, D.F., Editorial 'El Libro Libre', 1944), pp. 278-279.

On December 4, a French journalist of *Excelsior*, a Paris newspaper, interviewed Leipart, and reported that he had discussed plans for a truce of arms with Schleicher during the consolidation of power, and had also expressed a most lively admiration for the Chancellor.²² The ADGB President did not leave this article uncorrected. He denied that the correspondent had asked him whether the unions would grant such a truce, and asserted that that would be the task of the political parties in the Reichstag. Moreover, Leipart denied having said that the government must "for some time" lay aside plans for constitutional and electoral reforms. Rather, he had informed the journalist of press articles in which Schleicher himself stated that he did not consider the time ripe for these reforms. The journalist was also under the impression that Schleicher's ascendancy to power would cause great unrest in France. Leipart retorted that, in view of "the love of peace among the German people," there was no ground for concern. Although he denied expressing a lively admiration for Schleicher, the ADGB President intimated that, despite his denials, Leipart was not diametrically opposed to the new régime, nor to Schleicher personally. Perhaps Leipart might have been ready to agree to the Chancellor's plans had the SPD not so vociferously opposed them, but he did not desire to seize the initiative in separating from the Party.²³ Nevertheless, rumors abounded of trade union approaches to Schleicher and other reactionary elements. It was reported that Leipart, in an effort to lessen the prevailing suspicions, rather than negotiating himself, sent labor representatives to confer with the Chancellor.

One of the first moves that Schleicher made was to withdraw part of Papen's emergency decree. The Union naturally welcomed this move and declared that Schleicher was less reactionary than Papen. This statement caused adverse comment, whereupon the Union issued denials of a political rapprochement with the new government. It did not succeed, however, in quashing rumors of unofficial connections.

Later in the month, Leipart, in an open letter to the workers, assailed those who were accusing the Union of compromising itself by associating with reactionary groups. The Union, he asserted, must improve the lot of the workers within the current economic and political framework and simultaneously strive for socialism. While it was clear, according to Leipart, that Schleicher did not favor socialism, labor could not oppose his plans as long as his immediate program was favorable to the workers.²⁴

A left-wing Party journal supported those elements, constituting a majority in the Party and a minority in the unions, who favored stronger opposition to Schleicher. The journal emphasized that, even after the denials of Leipart, doubts over the ADGB position arose among Socialists.

²²Gentz, Paul, "Les Pourparlers entre von Schleicher et les Syndicats ouvriers," *Excelsior*, quoted in Robert Goetz, *Les Syndicats Ouvriers Allemands après la Guerre* (Paris, F. Loviton et Cie., 1934), p. 249. *G-Z*, December 17, 1932, p. 811.

²³Frey, Lothar (pseud.), *Deutschland Wohin?* (Zürich, Europa Verlag, 1934), p. 21; *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, Zürich, January 30, 1933.

²⁴*G-Z*, December 31, 1932, p. 833.

The article granted that the unions had to negotiate with governments inimical to the labor cause, but asserted that the unions represent the shock troops of the socialist movement in any non-parliamentary struggle and must not stand aside in a conflict.²⁵ According to a Communist writer, the majority of the SPD Executive members, including Chairman Wels, denounced Leipart's stand, interpreting it as the expression of a desire to loosen the ties to the SPD in order to become more "non-political."²⁶

These protests led to a further rebuttal. At a Union meeting in January, 1933, Leipart again sought to answer the objections which were raised to the policy of toleration. He declared that the unions did not constitute a political party. They had neither the means nor the right to overthrow the government; there could thus be no talk of toleration. Labor representatives, he insisted, must discuss their demands with the minister of labor and the chancellor of whatever party is in power. Some commentators asserted that while the SPD was in opposition to the government the unions were not; but, Leipart continued, the unions were always in opposition, and would never bind themselves to any administration, even though, as had recently been the case, the chancellor and the minister of labor were Socialists.²⁷

Thus ended a series of accusations and denials which certainly created more confusion than enlightenment regarding the alleged Union-Schleicher collaboration. There is little doubt that it existed to a degree, for opportunism, a trend to conservatism, and a sincere belief that National Socialism could be staved off, played a decisive role among labor leaders during those crucial weeks.

After failure to split the Nazi Party and to win substantial labor support, and after further intrigues behind the scenes on the governmental level, the Chancellor was dismissed. When negotiations for a new cabinet began, Schleicher, it is reported, attempted once again to gain the support of the unions in a last-minute effort to stop the appointment of Adolf Hitler as chancellor. The General sought to intimidate the President by summoning top trade union leaders to an immediate conference in the War Ministry. This caused government officials to wonder whether the move might be the prelude to a general strike.²⁸

In this brief interlude before the impending storm, the role of the unions was significant. They could ill-afford the rise of fascism, yet did remarkably little to avert it. Their conversations with Schleicher, their toleration of his administration, and Leipart's thesis that labor must present its demands to whatever government happens to be in power, also

²⁵"Das Experiment des Herrn von Schleicher," *Neue Blätter für den Sozialismus*, Vol. IV, No. 1 (1933), 7-8.

²⁶Merker, *op. cit.*, p. 279.

²⁷G-Z, January 28, 1933, p. 52.

²⁸Wheeler-Bennett, *op. cit.*, p. 432. Confirmation of this report is lacking. Schleicher denied another rumor that he was planning a military uprising. *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, February 1, 1933.

strained the relations between Union and Party. Their frail collaboration was to be further weakened when Hitler assumed power.

Hitler: Labor's Downfall

Papen's backstage intrigues and pressures forced Schleicher to resign on January 28, 1933. Two days later, President Hindenburg administered the oath of office to the new Chancellor, Adolf Hitler, who, ironically enough, promised to uphold the Constitution. January 30 proved to be a fateful day in German history. It marked the definite end of the Weimar period and the beginning of the fascist era.

Would the unions undertake any last-minute move to rescue the nation, or yield to the fascist assumption of power? We know that they chose the latter path, and failed again to use their most potent weapon, the general strike. There were many diverse excuses given for this lack of action: it was pointed out that the Chancellor had assumed his office legitimately, and that the odds were against the workers, since any uprising would be crushed by the Reichswehr. It was argued later that the unions could not yet discern the totalitarian character of the fascist movement, that they believed Hitler would not remain long in power, and that they could hope to save themselves from extinction by ending the collaboration with the Party.

There was apathy among all ranks of labor, caused partly by the failure of the leaders to present any positive plan for counteracting the Nazi policies. The Union might have advanced an effective anti-depression program of deficit financing, as was practiced by the United States "New Deal" and the Swedish labor governments in the 'thirties. It might have rallied the workers to a political program of broad scope; it might have demanded, for instance, that the major democratic parties bury their differences and unite against the Right. But by now it was too late. A general strike would undoubtedly have led to civil war, and the Union leaders were not willing to risk it.

Instead, the Union pursued a policy which had little to commend it. In the beginning of 1933, some of its top officials parleyed with conservatives and Nazis in order to play for time and prevent their organization from falling under the fascist yoke.²⁹ Union representatives appear to have engaged in negotiations with Minister of Labor Seldte (member of the NSDAP, National Socialist Party) and Vice-Chancellor Papen on the theory that these men would be reluctant to betray the unions to Hitler.³⁰ There were other reports of a parley between Leipart and Nazi district chief Wag-

²⁹For instance, Hermann Seelbach, head of the ADGB training school in Bernau, admits participating in talks with responsible Nazis. *Das Ende der Gewerkschaften* (Berlin, Elsner Verlag, 1934). Other local leaders did likewise. These facts are substantiated in a letter to the author of this article from Dr. Hans Hirschfeld, SPD leader, Berlin, February 5, 1951.

³⁰Seldte was considered sympathetic to labor, since he had allowed the semi-military Stahlhelm organization (anti-Socialist) to be filled with former members of the Reichsbanner and the SPD, according to Frey, *op. cit.*, p. 114.

ner of Munich, and, as noted below, of a crucial meeting on April 5 between leaders of the ADGB and the NSBO (National Socialist Shop Organization).³¹ One writer maintains that there was in existence a union plan which envisioned the resignation of certain labor officials, whereupon the unions would sever their links with the SPD and become "non-political." The left wing of the NSBO apparently agreed to this plan, but it was rejected by the right wing of the NSDAP.³²

An American unionist, who held conversations with German labor leaders at the time, states that indirect negotiations with the Nazis started in mid-March, 1933, but claims that no definite proposal was advanced on which agreement could have been reached.³³ SPD editor Stampfer also intimates the existence of unofficial relations between the unions and the Nazis.³⁴

Consultations such as these, and an increasing stress on nationalism by top ADGB officials, led to more friction with the SPD in the last year of the Republic. The Union argued publicly that Germany's reparation payments had been a burden on the economy, while the majority of the Party and the left wing of the Union stressed the need for an internationalist approach to the crisis and advocated a rapprochement between France and Germany. There was even talk in union ranks of forming a labor party separate from the SPD, but the idea failed to materialize.³⁵

The growing Union-Party rift was accentuated by labor writers who once had favored close ties between the two organizations, but who in 1932 and 1933 had urged the unions to stay out of politics. Clemens Nörpel, an authority on labor law and a member of the ADGB staff, asked the unions to adopt a non-political role and cease spreading party propaganda within their organizations.³⁶ In a later article, he once again wrote: "The trade unions are autonomous and independent of each political party and must remain so."³⁷ Karl Zwing, a veteran union writer, also pleaded with the Union to give up its support of the SPD, and to establish a non-partisan policy.³⁸ As will be seen, a policy not altogether dissimilar to that advised by these men was followed in the last months of the Republic.

The Union-Party dissension had little bearing on the normal political behavior of the unions. They continued their unsuccessful efforts to influence the government, and more often submitted to its vagaries. During

³¹Interview of author with Aufhäuser, New York, 1950; Frey, *op. cit.*, pp. 116-117.

³²Franz, Leopold (pseud.), *Die Gewerkschaften in der Demokratie und in der Diktatur* (Karlsbad, Verlagsanstalt 'Graphia', 1935), pp. 53-54.

³³Plotkin, Abram, "The Destruction of the Labor Movement in Germany," *American Federationist*, XL (August, 1933), 816-817.

³⁴Stampfer, *op. cit.*, p. 601.

³⁵Interview of author with Aufhäuser, New York, 1950. Another plan envisaged the amalgamation of all trade union organizations. *G-Z*, April 15, 1933, pp. 229-230.

³⁶"Selbständige Gewerkschaften oder Parteipolitische Ausschüsse," *G-Z*, December 24, 1932, pp. 819-822.

³⁷"Entwicklung und Rechtsstellung der Gewerkschaften bis zur Gegenwart," *Arbeit*, No. 3, 1933, p. 183.

³⁸"Um die Zukunft der Gewerkschaften," *Gewerkschafts-Archiv*, IX, No. 6 (1932), 241-244.

the crucial cabinet shuffle when Hitler became Chancellor, labor leaders took no action, except to issue routine public declarations and make futile attempts to seek audiences with President Hindenburg.³⁹

In its declarations, the Union characteristically asked the workers to remain calm and to follow the slogan of the hour: "Organization, not demonstration." It still entertained hope for the future and asserted that even the new government would not be able to crush the workers and their unions. In line with the policy during the Schleicher administration, the Union announced that it intended, despite its opposition to the government, to present the demands of the workers to the nation's leaders.⁴⁰

The ADGB Board, on January 31, issued a carefully worded statement, in which it was implied that, if necessary, a compromise in order to conform with government policies might be accepted. The Board argued that while the desire of the workers to take action against the new administration was understandable, such a step would merely harm their interests. Governments are transitory, it was emphasized, and reactionary ones do not necessarily destroy the labor movement.⁴¹ While this release was issued in order to preserve the organization, it nevertheless left no doubt about the passive mood of the ADGB staff officials and their mistaken appraisal of the new régime.

During the month of February, it is true, there was hope that the unions would stand firm. They protested Nazi chief Göring's order to the police, SA and SS (Nazi semi-military units) to unite against the Left, but were ignored.⁴² Furthermore, some union speakers urged SPD and KPD (Communist Party) workers to bridge their differences and unite. In Berlin, Clothing Workers and Lithographers Unions asked the ADGB to seek an agreement between the SPD and the KPD, but the ADGB took no action, for it had already decided a year earlier that it would not put its weight behind a unity campaign until the KPD stopped attacking the socialist unions and the SPD.⁴³

Despite the formal Union appeal to its members to vote for the SPD in the March 5 nation-wide election, the next two months, March and April, gave rise to indications that the Union, in order to preserve itself, was beginning to adopt a neutral political attitude. In a letter to the right wing SPD leader Wilhelm Keil, dated March 3, Leipart categorically asserted that he intended to remain in the political limelight no longer, and hoped that organized labor would now benefit from his earlier modest role in the activities of the Party.⁴⁴

After the March 5 Nazi election victory, gained as a result of a wave of

³⁹*Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, January 30, 1933.

⁴⁰*G-Z*, February 4, 1933, pp. 65-68.

⁴¹*Ibid.*; *Vorwärts*, February 1, 1933.

⁴²*Vorwärts*, February 23, 1933.

⁴³*Ibid.*

⁴⁴ADGB Correspondence File, Washington, D. C.

terror against all opposition parties, the AfA Executive (Federation of Salaried Employees) drew up a resolution which stated in part:

It cannot be the task of the trade unions to take a stand on the political consequences of this election. However, (they) . . . are cognizant of their duty to continue to work for the fulfillment of their social and economic task in this historic, significant moment for the country and its people.⁴⁵

Ten days later, the ADGB Executive issued a document of great importance, which was similar in content to the AfA resolution. The ADGB declared that a trade union must be independent of political parties as well as of employers. Its social tasks must be fulfilled no matter what government is in power, but it should not attempt to interfere directly in politics.⁴⁶

Following these official declarations, most local labor weeklies urged their readers not to voice political opinions but to devote their time entirely to economic problems. In a similar vein, the ADGB journal declared that the Union was more than ever occupied with its immediate tasks, and that the reduced political role of the workers must be balanced by strengthening the organization.⁴⁷

These policy declarations did not have the desired effect. Hopes of saving the movement crumbled when the Nazis increased their relentless persecution of the unions, thereby causing much hardship. The many-pronged attack was carried out against the property of the unions, their leaders and press, and the newly-elected officials of the works councils.

The attacks on union property constituted flagrant violations of democratic procedure. On March 8, the ADGB training school in Bernau was occupied by SA men. The ADGB Executive immediately protested to Vice-Chancellor Papen and Prussian Commissioner Göring, who had the building cleared and returned to the Union.⁴⁸ Renewed Nazi attacks on union property prompted further protests. On March 10, the ADGB appealed to the President to stop the infringements of the law, the acts of terror against union members, and the destruction of property.⁴⁹ The appeal was in vain. More headquarters were occupied or closed by the police, labor leaders were arrested, and it was decreed in many German states that no union official could hold a party office or agitate against the government.⁵⁰

In another type of crackdown, the Nazis periodically confiscated and suppressed labor newspapers. This caused the newspapers to exercise great

⁴⁵Resolution of March 10; G-Z, March 18, 1933, pp. 163-164.

⁴⁶The statement reaffirmed the right of the government to intervene in the establishment of wage agreements and arbitration awards. G-Z, March 25, 1933, p. 177. The document, sent to the government on March 21 also, reportedly, affirmed that (a) Party and Union have separate and different functions, and (b) the Union was ready to form a working agreement with employers. Frey, *op. cit.*, p. 114.

⁴⁷G-Z, March 25, 1933, p. 187.

⁴⁸G-Z, March 11, 1933, p. 159.

⁴⁹G-Z, March 18, 1933, p. 163.

⁵⁰G-Z, April 8, 1933, p. 220.

caution in their comments on Hitler's speeches to the Reichstag and on other Nazi pronouncements.

The government brazenly dismissed from office ADGB candidates successful in the works council elections.⁵¹ Once again, the Union appealed to the administration, but received no satisfaction. It was belatedly realizing that its efforts were becoming increasingly futile.⁵²

There was no unanimity in labor ranks regarding the policy that should be pursued as a result of the illegal Nazi acts. In a book of doubtful reliability, Hermann Seelbach, head of the ADGB training school of minor union functionaries, and secretly a Nazi Party member, reveals that among his students there was as little agreement as at the top level. A large group favored yielding to the Nazis (an attitude prompted by Seelbach himself), a second smaller group counseled a "let us wait and see" attitude, and only a small group advocated illegal anti-Nazi action. The groups engaged in constant discussions on the future role of the unions, but the decision was not in their hands; it rested with the Union Executive. Yet, at Executive meetings the debates merely centered on methods of countering individual Nazi attacks. Broader issues and policies were rarely touched upon, according to Seelbach, chiefly due to the lack of knowledge of government plans.⁵³

Apparently the majority of Union leaders, partly under the influence of Seelbach and other minor chieftains, who later revealed themselves as NSDAP members, did favor a compromise with the Nazis. Accordingly, at the demand of the ADGB, Professor E. R. Huber, an associate of Hitler's advisor Carl Schmitt, drafted a document on the future legal position of the organization. It recommended the recognition of the unions in the state and, simultaneously, their transformation into public legal bodies by a coordination (*Zuordnung*) with the Third Reich.⁵⁴

The unions also attempted to clarify their precarious position by engaging in discussions with Nazi representatives. Since Minister of Labor Seldte and other conservative cabinet members no longer held any influence over Hitler, the unions were forced to negotiate directly with the National Socialist Shop Organization (NSBO). A conference was thereupon held on April 5 between leading ADGB and NSBO staff officials. NSBO chief Bruckner took the initiative. He outlined the Nazi program, and revealed that the government intended to form a unitary labor organization, headed by an appointed leader, and would regulate wages and prices. Bruckner asked for the resignation of the ADGB President. Labor officials Leipart, Grassmann, Eggert, and Leuschner retorted that the unions had fought a valiant struggle in the past to obtain their goals, and could not agree to the arbitrary appointment of a new leader. Leipart refused to resign from his

⁵¹G-Z, April 1, 1933, p. 205.

⁵²The persecution of the unions is revealed by the number of protest notes sent to Berlin Police Commissioner Diels and to top Nazis: March 11, 13, 15, 20; April 6, 10, 26, and 28. ADGB Correspondence File, Washington, D. C.

⁵³Seelbach, *op. cit.*, pp. 23, 26.

⁵⁴Frey, *op. cit.*, p. 116.

post, still under the illusion that he could save the unions from extinction.⁵⁵

On March 28, a week before this conference, the AfA Executive gave indications of yielding to the government by evolving reorganization plans.⁵⁶ On April 6, however, the ADBB Executive (Federation of Civil Servants) agreed to disband its organization before any further administration measures would crush the labor movement.⁵⁷ The ADGB continued its precarious existence, even though its leaders, once active in the SPD or in the international labor movement, were resigning.

The methodical pressure on organized labor increased. The government decreed that May First, a holiday traditionally celebrated by the forces of the Left, would be a "National Labor Day." Apparently, this was a calculated Nazi maneuver to win the allegiance of the workers to the fascist state. Simultaneously, plans were made to crush the free labor movement the day after the celebration. NSDAP chief Joseph Goebbels records that on April 17 he discussed with Hitler plans for May Day and the seizure and occupation of trade union buildings on May 2. Goebbels foresaw the possibility of a few days of struggle.⁵⁸

On April 15, the ADGB Executive asserted that it welcomed the government's May Day decision. The declaration left up to the members the question of whether to participate in the official demonstrations. After pressure reportedly was exerted by other trade union organizations, the ADGB Board issued a declaration on April 19 requesting the members to participate "for the honor of creative labor, for the complete incorporation of the working masses into the state."⁵⁹ The manifesto represented a clear-cut capitulation to the fascist government, and was followed by the Nazi-sponsored May Day demonstrations.

A few columns appeared in the official Union journal which compromised even with the Nazi ideology. In its final issue, an article welcomed the May Day and the 'socialist' principles embodied in National Socialism. The article read in part:

We certainly need not strike our colors in order to recognize that the victory of National Socialism, though won in the struggle against a party which we used to consider as the embodiment of the idea of socialism (SPD), is our victory as well; because, today, the socialist task is put to the whole nation.⁶⁰

Even this last desperate effort to save the Union failed completely. For the Nazis, a compromise with the trade unions was out of the question. The democratic labor movement, a potential opposition in a totalitarian state, had to be destroyed. Accordingly, the day after 'National Labor Day,' Un-

⁵⁵*Ibid.*, pp. 116-117. A record of this meeting did not appear in Union or Party journals.

⁵⁶G-Z, April 1, 1933, p. 207. President Aufhäuser thereupon resigned his post.

⁵⁷G-Z, April 15, 1933, p. 239.

⁵⁸*Vom Kaiserhof zur Reichskanzlei* (München, Zentralverlag der NSDAP, 1934), p. 229.

⁵⁹Frey, *op. cit.*, p. 120; Seelbach, *op. cit.*, p. 29.

ion leaders Leipart, Grassmann, Wissell, and numerous others were arrested by the Nazis, and on May 13 all union property was confiscated.⁶¹ The Christian and Liberal trade union organizations also were subsequently suppressed. A new Nazi Labor Front was created which remained in power until Germany's defeat in World War II.

A fundamental question must be posed. Why did eminent labor leaders, holding socialist convictions in the 'twenties, attempt to compromise with the Nazis during the initial months of the Hitler era?⁶² Several factors may have had a bearing on the course of action chosen by these men. The Depression demoralized the labor movement both physically and psychologically. The faith in socialism of some leaders gradually receded and was being replaced by a stress on nationalism, which could have led to an ideological capitulation to the Nazis. Moreover, the leaders expected the Nazis to spare their movement, painfully nurtured through bitter struggles, from the totalitarian web. But they failed to foresee the ruthlessness of the new policy, its drive toward total elimination of the democratic institutions, and its opposition to any non-fascist ideologies. The labor officials were not the only ones, however, to have lacked this vision. The burden of guilt must be placed on most leaders of the democratic groups, since few had the courage to oppose actively the National Socialists at the critical hour.

It was not always so. During most of the Weimar era, the Union, in cooperation with the Social Democratic Party, was able to wield considerable power within the state machinery. It served as a potent weapon for the protection of the Republic against internal and external onslaughts. Only when the fragile democratic structure began to decay from within, did the Union, as a major national institution, gradually lose its power to act. When the crisis came, neither the democratic régime nor the free labor movement had the strength of will to cooperate any more in halting the plunge into the abyss. In this failure to act lay the tragedy of Germany.

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⁶⁰G-Z, April 22, 1933, p. 259. It is a disputed question whether this article, signed by Walter Pahl, was inspired by Leipart. One further example of the trend toward Union capitulation is a letter to Police Commissioner Diels, dated April 25, 1933 (ADGB Correspondence File, Washington, D. C.). The letter from ADGB headquarters noted that a copy of an article to appear in the May issue of the G-Z would be delivered to Diels. The opinions in the article, the letter continued, would be shared by a large number of the younger generation, and the article should be submitted to several NSDAP members for their reaction. (The May issue, of course, never appeared.)

⁶¹Anderson, Evelyn, *Hammer or Anvil: the Story of the German Working-Class Movement* (London, Gollancz, 1945), p. 155. *Le Temps*, May 4, 1933, an independent French newspaper, commented bitterly on the failure of the trade unions to counter the rise of Hitler, thereby ending the influence of the Social Democratic working masses in Germany.

⁶²It must be emphasized that many other union officials and members played a heroic role in the resistance movement against Hitler in the following years.

THE *DEUTSCHE VOLKSLISTE* IN POLAND 1939-1945

by Robert L. Koehl

HITLER went to war with Poland ostensibly to save the Germans living there from martyrdom. The "intolerable" position of the seven or eight hundred thousand Germans (*Volksdeutschen*) in Poland in 1939 was partially created by Hitler himself with his demands for Danzig and a radical redefinition of German-Polish relations shortly after Munich. Nevertheless, the real precondition for the oppression and victimization of the German minority of Polish citizens was the whole secular demographic trend in Eastern Europe, which has been termed "the German withdrawal from the East."¹

Differential birthrates and differential migration had favored the Poles in the Kingdom of Prussia even before the *Reichsgründung*. Polish nationalism fed upon this decay of a ruling class in the decades before 1918, and when the victors of 1918 helped the Poles to a sizable state, the doom of German culture within the Polish frontiers was all but assured. The German minority lost the backbone provided by the Prussian state. By legal and extralegal pressures the dominant economic position of the ethnic Germans in the agriculture and commerce of western Poland was destroyed in the 1920's, and German emigration was systematically encouraged. By the thirties the Germans in Poland had been weakened enough for the authoritarian Warsaw régime to feel safe in reaching a *modus vivendi* agreement with the new German authoritarians. For nearly five years German-Polish relations took the form of a grudging coexistence and cautious cooperation against Bolshevism.²

Meanwhile Hitler began to draw together the organizational threads which still bound the ethnic Germans of Poland to the Reich. By 1938 Hitler had built up a fifth column system (the *Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle*) which was complete master of the ethnic German organizations in Poland. The German government could and did turn ethnic German demonstrations and provocations on and off in Poland to suit its foreign policies. Never given to much restraint with reference to the Germans, the Polish populace turned in fury on a not entirely guiltless German minority, as the mirage of a German-Polish alliance against Soviet Russia faded into the realities of Nazi-Soviet collaboration.³

In attacking Poland Hitler in fact precipitated the torture and death of thousands of border Germans whom the Poles forced to march into the interior under unspeakable conditions. But this fact was quickly obscured

¹My estimate is intentionally intermediate between Polish and German claims and is limited to clear-cut types. It assumes 3-400,000 in the province of Posen, and roughly 100,000 in West Prussia, Eastern Upper Silesia. Central Poland (*General-Gouvernement*) and in Soviet-occupied Poland. For the demographic trend, see E. M. Kulischer, *Europe on the Move* (New York, 1948), p. 164 and J. M. Winiewicz, *The Polish-German Frontier* (London, 1944), pp. 7-9.

²Kulischer, pp. 133-136. See also L. B. Namier, *Diplomatic Prelude 1938-1939* (London 1948) pp. 7-45.

by the overwhelming success of German arms in "liberating" Danzig and all the old Prussian areas of Poland. Thousands of Poles fled or were driven from their homes in these provinces during the military action and immediately thereafter, leaving the ethnic Germans in complete command of the scenes of their humiliations and defeats of twenty years. With the aid of the military commanders of the re-created but short-lived *Ober Ost* occupation régime, the local Germans seized Polish farms and workshops, deporting and "punishing" the owners with lynch justice. In the confusion even some ethnic Germans found themselves deported eastward by zealous neighbors and *Wehrmacht*.⁴

But these actions too were largely Nazi-controlled demonstrations, to be turned off in favor of *Ruhe und Ordnung* with amazing rapidity. Hitler hoped by fighting a war of limited objectives, followed by very definite annexations, to extort a peace settlement from France and England; as early as October 8 Hitler had made his annexations in the Corridor, the Posen district south of East Prussia, and in eastern Upper Silesia. As a result, the ethnic Germans found themselves no longer encouraged to commit wildcat evictions of Poles but were themselves subject to scrutiny and new controls. The form this scrutiny and control ultimately took was called the *Deutsche Volksliste* (the German Nationality List), often alphabetized into "the DVL."⁵

Hitler's plans for Poland foresaw nothing less than a turning of the demographic tide in the east in favor of Germanism by means of a vigorous resettlement program. Not merely systematic eviction of Poles, but the settlement of Reich Germans from the overcrowded southwest, as well as ethnic Germans from North and South America was contemplated. Furthermore, the recently delivered ethnic Germans of Danzig and Posen were almost immediately saddled with the care of the 60,000 Estonian and Latvian Germans "rescued from Bolshevism" by the *Führer* who had sold their homelands to the same Bolsheviks. Another 128,000 ethnic Germans poured back into the annexed Polish provinces from Soviet-annexed Polish Wolhynia and Eastern Galicia. Clearly, the original German inhab-

⁴Basic decrees on the *Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle*: July 1938, Nuremberg document NG 4948, exhibit 1303 in U. S. Military Tribunal Case 11, document book 72-B; February 1939, 837 PS, *Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal* (hereafter referred to as IMT) (Nuremberg, 1947), XXVI, 362-64. On intervention: *Documents of German Foreign Policy 1918-1945*, Series D (hereafter DGFP), V, 51-52, 170-71. Polish disillusionment in October 1938: *ibid.*, 107-109. Fury: *Documents on the Origin of the War* (Auswärtiges Amt, Berlin, 1939) pp. 245-78.

⁵Hans Hartmann, *Höllenmarsch der Volksdeutschen in Polen September 1939* (Berlin-Wien, 1940) and *Dokumente polnischer Grausamkeit, herausgegeben im Auftrage des Auswärtigen Amtes* (Berlin, 1940). On Polish flight, property seizure and deportations: Stefan Tadeusz Norwid, *Martyrium eines Volkes. Das okkupierte Polen* (Stockholm, 1945), pp. 36-69, and testimony recorded in the transcript (hereafter T.) of U. S. Military Tribunal Case 8, pp. 872, 876, 894, 1442-3, 1742-3, 3837, 3879, 3902-3.

⁶Hitler's peace plans: Hans Frank, *Im Angesicht des Galgens: Deutung Hitlers und seiner Zeit auf Grund eigener Erlebnisse und Erkenntnisse* (München-Gräfeling, 1953) pp. 373-76. Poland: R. Lemkin, *Axis Rule in Occupied Europe* (Washington, D. C., 1944) pp. 221-222.

itants of Prussian Poland were not going to have the pickings all to themselves.⁶

Hitler's power depended considerably upon his ability to share out the spoils of conquest among a numerous gangster mob. Thus a neo-feudalism developed in Poland, whereby the highly centralized state was divided up among five rival robber barons with differing policies. Albert Forster in Danzig was determined to make the Corridor, renamed West Prussia, German in ten years by adding every conceivable person to the list of Germans by pressure and persuasion.⁷ Arthur Greiser, a Danzig Senator, appointed Govern-Gauleiter of the expanded Posen district, renamed the Warthegau, believed in a rigorous sorting out of self-styled ethnic Germans to destroy the opportunistic or floating segment.⁸ Fritz Bracht and Erich Koch of Upper Silesia and East Prussia were both primarily interested in the industrial and agricultural economies of their new empires.⁹

The fifth robber baron, Hans Frank, had received the scarcely breathing corpse of Central Poland to make of it what he could. On October 12 Hitler had made this region, named the *General-Gouvernement Polen*, an auxiliary area or *Nebenland* like the Protectorate of Bohemia-Moravia, and Frank's orders were to exploit the populace economically. It was to become a Polish-Jewish "pale" or dumping ground. There were relatively few Germans, and they were to be removed to the western provinces. Frank, however, thought of himself as a Renaissance figure, and dreamed of making Cracow the German capital of a rich oriental slave state.¹⁰

Another robber baron had a decisive influence on the lives and fortunes of the ethnic Germans of Poland: Heinrich Himmler. While modestly professing a desire to keep his own organization down to a minimum, the German Police Chief and SS (*Schutzstaffel*) leader began to build up an SS and police system charged with the Germanization of the annexed eastern territories of Germany. Known as the *Reich-Kommissariat für die Festigung deutschen Volkstums* (Reich Commission for the Strengthening of the German Nationality), and shortened to the RKFDV, Himmler's agency began by managing the emergency resettlement actions, turned then to property matters in the annexed Polish provinces, and by the summer of

⁶J. B. Schechtman, *European Population Transfers 1939-1945* (New York, 1946), pp. 38-44, 82ff.; R. L. Koehl, "The Politics of Resettlement," *Western Political Quarterly*, June 1953, pp. 231-42.

⁷On Hitler: H. Rauschnig, *Gespräche mit Hitler* (New York, 1940), pp. 89-93. On Poland as spoils to be divided: testimony of SS General Bach-Zelewski, case 8 (T.) pp. 383-85. On Forster: testimony of Security Chief Hans Ehlich, case 8 (T.) p. 583.

⁸Testimony of Bach-Zelewski, case 8 (T.) p. 394; testimony of Ulrich Greifelt, *ibid.*, pp. 1566-7.

⁹On Bracht and Upper Silesia: testimony of Bach-Zelewski, case 8 (T.) p. 394; on Koch and East Prussia: affidavit of Staff Main Office employee, Erhard Molding, Meyer-Hetling defense exhibit 120.

¹⁰Decree creating *General-Government: Trials of War Criminals before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals* (hereafter referred to as TWC), (Washington, D. C., n.d.), IV, 757-59. See also C. Malaparte, *Kaputt* (New York, 1946), pp. 64-129, and the official publication by Dr. Max Freiherr du Prel, *Das General-Gouvernement* (Würzburg, 1942), especially XV-XX and pp. 27-68.

1940 took up the task of laying down uniform directives on citizenship rights among ethnic Germans. It was to be the Staff Main Office of the RKFDV, headed by Ulrich Greifelt, which drew up the basic DVL decrees of March, 1941 and February, 1942.¹¹

The model from which the general nationality decrees were taken was developed in the Warthegau, where the clearest-cut conditions and the most doctrinaire National Socialists reigned. The decrees annexing Danzig and the Polish territories had specifically left the question of citizenship open.¹² Circulars of the Justice and Interior Ministries of November 25, 1939 provided for the issuance of Ethnic German Passes by local offices of the Interior Ministry (e.g. *Landräte*) on the basis of questionnaires and police investigation. Doubtful cases were to be screened by the *Kreisleiter* (county chief) of the NSDAP, and where he was in doubt, the ministry in Berlin was to be consulted. These circulars thus left the local Germans virtually in charge of their own naturalization. Only general conditions for *Volkszugehörigkeit* (nationality) were laid down on the basis of earlier decrees for the ethnic Germans of dismembered Czechoslovakia: language, education and culture. As a consequence, a chaos of conflicting policies developed even within the one bailiwick of Greiser.¹³

Dr. Walter Gross, one of Hess's protégés, and head of the Party's Racial Policy Office, had drawn up a top secret program for the Germanization of Poland. He had sent his lieutenants, the Party officials, Leuschner and Oppermann, to the city of Lodz, in the southern Warthegau. Lodz had been in Congress Poland and had whetted the German imperial appetite in World War One when Ludendorff had marked it out for future settlement by German veterans. The industrial city had been a textile center; renamed Litzmannstadt, it became a happy hunting ground for German official looting and for bureaucrats looking for office suites. Having no tangled history of pre-World War Prussian citizenship, the inhabitants could more easily be sorted into German sheep and Polish goats, according to Dr. Gross's racial-political theories.¹⁴

Leuschner and Oppermann developed a four-fold classification system for "persons of German origin," which they called the *Deutsche Volksliste*.

¹¹Führer decree creating RKFDV agency, October 7, 1939: TWC, XIII, 141-43; Himmeler's modest program is Nuremberg document NO 3078, case 8, exhibit 21, document book II-B. On the Staff Main Office see the summary in the opening statement of the prosecution in case 8, TWC, IV, 631-33.

¹²Danzig decree, article 2: TWC, XII, 1056-7; decree of October 8, 1939 annexing Polish territory, section 6: TWC, IV, 754-56. A valuable reference on the *Volksliste* as applied to the Warthegau is K. M. Pospieszalski, *Niemiecka Lista Narodowa w Kraju Warty, Documenta Occupationis Teutonicae*, IV (Poznan, 1949).

¹³Greifelt defense exhibit 63 and Hofmann exhibit 47, case 8; on conflicts in the Warthegau: testimony of Hans Ehlich, case 8 (T.) p. 745. In January 1940 Stuckart of the Interior Ministry informed Goebbels that initially a policy of magnanimity was being shown to all applicants for passes, especially in Upper Silesia, to get the indifferents: Nuremberg document NG 295, case 11, exhibit 1348, document book 72-D. Protests about lack of discrimination and unfairness from groups like the VDA (*Verein für das Deutschtum im Ausland*) came to Greifelt's office; see his letter promising review of all passes: Greifelt exhibit 76.

In class one (I) came individuals who were recognized members of the German community in Poland. In class two (II) they put other Polish citizens who used the German language except Jews and "renegades." Renegades were German-speaking people who were pro-Polish or anti-Nazi; they were classified DVL IV. The third category became a catch-all for (1) German partners and children of German-Polish marriages; (2) certain German-speaking Poles; and (3) Polish-speaking Germans. In the latter cases racial criteria were supposed to be significant. Ordinary indices of German ancestry such as birth records and proof of German political and cultural activities were usually sufficient in simple cases.¹⁵

Greiser took over the term *Volksliste* and the Lodz classification system for his whole Warthegau, insisting that DVL membership entail 50% German descent. He set up a three level system beginning at the office of the *Landräte*, where applications and questionnaires were processed; supervision was centered in the three *Regierungsbezirk* DVL headquarters at Posen, Lodz (renamed Litzmannstadt), and Inowroclaw (Hohensalza); policy was to emanate from the office of the Governor-Gauleiter. Only the toughest problems would he refer to the Interior Ministry—or none at all.¹⁶

On May 25, 1940 Himmler submitted to Hitler his own version of Walter Gross's secret memorandum, and on its being approved, arranged for its limited circulation by Ulrich Greifelt, the RKFDV chief of staff. Both Gross and Himmler insisted on a further winnowing of the Polish population to discover "valuable blood" and to divide the numerous sub-nationalities of Poland from each other to hasten their ultimate disappearance.¹⁷ In fact, Himmler had already decreed on May 9, 1940 that his Superior SS and Police Leaders (*Höhere SS und Polizeiführer*) in the northwest, west and south of Germany provide for the care and "Re-Germanization" (*Wiedereindeutschung*) of "nordic" persons of Polish nationality and culture.¹⁸

Himmler's next step was to have a directive prepared which appeared September 12, 1940 providing for the uniform introduction of the *Volksliste* procedure in the annexed eastern territories. Greifelt later characterized this move into already troubled waters as ameba-like on Himmler's part. In

¹⁴The Gross memorandum is quoted from at length in the Judgment of case 8, TWC, V, 91-96. See also testimony of Ehlich on Gross' Party Office (T.) p. 755 and Ehlich's affidavit (concerning Leuschner and Oppermann): Hofmann exhibit 155. For Ludendorff's plans, see S. Grumbach, *Das annexionistische Deutschland* (Lausanne, 1917), p. 24. On "Litzmannstadt" see "The Fate of a Polish City," *The Polish Fortnightly Review*, September 15, 1942.

¹⁵Testimony of Staff Main Office *Volksliste* expert, Kuno Wirsich, case 8 (T.) pp. 267-270.

¹⁶Testimony of Greifelt (T.) pp. 1567-8, 1571-2; testimony of Ehlich (T.) p. 613; affidavit of Warthegau RKFDV employee, Schuetz, Huebner defense exhibit 54. On DVL origins in the Warthegau cf. Pospieszalski, pp. 36-72, excerpts from a contemporary German memorandum showing the variant development in the Posen district.

¹⁷See TWC, XIII, 147-151 for the memorandum and Himmler's arrangements for its secret circulation.

¹⁸Re-Germanization decree: TWC, IV, 762-65. Testimony as to its origin and rationale by SS Racial Office official, G. Pancke (T.) pp. 695-96. and by Staff Main Office employee, B. W. Bethge, (T.) pp. 2165-8, 2189-95. Pospieszalski has documents and statistics on the Warthegau phase of racial examination and selection of Poles: pp. 193-94, 202-36.

his capacity as Reich Commissioner for the Strengthening of Germandom, Himmler ordered that "all offices involved" in his program follow the Warthegau DVL classifications.¹⁹ The result of his intervention was the formal codification of the *Volksliste* in March, 1941 by the Ministry of the Interior in collaboration with Himmler and the Party. Himmler was given a veto on Interior Ministry orders and a Supreme Court was created in his Staff Main Office to handle appeals from the Governor's decisions, to intervene in cases where Berlin felt that regional policies were improper (e.g. Danzig-West Prussia's assimilationism), and finally to handle the classification of the high Polish nobility.²⁰

The arrival at standardized regulations on paper for the classification of the population of the annexed Polish territories in 1941 coincided with preparations for *Fall Barbarossa*, the invasion of the Soviet Union. The need for soldiers and for workers to replace those called into service encouraged the local authorities to swell the third category of the DVL with the very opportunists which Himmler, Gross and Greiser sought to eliminate from Germandom. In keeping with his racial notions, Himmler now ordered a racial examination to be performed on all DVL III's by the "professional racial examiners" of the SS. An immediate uproar resulted in the very areas where marginality played the largest role: east Upper Silesia and in Forster's little Danzig-and-Corridor empire. Production was said to be affected by morale questions and the racial examinations were quietly withdrawn again in practice, though never in theory.²¹

The introduction of the theory of Re-Germanization of nordically-inclined (*nordisch bestimmt*) Poles and the racial classification scheme for DVL III's, though neither policy was very thoroughly exploited, both represent the first signs of an essential departure from the traditional nationalism which led the ethnic Germans of Poland to welcome the Nazis as liberators. Hitler had begun his annexations with a gerrymandering of the western Polish provinces in such a fashion as to tie 60,000 ethnic Germans administratively to seven million Reich Germans in the four *Ostgaue* (even the Warthegau included some old Reich territory). He had followed this traditional irredentism with a bold program of ethnic consolidation via resettlement, which was brutal and inhumane, but was not lacking in common sense. The actual introduction into the annexed eastern territories of about 200,000 ethnic Germans from the Baltic and eastern Poland, as well as several hundred thousand Reich German officials and businessmen, in the years 1940-1941, contributed to an ethos of reconstruction among the local

¹⁹Himmler's directive is included in Nuremberg document 2916 PS, IMT, XXXI, 290-94. Greifelt's comment: (T.) p. 1576.

²⁰The basic law on DVL is in the *Reichsgesetzblatt* for 1941, I, 118. A few small modifications were made in 1942, *ibid.*, I, 51. On the DVL Supreme Court of Appeals: testimony of Ehlich, (T.) pp. 573-76, 609, 612, 622, 653. See also the general directive on the court included in NO 4686, case 8, exhibit 101. document book IV-A. The court met nine times and dealt with 100-200 key cases: Greifelt testimony (T.) p. 1576.

²¹The racial examination order is Nuremberg document NO 4025, case 8, exhibit 102, document book IV-A. See the testimony (T.) p. 609 and affidavit of Ehlich: Hofmann exhibit 155.

Germans which could offset their resentment at failing to rule their own roosts and absorb all the property of their Polish neighbors.²²

The irrepressible optimism of the victorious German year 1940 was fed in Poland by the very potentiality of things there. The Reich had not yet begun to demand anything of its new vassals; indeed it dispensed favors. Even the war preparations of the spring of 1941 and the rear-area conditions of the summer of 1941, though they put a different color on the relations of Reich officials to the ex-Polish provincials, could not offset the second wave of nationalistic enthusiasm at the "Führer's victories" in Russia. Nevertheless, the seeds of deep discontent and distrust, which could be focused on the SS, and on the Berlin authorities, who "did not understand conditions out here," found soil prepared for them in the pseudo-scientific measures for sorting and evaluating the marginal populations of Poland.²³

It is probably some kind of psychological law that people who know they are being examined, sorted, tested and evaluated, experience their anxiety and tension as hostility toward the examiners. Perhaps if the rewards are big enough and near enough, and where self-confidence is supported by the examiners, the anxiety is supportable and the hostility is unimportant. At any rate, something of this kind occurred among the registrants in the German Nationality List. The characteristic authoritarian urge toward elitism made the Nazis distinguish invidiously even between categories I and II of the DVL. Only persons with a record of membership in German defensive organizations of a political, economic or at least cultural coloration, and essentially only those in the *Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle*-dominated organs, could achieve category I. But this category was a prerequisite to Party membership and to valuable official positions such as that of *Landrat* and even *Bürgermeister*. The consequence was endless litigation at every DVL office level, politicking, and corruption, resulting from persons in category II who, with or without prior claims, sought to "clarify" their German loyalties. Though officially a secret distinction, the knowledge of its existence was a social canker. But all these people were essentially loyal, received the same "blue card" with full German citizenship, and were not threatened by the loss of property, in contrast to the people in the third class.²⁴

To be awarded a green card meant becoming *de jure* a second-class citizen. In an environment where a billfold of identification papers was the most valuable human possession, the green pass spelled humiliation and insult and deprivation. As early as the fall of 1939 many partners and children of mixed marriages, conspicuously bi-lingual persons and others of

²²See, for example, pamphlets by Arthur Greiser, *Der Aufbau im Osten* (Jena, 1942) and Walther Kieser, *Der Aufbau im Gebiet um Zichenau* (Berlin, 1941); also the book by A. W. Schürmann, *Der deutsche Osten ruft* (Hamburg, 1942).

²³The former SS Racial Office Chief, Otto Hofmann, testified in case 8 that "people began to fear that a race-war (*Rassenkampf*) would be brought on by the Nazis after the war, in place of class-war (*Klassenkampf*)," (T.) p. 3202. See also Pospieszalski, footnote, pp. 115-6. The differential classification of members of a single family was an evil which the German authorities recognized but could never thoroughly abandon without raising or lowering individuals "unscientifically." *ibid.*, p. 65.

doubtful allegiance had been deprived of their property and livelihood by zealots. Some were deported to the General Government. Gradually the concept of an intermediate category of citizenship on sufferance, on trial, replaced the primitive all-black, all-white notions of 1939. Some of the deported were even returned. When systematic property confiscations replaced unregulated looting, these DVL III candidates found that their status differed from the Poles essentially in their right to maintain a claim, but not to prevent seizure, especially on behalf of resettled "refugees from Bolshevism."²⁵

Ordinarily a DVL III family was not to be driven from its farm or shop, though the property remained legally confiscated. But this was little different from the fate of most Polish families, the great majority of which had to be allowed to remain where they could produce for the German economy. Furthermore, the DVL III families and individuals were on principle to be prepared to leave the annexed eastern territories on orders of the district police headquarters "to take up a new life in Germany proper." They could be forced to sell their confiscated property on German terms, "even before their emigration." Their freedom of movement was restricted "in the interests of their systematic indoctrination and consolidation with Germanism."²⁶

DVL III's were granted conditional German citizenship revocable by the state during a ten year period where Re-Germanization seemed to have failed. The Gauleiter-Governor, in agreement with the Superior SS and Police Leader might shorten the waiting period where Germanization seemed to be completed and a racial examination had been passed. The Party, RKFDV officials and police were responsible for the education and surveillance of the candidates. They might be admitted to regular membership in the affiliated organizations of the Nazi Party (Labor Front, National

²⁴The status and treatment of groups I and II of the DVL is summarized in a directive by Himmler of February 9, 1942, NO 4739, TWC, IV, 721-22, but their position antedates even the Interior Ministry decree of March 13, 1941 cited by Himmler. One board of appeal consisted of the *Regierungspräsident*, a representative of the Gau leadership of the Party, the Superior SS and Police Leader, a doctor who was a "racial expert," and two ethnic Germans. A German woman who came before it was granted class II status for having insisted on a German wedding when she married a Polish officer, baptized their child in the German fashion, and educated both husband and child in the German language. The husband was examined racially and given the III category, whereupon he was released from POW status! The same board refused to raise another DVL III to II on the grounds that the family was bilingual and had only begun to use German regularly during the occupation: *Germany: Basic Handbook, Part III, Occupied Europe* (the British Foreign Office and the Ministry of Economic Warfare, 1944), p. 40. In the Warthegau the following totals for each DVL category were reached on March 31, 1943: I: 210,670; II: 192,311; III: 58,325; IV: 21,027; Pospieszalski, p. 259. Danzig-West Prussia and Upper Silesia had quite different proportions, with a great preponderance of DVL III's.

²⁵Testimony of Wirsich (T.) pp. 274-76. See also Himmler decree cited above, NO 4739, TWC, IV, pp. 725-27. On deportation and later return of potential DVL's: NO 5600, an order by Greifelt, case 8, exhibit 797, and Greifelt's testimony (T.) pp. 1742-3.

²⁶All evidence points to the uncertainty of the property status of group III's: affidavit of a Danzig RKFDV official, Franz Vietz, case 8, Huebner defense exhibit 34; affidavit of Staff Main Office employee, Siegfried Golling, Huebner exhibit 50; Judgment, case 8, TWC, V, 148-49.

Socialist Welfare, Hitler Youth) but could not assume leadership there, a possibility for the DVL II's. They were not allowed to be even lower civil servants, positions also open to the blue card. In fact, all positions of trust were to be closed to them: tutor, guardian, curator, employee representative.²⁷

Group III persons could not marry persons in Group IV, Poles, or other aliens (e.g. Jews, Russians). Marriages with Party Leaders, *Wehrmacht* officers, and higher civil servants had to be specially licensed by Himmler's headquarters. All names must be Germanized. They could attend universities and *technische Hochschulen* only by special agreement with the RKFDV. On the other hand, they were subject to the year of labor service and the draft. It is not surprising that countless persons in this category (a) refused to register at all; (b) refused green cards, demanding blue ones; (c) accepted their status until drafted, then changed their minds.²⁸

By 1942, with the pressing need for new military personnel, Berlin was not in a very good position to reject the mass registrations in Danzig-West Prussia and eastern Upper Silesia, but instead the edicts took the form of strengthening police measures against refusal to register, and draft dodging.²⁹ Concentration camp for both parents and removal of the children to a German boarding school was threatened and not rarely carried through, even in cases where "Polonization" seemed very pronounced. In fact, Himmler announced that "resistance to Germanization is a strong indication, where racial conditions are met, of truly valuable human material."³⁰ German population policy, under the pressure of war-time exigencies, and strongly influenced by Himmler's supra-national, racist theories, had gradually turned

²⁷Himmler directive, NO 4739, TWC, IV, pp. 723-24. In Upper Silesia the authorities sought to relax the prohibition on DVL III office-holding, against Berlin resistance; Forster sought to give permanent citizenship to drafted DVL III's, also in vain: NG 3430, a Himmler memorandum of August 1942, case 11, exhibit 1356, document book 72-D. See also testimony of Staff Main Office employee H. J. Goetz, (T.) pp. 971-72, and a letter of June 1942 from RKFDV to Berlin to its Kattowitz branch, NO 4686 (see note 20). Pospieszalski has a very interesting series of letters and orders from 1943-1944 illustrating the resistance of DVL III's and the local authorities to the efforts of Berlin to grant 100 DVL III cases full citizenship: pp. 159-87.

²⁸*Ibid.*, p. 725; on DVL III resistance, see Wirsich testimony (T.) p. 279 and *Basic Handbook*, p. 41. Wirsich wrote a letter to Greiser in May 1943 informing him that the cost of DVL III children's "education" (i.e. when separated from recalcitrant parents) would be met out of their parents' property claims: Nuremberg document NO 2648, case 8, exhibit 112, document book IV-A.

²⁹On *Wehrmacht* application for DVL speed-up, see testimony of Ehlich (T.) pp. 609-10. Forster achieved 600,000 registrants in 1942 by registering whole villages: Z. Kaczmarczyk, *Kolonizacja i repolonizacja ziem na wschód od Odry* (Colonization and Repolonization of the Lands east of the Oder), manuscript, p. 280, seen through the courtesy of the Polish Research and Information Service of New York. See also the affidavit of Staff Main Office employee, P. Dieckmann, case 8, Creutz defense exhibit 24. In Upper Silesia one million registrants were accepted for DVL: *Basic Handbook*, p. 42. See Himmler's decree of February 10, 1942 setting a March 31 deadline for DVL registration, case 8, Hofmann exhibit 189, and an Upper Silesian Gestapo order of April 1942 on DVL III draft evasion: TWC, IV, 733-35.

³⁰See Nuremberg document NO 1669, the files on cases of refusals to register, where not merely concentration camp and a separation of children from parents, but sterilization for 4 and 7 year old children is ordered by Himmler: TWC, IV, 738-41. For Himmler's theory of resistance, see Wirsich's testimony (T.) p. 249.

away from a relatively simple, straightforward notion of imperialist expansion via resettlement into the tortuous by-ways of Germanization. The slogan was, "Save the last ounce of German blood." One illustration of this tendency may be found in the treatment of the Polish sub-nationalities such as Kassubians (West Prussia) and Slonzaks or *Wasserpolen* of eastern Upper Silesia. They were quite uniformly registered as DVL III's and IV's.³¹

Another illustration of this philosophy came with regard to the status and fate of so many Polish intellectuals, death by shooting. Certainly some were killed, and many were among the masses deported to the General Government. Nevertheless, in February, 1942 Himmler found it necessary to issue a long set of regulations for the fourth DVL category. They were *not* to be cut off from the German people, much less lost in the Polish shuffle.

After insisting on the strictest secrecy regarding the use of his own epithet "renegade" in reference to DVL IV's, Himmler distinguished between three sub-classes of this category: biologically inferior and asocial types; politically heavily incriminated persons (participants in economic and political persecution of Germans); and others. The first two groups were committed to concentration camps, the children of political cases becoming automatically wards of the state, pending racial examination, re-education and adoption by German families. The last group was to be transferred to Germany proper, under the close care of the Gestapo, losing all its property except a 2000 Reichmark annual payment from the proceeds. Each family or individual received an adviser approved by the Party. All restrictions on DVL III's applied to this group as well. No specific provisions were made for their naturalization, but Himmler reserved the right to pay compensation for the property seized in the event of complete Re-Germanization. Group IV was found to include a sizeable proportion of downright Polish persons, opportunists, persons so classed against their will, especially in Danzig-West Prussia, non-German family members in mixed marriages, and lastly, a number of DVL III's and even persons in categories I and II who had their own status changed by false allegations concerning Polish connections, *to avoid the draft*.³²

The *Volksliste* procedure was a phenomenon of the annexed eastern

³¹This reversal of policy has been noted in Schechtman, pp. 345-46. On the Kassubians: *Basic Handbook*, p. 41; on Slonzaks, Massurians and Gorals: Greifelt testimony (T.) p. 1567 and *Biuletyn Główniej Komisje Badania Zbrodni Niemieckich w Polsce*. (Bulletin of the Chief Investigating Commission on German Crimes in Poland) (Warsaw, 1947), IV, 159. See also articles in the Ethnic German magazine, *Deutsche Arbeit*, for June-July 1942 by the Superior SS and Police Leaders of Danzig-West Prussia (Hildebrandt) and Upper Silesia (Arlt), Kaczmarczyk, MS, pp. 277-80, and Wacław Jastrębowski, *Gospodarka Niemiecka w Polsce 1939-1944* (German Rule in Poland 1939-1944) (Warsaw, 1946) pp. 252-58.

³²Himmler's DVL IV regulations: NO 3091, TWC, IV, 728-33. On DVL IV composition, see the May 1942 report of a racial commission stationed at Lodz, NO 4743, case 8, exhibit 882 in prosecution rebuttal document book. Nuremberg document R 112 includes an order by Greifelt to SS and Police officials in the Reich proper for the reception of DVL IV's as "Re-Germanizeables" (*Wiedereindeutschungsfähigen*), case 8, exhibit 796. Ehlich pointed out that few DVL IV's left the annexed territories; in other words, they went largely to concentration camps: (T.) p. 753. Himmler had not yet initiated racial examination for group IV's on February 12, 1942: NO 1404, TWC, IV, 779.

provinces, but the Nazi Germanization program was also extended to the population of the General Government. In September, 1940 about 30,000 of the most clear-cut Germans were transferred from the Lublin area to Polish farms in the Warthegau, but about 65,000 more remained in the General Government, to be classified by Governor Frank in his "private" *Volksliste*. There are signs that intimidation had occasionally to be used among some of these "Germans," too. It was not until late 1942 and early 1943, however, that Himmler and the Reich Government began to take a serious interest in looking for "lost Germans" among the people of Frank's realm. The Nazi empire now stretched out to Stalingrad. As a consequence, the General Government no longer seemed so remotely eastern in Berlin, and a scheme was hatched for "encircling" the Polish heartland with German settlements in the Lublin area and Eastern Galicia. Beside settling a token force of new German settlers in these areas of the General Government, mostly left-overs from settlement projects in the annexed eastern provinces, the fervid racism of the SS and police officials assigned the task turned up several thousand cases of *Deutschstämmigen*, "nordicly inclined," but Polish speaking "lost Germans."³³

Unlike the DVL III's and IV's, who at least theoretically were to go back to the Reich, and become thoroughly Germanized in safe surroundings, these families were very definitely expected to remain and become a *Wehrbauerntum*, a kind of peasant militia, to augment and protect the new German settlers against marauding Poles. The imagery of the Roman *limes* was not rarely applied. Unfortunately for the reality, the immediate results of the racial examinations in the General Government was the drafting of the rediscovered nordics, leaving the regions they left in the care of wives and children to the protection of the inadequate German police battalions stationed there to guard against the rising Polish underground.³⁴

An embarrassing situation arose from the Berlin headquarters in March, 1944 when the military evacuation of these *Deutschstämmigen* was ordered. The removal of these people to the annexed eastern provinces seemed the obvious solution in many respects, but Greifelt, Himmler's RKFVD lieutenant, was forced to point out that West Prussia, which had been suggested for them, was particularly bad because Forster "lacked sufficient understanding as to the significance of racial selection" and "might arrive at the false conclusion that in the selection of *Deutschstämmigen* in the General Government, as ordered by the *Reichsführer SS*, more magnanimity was shown than in the selection of the members of group III of the DVL in Danzig-West Prussia." They were sent to the Reich proper, in consequence, in this way,

³³Du Prel, pp. 243-63, 271-79, 297-98, 331, 350-57 (statistics on *Volksdeutsche*). Schechtman, pp. 215-22; *Basic Handbook*, p. 61 testimony of A. Roegner on forced registration (T.) pp. 479-83, 488, 493; testimony of Ehlich (T.) p. 619 and Greifelt (T.) p. 1587. On the "racial determination" of the *Deutschstämmigen* see NO 3210, case 8, exhibit 220, document book V-B, a report of February 1943.

³⁴See the teletype interchange on a massacre of the new "German" village of Cieszyn in the county of Hrubieszow, January 1943, NO 2780-1, TWC, IV, 871-72 and a report by the Governor of the Lublin district, Zoerner, of February 1943: NO 2418, case 8, exhibit 204, document book V-A.

in some cases, escaping the dangers of Polish retribution for "collaborating" with the Nazis, unlike their DVL III confrères in the annexed eastern territories, which were still unevacuated in January, 1945 when the Red Armies moved in. In other cases, forcible repatriation at the hands of the Allies eliminated these "nordics" from the German scene.³⁵

In the last year or so before the Nazi collapse, the DVL III's found themselves confronted with this new terror. It was quite impossible to conceal the fact of one's having had DVL III status in one's native region. And the German bureaucrats' elaborate system of identification papers would make it difficult to go elsewhere without false papers. The Poles openly mocked the DVL I's and II's asking them when they were leaving, according to the reports in Security Police records. The DVL III's took refuge in refusals to answer draft calls, turning in ration books and other privileges in an effort to provide a good mark for themselves on the day of reckoning. Of course, the Nazi answer took the form of "special treatment": concentration camp or the firing squad.³⁶

Since there was never a systematic evacuation by the *Wehrmacht* of the ethnic Germans of the annexed eastern provinces, such as occurred in some parts of southeast Europe, DVL registrants became the tragic pawns of international power politics. The story of their martyrdom is mingled with that of the Germans of East Prussia and Lower Silesia: how they were driven out of their homes without adequate clothing, precisely as the Germans had driven Poles from their homes, and if they were still alive, delivered on the doorstep of the Reich proper.³⁷ The fate of persons in category three remains obscure. Such persons in *Wehrmacht* uniform who were demobilized in the western zones ordinarily had a chance to remain in Germany as displaced persons, if they could avoid forcible repatriation. The great majority of persons in this category could easily live as Poles in Poland if they were permitted to survive. Undoubtedly many were expelled with the DVL I's and II's and are still living in the DP camps of western Germany a life of ignominy and humiliation as the butt of both German and Polish DP hatred. The *Volksliste* and indeed the very term *Volksdeutsch* (ethnic German) has become something to live down.

As to so many other Germans and non-Germans, Nazi hegemony became for the ethnic Germans of Poland the road to destruction. The *Deutsche Volksliste* was only a symptom of the terrible fashion in which common sense gradually departed from the actions and attitudes of every German as the power of the state increased. What began apparently as a

³⁵Correspondence on removal of the *Deutschstämmigen*: Nuremberg documents NG 3310 and NG 3008, case 11, exhibits 1332-1333, document book 72-C; and NO 4004-5, case 8, exhibits 223-24, document book V-B. On failure to evacuate the annexed eastern territories: Schechtman, pp. 361-62.

³⁶Reports on the behavior of Poles and DVL's: NO 4276, case 8, exhibit 363, document book VI-B, and NO 5456, case 8, exhibit 829. Punitive decrees in 1944 for refusal to sign the *Volksliste* or for refusal to accept a green card: NO 1393 and NO 5554, TWC, IV, 735-37. See also Norwid, pp. 365-67.

³⁷P. J. Bouman, G. Beijer and J. J. Oudegeest, *The Refugee Problem in Western Germany* (The Hague, 1950). pp. 1-17.

logical ordering of citizenship rights and a clarification of the red tape and regional variations, soon enough revealed itself as the vehicle of a rabid and pseudo-scientific racism which all but denied the realities of national and cultural difference. The cold demonism of the sorting and classifying mind realized itself most fully in the removal of DVL IV children from their parents, not as a by-product of impersonal judicial processes, but as a conscious program.

The search for military manpower and for civilian labor from 1942 on was combined with an effort to make the demographic statistics correspond to the glowing predictions of 1939-1940 when wholesale resettlement was assumed, with the result that the DVL III category, instead of disappearing, became a vast catch-all. It was this category which both Poles and Nazis despised because its very existence expressed the realities of coexistence between nationalities and cultures. Ultimately, the tendency toward Germanization vastly overpowered the urge to screen and separate out, culminating in the search for "lost German blood" in the Lublin area and Eastern Galicia, only to be inundated in turn by a new wave of Polish nationalist resistance in 1944. Under Soviet aegis the final liquidation of Germanism in Poland became inextricably linked with the surge of Polish power, Polish population and Polish culture into the age-old German lands of East Prussia and Lower Silesia.

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TWO DOCUMENTS ON SOVIET-BULGARIAN RELATIONS IN NOVEMBER, 1940

by Marin Pundeff

WHEN in October, 1940, the German army became lodged in Rumania and Italy launched her attack to occupy Greece in retaliation for his unilateral German move,¹ the position of Bulgaria assumed paramount importance. Already involved against Great Britain in the Mediterranean and North Africa, the Italian generals saw their chances for success against Greece contingent on Bulgaria's participation in the attack. On the generals' insistence Mussolini undertook to secure it. A personal message was sent to the Bulgarian king urging him to avail himself of the "unique opportunity" and thus satisfy the Bulgarian claim to Western Thrace. The Bulgarian king, however, replied that "although he thoroughly understood the advantages of collaborating with Italy, public opinion in his country was such that for the present he could not do anything."² As a result the Italian army undertook the action alone. Owing to inadequate strength, bad weather and terrain conditions, and Greek recalcitrance, it failed to penetrate the Greek defenses and became bogged down all along the front. The adventurous imbroglio was soon compounded into defeat when on November 14 the Greeks seized the initiative and started a counter-offensive which carried the war into Italian-held territory.

The Italian fiasco in the Albanian mountains was not only a severe blow to Axis prestige. Under the guarantees given to Greece on April 13, 1939, Great Britain responded at once to the Greek appeals for help and dispatched air squadrons to Crete and the Greek mainland. Intelligence reports of the arrival of the British units reached Hitler's headquarters in the first days of November. Frightened by the prospect of British raids of the Rumanian oilfields, upon which the German war effort was already heavily dependent, Hitler quickly resolved upon a campaign, via Rumania and Bulgaria, to clean up the situation in Greece. In his November 4 conference on the prosecution of the war Hitler gave vent to his irritation at Mussolini's "regrettable blunder" and indicated that an operation through Bulgaria would be required.³ From the ideas developed at the conference and the subsequent staff work a special directive No. 18 grew out, which Hitler signed on November 12.⁴

To carry out the clean-up operation against Greece, therefore, Germany

¹The circumstances of Mussolini's impulsive decision to retaliate for the German *fait accompli* in Rumania by occupying Greece are related in *The Ciano Diaries, 1939-1943*. (New York: Doubleday, 1946), p. 300, and thoroughly analyzed in Ehrengard Schramm-von Thadden, *Griechenland und die Grossmächte im zweiten Weltkrieg*. (Wiesbaden, 1955), pp. 92-107. Mussolini was a party to the Axis guarantee to Rumania of August 30, 1940, and expected to stay on an equal footing with Hitler in that country.

²Pietro Badoglio, *Italy in the Second World War*. (London: Oxford University Press, 1948), pp. 26-28.

³Führer Conferences on Naval Affairs, 1940, in *Brassey's Naval Manual 1948*. (New York, 1948), pp. 146-149.

needed operational freedom in Bulgaria. Prior to the involvement of Italy in Albania the German plans for the prosecution of the war envisaged no action in the Balkans south of the Danube. The German military regarded the Balkans solely as a "supply base" to be kept at peace and in line by Italy,⁵ while German professional diplomats, allowing for surprises in the area, advocated that in such a contingency Russia and Britain should be left to clash there. Once he had secured Rumanian oil against Russian interference, Hitler himself shunned further involvement in the Balkans and expected the various countries of the peninsula to continue their economic cooperation with Germany on the basis of neutrality or adherence to the Tripartite Pact. His own plans for military activities during the winter of 1940-1941 were to deny the Mediterranean to Britain by closing it at Gibraltar and Suez.⁶ For the drive on Suez, he rather skeptically relied on the Italians; Gibraltar, however, was to be taken by a joint German-Italian-Spanish operation—Operation *Felix*—which was to begin in early January, 1941, and mark the entry of Spain in the war. When Mussolini struck in Greece the entire design fell through although it was several months before this fact became apparent. The Italian adventure and fiasco compromised the Suez campaign and made German intervention necessary both in North Africa and the Balkans; they also encouraged General Franco in his reluctance to join Germany and in making his participation in the Gibraltar operation contingent upon the simultaneous seizure of Suez.⁷ Over and above the collapse of the Mediterranean strategy, the Italian imbroglio in Greece entailed an intensification of Germany's antagonism to the Soviet Union.

German-Soviet relations were already foundering on the issues of control of the interjacent area. The German-Italian guarantee to Rumania and the subsequent appearance of German troops in that country were declared by the Soviet government to be infringements on its interests and violations of the Nazi-Soviet pact. A prolonged exchange of recriminations involving this and other related matters took place between Moscow and Berlin, during which the Germans decided that the best method of attempting a new settlement with Russia was to invite Molotov to a conference in Berlin.⁸

When Molotov arrived in Berlin on November 12, Hitler had already formed his Balkan plans by signing Directive No. 18. The latter outlined the operation as involving approximately 10 divisions which were to be assembled in Rumania for deployment in Bulgaria at an opportune moment.

⁵*Nuremberg Trial Proceedings*, vol. III, p. 311. The final outline of the operation, given the code name *Marita*, was made in Directive No. 20 of December 13, 1940; *ibid.*, vol. XXVII, pp. 336-338.

⁶*Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918, 1945*, Series D, vol. IV. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1951), pp. 516; 529-531.

⁷William L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason, *The Undeclared War, 1940-1941*. (New York, 1953), p. 104.

⁸*Documents Concerning Relations between the Spanish Government and the European Axis*, Department of State *Bulletin*, March 17, 1946, p. 426.

⁹Department of State, *Nazi-Soviet Relations 1939-1941*. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1948), p. 196.

The directive ruled out the possibility of using Yugoslav railroads for moving the task force into position and thus made the whole undertaking contingent on operational freedom in Bulgaria. From the German point of view, therefore, the position of Bulgaria was not a matter for discussion; in fact, in his meeting with Ciano on November 4 in preparation for the conference, Ribbentrop emphasized that no Balkan problems were to be discussed with Molotov since they were internal questions of the two Axis Powers.⁹ However, in his initial conversation with Molotov on November 12, Hitler allowed himself to slip into a dispute over specific Balkan issues concerning, in the main, the matter of controlling Bulgaria.

In the preliminary meeting between himself and Molotov, Ribbentrop outlined a broad program for the talks which had no definite agenda: adherence of the Soviet Union to the Tripartite Pact; definition of spheres of influence among Germany, Italy, Russia and Japan; revision of the Montreux Convention concerning the Straits. In the proposed new partition of the world that Ribbentrop submitted, Russia was to receive the area in the direction of the Persian Gulf and a freer access to the Mediterranean; the German-Soviet Pact of 1939, he said, had "benefitted both partners" who "had together done good business. . . . The question now was whether they could not continue in the future also to do good business together," at the expense of the bankrupt British Empire.¹⁰ Hitler joined the two foreign ministers later that day, commencing with a grandiloquent survey of the world situation. In essence he repeated Ribbentrop's statements but included a few remarks concerning the Balkans obviously intended to pacify Russian fears. Stressing that Germany's interest in the Balkans existed "only for the duration of the war," Hitler assured Molotov that—

Germany had no political interests whatsoever in the Balkans and was active there at present exclusively under the compulsion of securing for herself certain raw materials. It was a matter of purely military interests, the safeguarding of which was not a pleasant task, since, for instance, a German military force had to be maintained in Rumania, hundreds of kilometers away from the supply centers.

For similar reasons the idea is intolerable to Germany that England might get a foothold in Greece in order to establish air and naval bases there. The Reich was compelled to prevent this under any circumstances.

After another sally into global issues, Hitler repeated that "Germany would at once oppose by military action any attempt by England to get a foothold at Salonika. She still retained unpleasant memories from the last war of the then Salonika Front." To Molotov's question as to how Salonika constituted a danger to Germany, Hitler pointed out the "proximity of the Rumanian petroleum fields, which Germany wished to protect under

⁹*Ciano's Diplomatic Papers*. (London, 1948), pp. 405-407.

¹⁰*Nazi-Soviet Relations*, pp. 217-225; facts and quotations hereafter following are from this source, pp. 226-257.

all circumstances." However, he said, "as soon as peace prevailed, the German troops would immediately leave Rumania again."

Molotov declared his agreement in principle with Hitler's mode of thinking but refused to be confined to Asia and clung to European and Balkan issues. The prospects of partitioning the British Empire did not appeal to him, especially since the conversations were interrupted twice by air-raid alarms and on November 13 the Royal Air Force compelled the conferees to seek the safety of a shelter where Molotov caustically remarked that the Germans were prematurely "assuming that the war against England had already actually been won." So he stuck doggedly to concrete issues in the area lying between Germany and the Soviet Union. The German military traffic in Finland caused comment and Hitler acknowledged again that "politically, Finland was of primary interest to Russia and was in her zone of influence" as agreed in the secret protocol to the Nazi-Soviet Pact of 1939, but Germany needed Finnish deliveries of nickel and lumber and safety in the Baltic. As regards Rumania, Molotov emphasized the Soviet interest in the southern part of Bukovina which, he said, had been violated by the German guarantee to Rumania. Hitler then again tried to conjure up the attractions of empire-partitioning but the tough Soviet negotiator persistently brought the discussion back to Balkan matters. The Axis guarantee to Rumania, he said, was aimed against the interests of the Soviet Union "if one might express oneself so bluntly" and should be revoked. Hitler curtly retorted that "for a certain time it was necessary and its removal therefore impossible."

Molotov then turned to the Straits which he called England's historic gateway for attacks against Russia. The situation, he said, was the more menacing to the Soviet Union since the British now had gained a foothold in Greece. For reasons of security the relations between the Soviet Union and the other Black Sea nations were of great importance. What would Germany say, Molotov asked—

if Russia gave Bulgaria, that is the independent country located closest to the Straits, a guarantee under exactly the same conditions as Germany and Italy had given one to Rumania. Russia, however, intended to agree beforehand on this matter with Germany and, if possible, with Italy too.

Hitler dodged the question but Molotov continued to press it, assuring his listeners that "the Soviet Union did not intend to interfere in the internal order of the country under any circumstances. 'Not a hair's breadth' would they deviate from this." Hitler was unable to evade the matter any longer and said that if the guarantee was to be given under the same conditions as the Axis guarantee to Rumania, the question would first arise whether Bulgaria herself had requested the guarantee. He did not know, he said, of any such request and, besides, he could not proceed in the matter without first consulting Italy. In Hitler's view the decisive question was whether Russia saw any possibility of improving her security in the Black

Sea through a revision of the Montreux Convention. He did not expect, he said, an immediate answer since he knew that Molotov would have first to discuss the matter with Stalin. However, Molotov replied at once that Russia had only one aim in view: to be secure from an attack by way of the Straits and would, therefore, like to settle this question with Turkey; a Soviet guarantee to Bulgaria "would alleviate the situation."

In this connection Molotov went back to the question of the Soviet guarantee and repeated that "the internal régime of the country would remain unaffected;" Russia, moreover, was prepared to guarantee Bulgaria an outlet to the Aegean Sea. He was again, he said, addressing to Hitler, "as the one who was to decide on the entire German policy—the question as to what position Germany would take with regard to this Russian guarantee." Molotov's tenacity only caused Hitler to repeat in irritation his counter-question as to whether Bulgaria had asked for the guarantee and his obligation to consult Mussolini beforehand. As a great Danubian power Germany was interested primarily in the Danube and only secondarily in the Black Sea; if she perchance was looking for sources of friction with the Soviet Union, Hitler hinted ominously, "she would not need the Straits for that."

In the final conversation Ribbentrop produced a draft treaty whereby the USSR was to join the Tripartite Pact on the basis of a delimitation of the spheres of influence of each of the four powers. A secret protocol to the pact was to accord to the Soviet Union the unrestricted right of passage through the Straits for its warships at any time, whereas all other powers, except the other Black Sea nations, Germany and Italy, were to forfeit such rights. Transit through the Straits for merchant ships was to remain free on general principles. Molotov reacted to the effect that to the Soviet Union the question of the Straits was crucial and that the Montreux Convention was indeed worthless. Russia's concern was one of securing "effective guarantees;" because of historical experience, "paper agreements would not suffice." Ribbentrop, however, only reiterated the points made earlier that Bulgaria would first have to request the Soviet guarantee, that Germany had no territorial interests in the Balkans, and that her measures there were temporary, dictated by the exigencies of her war against Britain. The two foreign ministers parted on November 13 with the sole agreement to refer the questions raised to diplomatic channels.

The failure of the German-Soviet negotiations confirmed Hitler in his intention to attack Russia. As the Russian emissary was departing from the German capital, oral orders were issued to begin the staff work for a campaign against the Soviet Union immediately following the operation in the Balkans. In further preparation for the events to come, Germany turned to the task of consolidating her continental system by adherences of the lesser European states to the Tripartite Pact. Preliminary agreement had already been reached with a number of countries, Bulgaria included,¹¹ and,

¹¹Franz Halder, *Diaries* (mimeographed copy kept in the Library of Congress), vol.

as General Halder has recorded it in his diary on November 14, a close succession of ceremonies was planned for the week of November 18-25 in which Spain, Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria—in that order—were to make their official commitments.¹² Indeed, according to schedule, Hungary joined the pact on November 20, followed by Rumania three days later. Spain and Bulgaria, however, failed to take the step. In anticipation of the scheduled events and anxious to find out the result of the talks with Molotov, the Bulgarian king rushed to Germany on November 17 to see Hitler.

According to Hitler's personal interpreter, no interpretation was needed at the meeting since the Bulgarian king spoke fluent German and no records were kept of this and other subsequent talks between him and Hitler because the latter "did not seem to want a record of these lengthy political conversations."¹³ It has transpired, however, from indirect sources that on the political side Hitler informed the king of Molotov's views and demands as to a Soviet guarantee to Bulgaria and that an agreement was reached that Bulgaria's official adherence to the Tripartite Pact was not advisable as an immediate step and that it should be postponed until the position of the Soviet Union in relation to the Pact had been clarified and the safety of Bulgaria guaranteed by adequate German concentrations in Rumania.¹⁴ On the military side Hitler set forth his plans for a campaign against Greece which necessitated Bulgaria's cooperation. According to the historian of the German High Command, Helmuth Greiner, who kept the general war diary at the time, the Bulgarian king indicated "in noticeable reserve" that weather and road conditions would not permit the deployment of large forces in Bulgaria prior to the beginning of March and "in general declared that he deemed it of greatest importance not to be burdened with the German preparations on Bulgarian soil until the last moment. He left the question of the cooperation of the Bulgarian army open."¹⁵ As a result, Hitler immediately ordered that two more divisions be added to the task force to be assembled in Rumania.

The position which the Bulgarian king took in his conversation with Hitler was determined by a multiplicity of factors, paramount among which was his fear of bolshevism. In his personal experience this fear was altogether justified for several attempts had been made upon his life by Bulgarian communists. Historical experience, too, existed to remind Bulgarians of Russian policies and ambitions. When in the spring of 1939 the possibility of a joint British-Soviet policy against German expansion still existed and the Soviet Deputy Foreign Commissar Potemkin paid explora-

IV, pp. 235, 245, entries for October 15 and 24, 1940; Cf. Gerhard L. Weinberg, *Germany and the Soviet Union, 1939-1941*. (Leiden, 1954). p. 141.

¹²Halder, *op. cit.*, vol. V, p. 22.

¹³Paul Schmidt, *Hitler's Interpreter*. (London, 1951), pp. 200, 266.

¹⁴Records of the Special Interrogation Mission of the Department of State, 1946 (U.S. National Archives); interrogation of Hermann Neubacher, special German envoy for economic affairs in the Balkans.

¹⁵Helmuth Greiner, *Die Oberste Wehrmachtführung 1939-1943*. (Wiesbaden, 1951), p. 240.

tory visits to Bucharest, Sofia and Ankara, the Bulgarian king hastened to warn Great Britain that he was apprehensive of Russian policy because if Russian troops were to come to the assistance of a Balkan country, they would entrench themselves in bases; Russian help in arms rather than in men would be easier to accept.¹⁶

The Nazi-Soviet Pact of August 23, 1939, however, provided the Soviet Union with legitimate grounds for a forward policy in the Balkans and with Germany's initial acquiescence. In October of that year the Soviet Union proposed a mutual assistance treaty with Bulgaria which the latter declined.¹⁷ However, collaboration with the USSR could not be entirely evaded under the circumstances of the Nazi-Soviet partnership and relations were channeled in the economic sphere. Concern over the political designs of the Soviet Union, which had the powerful weapon of international communism at its disposal, was nevertheless continuous. When the Soviet government resorted to war to force Finland to terms the Bulgarian king pointedly expressed to the Germans "his deep concern over the latest developments in Finland, especially the setting up of a new Finnish government by the Russians" and asked directly what in Germany's opinion Bulgaria should do "if Russia were to raise again the question of a mutual assistance pact and demand possibly the cession of air and naval bases against Turkey." In addition he asked "whether it was not possible, if the Russians should intend to take some action against Turkey, to divert them toward the Caucasus."¹⁸ At this stage (December, 1939), however, the Germans wanted above all to avoid trouble with the Soviet Union and held that their policy was determined by the requirements of the war and their treaties with Italy and the USSR. The Bulgarian king was accordingly told that no aggressive Soviet policy was expected and that, at any rate, any reply to possible Soviet demands for the conclusion of a mutual assistance pact and cession of air and naval bases "would naturally depend in the main on the time and circumstances, especially on whether Bulgaria's national aspirations could thereby be fully realized."¹⁹ Less than a year later, however, the Germans were to reverse themselves completely.

Hitler was not pleased with the results of the conference with the Bulgarian king and uttered his displeasure in a letter to Mussolini on November 20. In it Hitler upbraided sternly his ally for the foolhardy adventure in Greece and drew attention to the adverse psychological and military consequences of the Italian action. The attack, Hitler said, should have been postponed at least until favorable weather and the American presidential election. The psychological effects had been bad everywhere and, among the countries affected, "Bulgaria, which showed little willingness for an ad-

¹⁶*Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919-1939*, Third Series, vol. V. (London, 1952), p. 530.

¹⁷*Nazi-Soviet Relations*. p. 124.

¹⁸*Documents on German Foreign Policy 1918-1945*, Series D, vol. VIII (1954), pp. 484-485.

¹⁹*Ibid.*, pp. 533-534.

herence to the Tripartite Pact, is now completely disinclined even to mention such a step." To cope with the situation Hitler proposed to take a series of steps to (a) draw Russia at all cost away from the Balkans and orient her eastward; (b) come to terms with Turkey in order to relieve Bulgaria from the Turkish pressure since Turkey's stand "will ultimately determine the course of Bulgaria;" (c) obtain Yugoslav indifference or positive interest in the liquidation of the Greek question because "without assurance from Yugoslavia no operation in the Balkans is to be risked;" (d) have Hungary agree to the transport of additional German contingents to Rumania; and (e) make Rumania accept the increase of German troops as being in her own protection. Upon achieving these objectives, Hitler assured Mussolini, Germany would strike with decisive power.²⁰

To Mussolini, who had boastfully said that Hitler would learn from the newspapers about his occupation of Greece, this letter must have been supreme humiliation. In his reply of November 22, he invoked three reasons for the Italian fiasco: (a) bad weather; (b) the wholesale defection of Albanian troops; and (c) "the attitude of Bulgaria which has permitted the Greeks to withdraw eight divisions which they had in Thrace and dispatch them to reinforce those already fighting against us." As to Hitler's plans he gladly concurred.²¹

Outside his personal characteristics which Hitler crudely assessed in animal terms,²² the Bulgarian king's demurring attitude was, as we have seen, the result of cogent considerations. He had accepted Bulgarian-Yugoslav harmony and solidarity as the cornerstone of his policy and would have naturally preferred to adhere to the Tripartite Pact, if he had to, after Yugoslavia had done so. The position of Turkey as a non-belligerent ally of Great Britain was menacing because the Turks maintained a strong army of 500,000 men on the Bulgarian border. Greece, an active ally of Britain in the process of receiving help, was successfully fighting off Italian aggression and had even mounted an impressive counter-offensive. Public opinion at home was ridiculing the Fascist war effort and openly sympathized with the Greeks despite the Bulgarian-Greek grievances and the queen's Italian origin.²³ On the more distant horizon, Britain stood unconquered and behind her America had just re-affirmed her opposition to the Axis Powers by re-electing President Roosevelt on November 5. It is known from the observations of the British Minister to Bulgaria, as recorded by Derek Patmore, that the Bulgarian king hoped for a compromise peace between Germany and Britain through the mediation of America. America, however, was throwing her resources in the scales for a British victory and Germany's

²⁰Klaus Hohlfeld, editor, *Dokumente der deutschen Politik und Geschichte*. (Berlin, 1951), vol. V, p. 257.

²¹*Hitler e Mussolini, Lettere e Documenti*. (Milan, 1946), p. 78.

²²*Hitler's Table Talk*. (London, 1953), pp. 417-418. On April 9, 1942, Hitler described King Boris' temperament and behavior during these events as that of "a fox rather than a wolf. . . . The fox, as we all know, prefers to pursue a course which will allow him. if danger threatens, to eliminate all trace of his passing."

²³Derek Patmore, *Balkan Correspondent*. (New York, 1941), p. 237 ff.

chances for a negotiated peace were, at best, contingent on Soviet friendship and resources. It is not surprising, therefore that the shrewd and calculating monarch, in contrast to the leaders of Hungary and Rumania, turned to temporization.²⁴

The Soviet government was naturally disturbed by the prospects of a Bulgarian alignment with Germany implicit in the king's meeting with Hitler. On November 18 Molotov summoned the Bulgarian Minister and, speaking in a "vigorous yet friendly" manner, made the following statement:

Is Bulgaria too going to join the Three Power Pact? Bulgaria's future is of great concern to Soviet Russia who, because of her historic responsibilities, wants a strong Bulgaria. The Soviet Government is of the opinion that Bulgaria should achieve her national aims against Turkey, Yugoslavia and Greece. It had said as much to Hitler. The Soviet Government is ready to give every assistance to Bulgaria. It will also support the present Bulgarian régime and the Czar (Boris), whom it considers to be intelligent and loyal. But the Bulgarian Government must inform him of its ties with Italy and Germany. If there is any question of a guarantee it will also be given by the Soviet Government.²⁵ Bulgaria had clearly become the focal point of German-Soviet rivalry.

Both powers were pressing her to commit herself to a definite alignment to one implicitly against the other. The Soviet step which directly led to the King's final choice was taken on November 25. On that day the Soviet government directed simultaneous proposals to both Bulgaria and Germany, the object of which was to place Bulgaria in the Soviet sphere of influence.

The Soviet *démarche* before the Bulgarian government was made by the secretary-general of the Soviet Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, Arkadi Sobolev, who was the Soviet delegate to the Danubian conference then in progress in Bucharest. On November 25 he made a side trip to Sofia to deliver the following proposals:

1. Bulgaria and the Soviet Union enjoy friendly relations which are mutually beneficial and have often been tested in practice (as an example the solution of the South Dobrudja question is recalled.)
2. The Soviet Union fully appreciates the interests of Bulgaria in Western Thrace and is prepared to take part in their realization.
3. There are authentic reports that Turkey will offer military opposition to the advance of Bulgaria toward the south and will seek with all forces at its command to prevent the realization of the Bulgarian plans.
4. On the other hand, the Soviet Union is vitally interested in

²⁴The global picture was assessed in a like manner by the ruler of another small European country, Salazar, who became convinced that the war would be long and drawn-out and offered on November 19, 1940, to the Italians to mediate for peace. Cf. R. Bova Scoppa, *Colloqui con due dittatori*. (Rome, 1949), p. 26.

²⁵A Rossi, *The Russo-German Alliance*. (London, 1950), p. 178, quoting an unpublished German telegram of November 22, 1940.

the Straits for the sake of the security of its Black Sea frontier and cannot permit a repetition of the danger which is constantly directed through the Straits toward Southern Russia.

5. In consideration of the community of interest of the Soviet Union and Bulgaria, the Soviet Union repeats its proposal of September 1939 to conclude a mutual assistance pact, which would aid Bulgaria in realizing its national aspirations not only in Western but also in Eastern Thrace.

6. The Soviet Union is opposed in principle to unilateral guarantees which emphasize the inequality between the two participants. Therefore, it proposes to Bulgaria a mutual assistance pact.

7. Under this pact the Soviet Union undertakes to render to Bulgaria every kind of assistance, including military, in case of threatened attack on Bulgaria by a third Power or a combination of Powers.

8. Bulgaria undertakes to render assistance to the Soviet Union in case there should arise a real threat to the interests of the Soviet Union in the Black Sea or in the Straits.

9. The pact of mutual assistance between the Soviet Union and Bulgaria cannot in any case affect the internal régime, the sovereignty, or the independence of Bulgaria.

10. If there should be a threat of attack on Bulgaria or an actual attack by Turkey, the Soviet Union will assist Bulgaria with all means and support it in the realization of the well-known claims of Bulgaria in the European part of Turkey.

11. The Soviet Union is prepared, by means of a loan, to render suitable aid to Bulgaria in money, food, arms, and materiel, should Bulgaria need them. At the same time the Soviet Union is prepared to expand its purchases of Bulgarian goods.

12. The objections of the Soviet Union to the adherence of Bulgaria to the well-known Three Power Pact will be dropped on condition that the mutual assistance pact between the Soviet Union and Bulgaria is concluded. It is entirely possible that the Soviet Union will in this case adhere to the Three Power Pact.²⁶

The proposals showed that the Soviet Union wanted at all cost to outbid Germany in the gains promised to Bulgaria in exchange for her cooperation. Both powers promised Western Thrace as a region on which Bulgaria had generally recognized claims. However, the Soviet Union also promised Eastern Thrace in order to create a Soviet-Bulgarian community of interest against Turkey. Significantly, the Soviet government was prepared to drop its objections to the eventual adherence of Bulgaria to the Tripartite Pact if a Bulgarian-Soviet mutual assistance pact was concluded first and, indeed, the Soviet Union was inclined under such circumstances to adhere to the pact.

In the evening of the same day (November 25) Molotov handed the German ambassador in Moscow the text of the Soviet counter-proposals concerning the questions discussed during the Berlin conversations of November 12-13. Accordingly, the Soviet government was prepared to ac-

²⁶Unpublished. In the author's possession.

cept the German draft of a Four-Power Pact "regarding political collaboration and reciprocal economic support" subject to four conditions: (a) that Finland was restored to Soviet influence as provided by the Nazi-Soviet Pact of 1939; (b) that Bulgaria concluded a mutual assistance pact with the USSR and Soviet security was assured "by the establishment of a base for land and naval forces of the USSR within range of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles by means of a long-term lease;" (c) that "the area south of Batum and Baku in the general direction of the Persian Gulf was recognized as the center of aspirations of the Soviet Union;" and (d) that Japan renounced her rights to concessions for coal and oil in Northern Sakhalin. By a separate protocol Germany, Italy and the USSR were to agree to "work out and to carry through the required military and diplomatic measures" in case Turkey refused to join this Four-Power Pact.²⁷

Condition "c" of the Soviet counter-proposals met squarely the German plans to divert Russian energies toward the Persian Gulf and condition "d" involved a matter of the Far East which Germany would hardly have allowed to create difficulties and which was in fact amicably settled between the USSR and Japan on April 12, 1941.²⁸ The matters at issue between the USSR and Germany were consequently embodied in conditions "a" and "b". This fact was subsequently confirmed by Hitler in a letter to Mussolini on December 31, 1940:

In fact, only the problems of Finland and Constantinople divide us. In regard to Finland, I do not see any difficulty because fundamentally we do not consider Finland as belonging to our zone of interests and only wish that another war does not occur there.

In regard to Constantinople, it could not be in our interest to give Bulgaria in the hands of bolshevism or the Straits themselves. But even there a solution could be found with a little good will to avoid the intolerable and facilitate the attainment of what is justly desirable.²⁹

Despite these late elaborations, Hitler had already made up his mind to wage war against the Soviet Union and left the Soviet counter-proposals unanswered. The Bulgarian government, however, could not afford such a course and on November 30 made its reply known. As the German Minister in Sofia reported it to Berlin—

This afternoon the Foreign Minister requested the presence of the Russian Minister so as to present him with the reply of the Bulgarian Government to the offer dated November 25th. He informed me that he had told him the following verbally:

Bulgaria desires to foster friendly relations with Russia and has followed this policy since the end of the World War. She has suffered so much in two losing wars and in the post-war periods that it is the duty of the (Bulgarian) Government to protect the country from a new war. It is true that the Bulgarian people have their national ideals, but

²⁷*Nazi-Soviet Relations*, pp. 258-259.

²⁸*Ibid.*, p. 322.

²⁹*Hitler e Mussolini, Lettere e Documenti*, pp. 85-87.

even the Dobrudja (incident) showed that this could be realized in a friendly manner. As long as Bulgaria tries to achieve peacefully her claim to a revision of the western part of Thrace, there exists no Turkish danger. The Turks have repeatedly given their peaceful assurances to this and the latest was on the very day of the Russian offer. Should Bulgaria conclude an assistance pact with Russia, Turkey would regard this as an unfriendly act.

Bulgaria must avoid anything which could involve her in extensive policy problems. The question of the Straits does not directly involve Bulgarian interests. If Bulgaria were to take an interest in it, she would always have to be alert. The people, therefore, would observe in the agreement an ever present danger of war.

There would also be another obstacle. Bulgaria is negotiating with Germany regarding the Tri-Pact, but as yet has not signed it. Basic agreement having already been reached before the Russian offer. Should Bulgaria now enter into negotiations with Russia, this would reflect on Bulgaria's integrity as regards a state friendly to Bulgaria and Russia.

The fact that the Russian Government is considering the possibility of entering the Tri-Pact proves that Bulgaria has undertaken nothing against Russian interests. She hopes that this sincere presentation of the Bulgarian standpoint will receive understanding in Moscow.

The Russian Minister stated that these views which Popoff tells me were unanimously accepted by all the Ministers yesterday would be transmitted to Moscow. Moreover, the Minister expressed surprise at the Bulgarian statement and about the leaflets which were scattered here. The Minister decided to report this. Only a few individuals knew of the proposal and what is more they were only informed yesterday. To the Minister's remarks that in any case the Embassy was not indiscreet, the Minister replied that undoubtedly the leaflets originated with the Communists here and asked for an investigation as to where they had acquired their knowledge.⁸⁰

Soviet use of fifth column tactics, discussed in the final paragraph, was one of the things dreaded most in any dealings with the USSR. Fearful of the consequences of any association with the Soviet Union, the Bulgarian government turned down the Soviet proposals in their entirety. The alternative it embraced was association with Germany.

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⁸⁰Unpublished telegram of the German Minister to Sofia of November 30, 1940. In the author's possession.

POLAND, 1950 - 1954

"NEW COURSE" OR "NEW LOOK."¹

by M. K. Dziewanowski

1. *The Party and the Plan*

THE Unification Congress of the Polish Workers' Party and the Polish Socialist Party (December 1948) opened a new era in the history of Poland. Soon after the Congress the Party embarked upon several ventures of impressive scope, such as the revised Six-Year Plan, which implied rapid collectivization, the reform of education, and a struggle with the Roman Catholic Church. In order to achieve these tasks the Party has energized the state agencies for mobilizing the human and material resources of the country and for carrying on the relentless transformation of the social, economic and cultural pattern of the country. The Party has been the driving force which imparted direction and purpose to the work of the State apparatus.

Since 1948 the process of interpenetration of State and Party has been speeded up, and, consequently, the Party has tightened its supervision over the State apparatus. While some of the Party bureaus and departments deal mainly with internal problems, the majority correspond to various ministries. In fact, no minister may make a major decision without the previous agreement of the corresponding organs of the Politbureau. The Six-Year Plan, for instance, was first approved by the Politbureau before it was adopted by the *Sejm*. The Constitution of 1952 was published only after it had secured the approval of the Politbureau as being "in accordance with the Party policy."

From 1949 on, the executive organs of most of the outwardly non-political organizations, such as Trade Unions, the Peasant Self-Help Association, the Women's League, the Union of Fighters for Freedom and Democracy, the Polish-Soviet Society, and various professional associations, were gradually taken over by members of the Party and increasingly used as "transmission belts" and instruments of speeding up the fulfillment of the Six-Year Plan. The methods of influencing these bodies by the United Workers' Party were formulated by the Party Rules. The Rules provide for the establishment of party cells inside various mass organizations in order to "carry out the policy of the Party, enhance its influence and authority, and expand the activities of the masses for the implementation of aims set by the Party."

The truly mystical aura created around the Plan affected all areas of Party activity, including its personnel policy, where training of the cadres has been increasingly stressed. The Plan which provided for an average

¹This paper is based on the last chapter of a larger project entitled "The Communist Party of Poland, An Outline of History." The research for this project has been supported by the Russian Research Center of Harvard University. The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance granted him by this institution.

yearly increase of from eleven to twelve percent in the nation's output and the annual production growth of Socialist industry by about twenty per cent confronted the Party with a truly superhuman task. In attempting to complete this second social and economic revolution, the Party had ruthlessly to mobilize every ounce of the country's energy and tighten the straight jacket in which it has kept the nation ever since 1948. By the summer of 1950, the original, already rather ambitious, targets of the Plan were markedly increased, apparently under Soviet pressure. The final Plan, adopted at the Fifth Plenum of the Party's Central Committee (July 1950) contained substantially higher objectives to be attained by the end of 1955: 4,600,000 tons of steel; 100,000,000 tons of coal, and 19,300,000,000 kwh of electric power.² The revision of the Plan followed a prolonged visit of its chief architect and Poland's economic boss, Hilary Minc, in Moscow, where he was promised more "fraternal aid" and signed an intricate commercial agreement to last for eight years.

In his exposé given to the Fifth Plenum, Minc proposed that the revised goal be attained by discarding "cautious methods of planning" and introducing "the Bolshevik approach" to planning, management, and production, as well as the Stakhanovite methods of labor competition and the principles of Socialist emulation. "Utilization of hidden reserves" of manpower and raw materials was coined as a new battle cry. The fulfillment of planned industrial objectives has become the main preoccupation of the Party and the Party-controlled administrative apparatus.

The launching of the Six-Year Plan created an atmosphere which resembled, to some extent, that which prevailed in the Soviet Union during the first two Five-Year Plans. Although popular enthusiasm for the Plan has been largely dampened by the realization that the Soviet Union benefits as much from Poland's progress as does Poland herself, and that the Plan is largely determined by the military requirements of the Soviet Union, the industrial achievements of the régime have been considerable. As an emigré economist rightly pointed out, the feeling of revulsion at Soviet economic exploitation and at the harsh methods of enforcing the will of the Party has existed alongside the awareness that Poland's growing industrialization is a valuable byproduct of the Plan. Most of the peasants recruited from the villages for factory work are inclined to feel that they are gaining socially by joining the privileged urban proletariat. Moreover, their economic status tends to be improved and new prospects are opened to them. The urban working class, which now constitutes more than half of the population, becomes proud of the new mines and factories. Many young people believe that, at the cost of immense privations, they are laying the foundations for the future prosperity of their country.³

As a result of the Six-Year Plan Poland is being converted into an im-

²For an outline of the revised Plan and a discussion of the Fifth Plenum, see *Nowe drogi*, July-August, 1950. The original targets announced at the Unification Congress were: steel—4,000,000 tons; coal—95,000,000 tons, electric power—18,000,000 kwh.

³J. Wszelaki, "The Rise of Industrial Middle Europe," *Foreign Affairs*, October 1951.

portant industrial power, the per capita production of which has already exceeded the corresponding output of Italy and is rapidly approaching that of France. The progress, impressive as it is, sadly neglects the standard of living of the population, which has been gradually lowered to the Soviet level. From the beginning of the country's reconstruction agricultural output has lagged behind industrial production. Moreover, neglect of food production was one of the most striking features of the Plan.

Six months after the Moscow imposed revision of the Plan, the Party realized that it could not carry on the gigantic task without new sacrifices which would require the substantial support of the entire nation. Moreover, of the expected \$600 million loan from the International Bank, only \$120 million materialized. To get machinery from abroad more food had to be exported and this depressed the already pitifully inadequate standard of living. On the occasion of the Plebiscite of Peace, initiated in 1951, a new slogan, that of National Front, was first coined by the Chairman of the Party's Central Committee and President of the Republic, Bolesław Bierut. The slogan has been connected with the Six-Year Plan, with the problem of Poland's western frontiers, and with the U. S. sponsored remilitarization of Germany. In February 1951, Bierut declared:

"We realize more and more clearly that every single man, each and every one of us, must continue the struggle for peace and that it should become part of the everyday toil of the entire nation, the very essence of its labor. It is obvious that the fight for peace must be carried on on a wide front with the entire nation participating in it. We vividly recall the horrors of the last war. We remember only too well the inhuman faces of Hitlerites who are at present the protégés of the U.S.A. They are reaching with their greedy claws not only for our Western Territories, but for the entire country, which they would like to trample with their boots. . . . Is there one honest Pole who would hesitate to take a courageous and unequivocal stand with regard to those criminal plans? Is there any other answer than a further tightening of our ranks on our National Front in the struggle for Peace and for the Six-Year Plan?⁴

Thus, even those who opposed Communism as a doctrine were asked to cooperate with the Party for purely patriotic reasons, for the sake of national solidarity and interest. Consequently, the slogan of National Front became a device aimed at attracting non-Party people towards collaboration with the Party. At the same time, the Party pressed home its argument that the Soviet Union was the sole power that was ready and able to protect Poland's possession of the newly acquired provinces. Exploiting the attachment of the overwhelming majority of the Poles for the Western Territories and the U.S. policy of bolstering the German Federal Republic, the régime stepped up its anti-American propaganda which largely overlapped the attack on the Vatican.

⁴*Nowe drogi*, February, 1951.

2. Toward a Party State

Simultaneously with the launching of the Plan, the top echelons of the government and the public administration underwent a reform. The main endeavor was to reject all western patterns as unsuitable to the needs of a Socialist country, and to introduce Soviet institutions and administrative practice. There has been a marked tendency to expand the existing agencies to create various new offices and to replace the remnants of the non-Communist element by younger and more reliable people. Creation of numerous new ministries necessitated the creation of an inner cabinet, called the Presidium of the Government, which, alongside the State Council, decides on matters of policy. The Presidium of the Government has been composed of the following persons: the President of the Republic, the Prime Minister, the Vice-Premiers, and the Secretary of State for the Presidium of the Council of Ministers—since 1949 all members of the Party.

Simultaneously with these top strata changes, there occurred the less spectacular but perhaps more essential process which transformed the whole internal administrative system of the country. On March 20, 1950, a "Bill Concerning Regional Organs of Unified State Authority" was adopted by the *Sejm*.⁵ As a result of the application of the Bill the democratically elected provincial and local legislative bodies (like village, county, and provincial councils) were replaced by a system of People's Councils. The most important aspect of the Bill lies in the greatly increased powers it grants to the Councils, which have now become the sole organs of the general local administration. By dropping the posts of provincial and local executive officials and corresponding legislative bodies, and transferring their functions to People's Councils, the régime abolished the last remnants of pre-war Polish local government and established a system which closely followed that of the Soviet Union. As in the U.S.S.R., the Councils (Soviets) of the smaller areas are responsible to the respective bodies of the larger areas. At all levels the Councils are permeated by Party activists and ultimately controlled from above by the State Council.

After the reform of the local administration had been accomplished it came time to replace the dated Provisional Constitution of 1947. The Provisional Constitution of 1947 did not reflect the tremendous changes which had taken place in Poland since 1944, but was retained largely as a decorative fig-leaf on the developing totalitarian structure. With the consolidation of the Party rule the need for a constitutional expression of the revolution became more and more obvious. Only July 22, on the eighth anniversary of the July Manifesto of 1944, after a prolonged "general national

⁵For the text of the law see: "Ustawa z dnia 20 marca 1950r. o terenowych organach jednolitej władzy państwowej." (The Law of March 20, 1950, on the Unified Organs of the State Administration"), *Dz.U.R.P.*, No. 14, April 13, 1950; for a detailed and penetrating analysis of the Law see Ralph A. Jones, "Polish Local Government on Soviet Model" in *The American Slavic and East European Review*, February, 1951.

debate," the new Constitution was passed unanimously by the *Sejm* and proclaimed in force on the same day.⁶

The Preamble, which refers to "the experience of the Soviet Union," rejected the principle of the hitherto accepted division of authority into legislative authority, executive authority, and "independent courts of law."

The office of President of the Republic was abolished. The Council of Ministers became an administrative body deprived of most of its political significance. Although the Legislature was declared the highest organ of State authority, this institution has been overshadowed by the State Council, which is composed of fifteen members and acts collectively. Article 25 declares that the *Sejm* is superior to the Council. There is, however, no provision for the revocability of this body or of its individual members. Thus the Council, once elected by the Parliament, becomes independent of it.

The Council, moreover, was given very extensive powers. It nominates the highest officers of the State, including ambassadors. It ratifies and nullifies international agreements, has the right of clemency, and awards decorations. The Council orders elections to the *Sejm*; it convenes the sessions of the Diet; it is endowed with legislative initiative similar to that granted to the Government and the *Sejm* deputies. The Chairman of the Council and its secretaries sign all laws passed by the Diet; the Council may issue decrees which have the force of law, when the Legislature is not in session. The Council declares martial law, orders mobilization in case of war emergency, and, when the *Sejm* is not in session (such sessions are to take place at least twice a year but with no minimum duration mentioned), the Council may declare war as well. Moreover, the Council interprets the laws of the country. In addition, it supervises the net of People's Councils which, according to the law of March 7, 1950, are the sole organs of State authority in villages, towns, districts, and provinces. Consequently, the State Council is in practice the apex of the hierarchy of People's Councils and, according to the letter of the Constitution, the most powerful body of the Republic.

The Government remains a purely administrative organ and its functioning is defined in the chapter entitled "The Leading Organs of State Administration," while the prerogatives of the State Council are significantly enumerated under the heading "The Leading Organs of the State Power." The Government's function is to carry out decisions of the policy-making Council and to enforce the laws passed by the Council and the Diet.

The Legislature is elected by all citizens of 18 years of age and over for a term of four years. The right to nominate candidates is reserved to political and social organizations of citizens. Another article of the constitution stipulates, however, that: "Setting up associations, and participating in associations, whose aim or activities are directed against the political or

⁶For the text of the new Constitution and its authentic interpretation see B. Bierut, *O Konstytucji Polskiej Rzeczypospolitej Ludowej. Konstytucja Polskiej Rzeczypospolitej Ludowej* (About the Constitution of the Polish People's Republic. The Constitution of the Polish People's Republic), [Warsaw], 1952.

social system or the legal order of the Polish People's Republic is forbidden."

Article 70 states that the Church is separated from the State. "Freedom of conscience and religion" is guaranteed by the State, but abuse of these freedoms is punishable. This is a rather enigmatic provision. While one can easily imagine abuse of religious freedom, it would be difficult to visualize abuse of the freedom of conscience.

It appears that the new Polish Charter of July 22, 1952, is largely an adaptation of the basic features of the Soviet Constitution of December 5, 1936: out of 91 articles of the Polish Fundamental Law, 50 contain clauses similar, if not identical, to those of the Stalinist Constitution. The second paragraph of Article 12 of the Stalinist Charter says: "The principle applied in the U.S.S.R. is that of Socialism: from each according to his ability, to each according to his work." The third paragraph of article 14 of the new Polish fundamental law declares: The "Polish People's Republic puts into even fuller effect the principle: from each according to his abilities, to each according to his work." The great idea of Socialism is to be "the final aim of the Polish People's Republic," while in the U.S.S.R. it is allegedly an accomplished fact. As for the difference between the two Charters, the Polish Constitution provides for two "supreme organs of State authority," the Diet and the State Council; these bodies are similar to the Supreme Soviet and the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, respectively. While the Soviet body has two chambers, the *Sejm* consists of only one, as is the case with the Soviet national republics.

The Polish Constitution, however, does not incorporate the provision of Article 126 of the Stalinist Charter, which gives a monopolistic position to the Communist Party; Article 72 of the Polish Charter enumerating citizens' associations permitted by law also mentions political organizations. On the other hand, there is no difference between the Soviet Constitution and the Polish in the definition of the fundamental rights and duties of citizens, such as "watchfulness against the nation's enemies and the close guarding of State's secrets" or "the observance of the Socialist discipline of labor." Another significant difference between the Polish and Soviet Constitutions is that the former does not provide for the nationalization of all means of production. Article 10 recognizes individual ownership of small farms, although "producers' cooperatives receive the special assistance and protection of the State." The right of inheritance is limited to "personal property." The Charter distinguishes between three kinds of property: national and co-operative property; individual property of land, buildings and other means of production owned by working peasants and artisans; and personal property of citizens. No private property has been mentioned.

The passing of the Constitution was followed by an electoral campaign. Unlike the 1947 campaign, the 1952 elections were uneventful and conducted in a rather apathetic atmosphere. The Electoral Law gave the right of nominating candidates for election to the "mass social organizations of the working people." In each district one list, that of the "National Front"

was put forward. The election which took place on October 26, 1952, brought anticipated results.

The opening of the new Diet coincided with another reconstruction of the Government. Józef Cyrankiewicz was demoted to the position of Vice-Premier and replaced by Bierut, who retained the Chairmanship of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party. Thus, Bierut, besides his Party posts, became both chief of the executive and the head of the policy-making body; he is also an *ex officio* member of the State Council, thus achieving a nearly dictatorial position.

The cabinet of Bierut consisted of as many as forty-two ministers, including eight Deputy Prime Ministers, all members of the United Polish Workers Party (U.P.W.P.), except for three from the United Peasant Party. Alexander Zawadzki, formerly one of the six Vice-Prime Ministers, became Chairman of the State Council, and, at least formally, the Head of the State. Thus, as a result of the new Constitution and the new elections, the Party dictatorship was made complete and Bierut became an unquestionably dominant figure within the Party. Simultaneously, an intensive propaganda campaign was put in motion to glorify "the first builder of Socialism in Poland."

Hardly had the new pattern in Poland solidified when Stalin's death occurred. This event and the ensuing jockeying for power caused a great deal of confusion among the Polish Party leaders. At the Eighth Plenum of the Central Committee they promptly accepted "the collective leadership" of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and, fearing to back a wrong horse, refrained from more outspoken political pronouncements.⁷ The May Day Speech of Bierut mentioned no living Soviet statesman. The prevailing uncertainty was deepened after the fall of Beria. On the other hand, the death of Stalin provided for the Party an opportunity to turn the screw of "Socialist competition" still more tightly. This new drive for larger output started with reports from all over the country of individual production pledges to be fulfilled in honor of "the leader of the working class." But neither these pledges nor the propaganda of the National Front could camouflage the deepening agricultural crisis. It became the most serious problem of the régime after 1952.

3. *The Agrarian Crisis*

During the Three-Year Plan (1947-1949) there was no significant attempt to speed up the tempo of collectivization. By the end of 1949 less than 250 "producers' cooperatives" existed in the whole of Poland.⁸ During this initial period the food situation in Polish cities was improving slowly but steadily. Since the food prices on the free market were consistently high the economic position of the farmers was rather favorable. Meanwhile, however, detailed preparations for a collectivization drive were carried out by the régime: Machine Tractor Stations were set up, production of tractors and

⁷For the Eighth Plenum see *Nowe drogi*, March 1953.

other machinery was bolstered, and a considerable amount of propaganda exalting Soviet achievements in the sphere of collective farming was forced on the reluctant peasantry, including numerous trips of selected delegates to visit the Soviet *kolkhozes*.

At the same time a sort of "softening" process was applied to the peasantry. After the end of 1949 the life of the wealthy and middle income farmers became increasingly difficult. In order to drive him into collective farms, the régime tried to deprive him of proper supplies of fertilizers, forbade him to hire outside help, set high delivery quotas, made him contribute about thirty days a year of free labor for his community, and paid him ridiculously low prices for his compulsory deliveries. In addition, state ownership of the Machine Tractor Stations, with their highly differentiated fees for use of tractors,⁹ state control over the flow of supplies to the village stores, managed almost exclusively by the "Peasant Self-Help," plus a differentiated taxation policy administered on a "class basis"—all these measures were designed to undermine the superiority of Socialist farming.

Numerous statements made by Bierut, Minc, and others left no doubt as to the methods used to show the peasant masses the advantages of joining. At the meeting of the Central Committee of the U.P.W.P., Minc admitted that "the criteria of class division in the rural areas are not based solely on the number of hectares which are owned."¹⁰ Roman Zambrowski, another member of the Politbureau, who was for some time in charge of the agricultural program, revealed that "the land tax paid by the poor peasants in our country accounts for 3.5 per cent of their cash income, while 378,000 *kulaks* and the most wealthy middle peasant household pay taxes amounting to 27.6 per cent of their cash income."¹¹ Zambrowski's statement

⁸By the end of 1953 there were 8,054 "producers' cooperatives," with about 11,500,000 acres of land (*Chłopska droga*, Jan. 31, 1954). The rate of collectivization for the past five years has been as follows:

Year	No. of Kolkhozes	Increase
December 31, 1949	243	
December 31, 1950	2,199	1956
December 31, 1951	3,056	857
December 31, 1952	4,900	1744
March 31, 1953	6,253	1767
July 31, 1953	8,105	1852
December 31, 1953	8,054	
March 1, 1954	8,300	295 (246)

According to the above information, all based on official announcements made in the Polish Communist Press, there were over 3,000 *kolkhozes* created in 1953. Bierut stated at the Congress that there were "over 8,000 cooperatives" by the end of 1953. *Trybuna Ludu* on March 1 put the figure at 8,300 as of February 30. Quoted by *Communist Party Congresses in the Soviet Bloc. II. Poland*, N.C.F.E., New York, April 1954, p. 34.

⁹Producers' cooperatives and State Farms have to pay 96 zlotys for plowing one hectare (or 2.5 acres) with a tractor; small and medium farms pay 198 zloty; largest farms, 242 zloty; *Chłopska Droga*, January 24-31, 1954.

¹⁰*Nowe drogi*, September-October, 1948, p. 160; also Zambrowski, "Aktualne zagadnienia Partii na wsi," (Topical Problems of the Party in the Countryside), *Nowe drogi*, March-April, 1949, pp. 100-101.

For a competent discussion of agricultural problems in present-day Poland see S. Gryziewicz, "Rolnictwo" (Agriculture), Special issue of *Kultura*, Paris, 1952, Vol. I, pp. 316-318.

indicates that the régime regards as a *kulak* any farmer who owns more than 10 hectares (about 25 acres) of land. The pronouncement of Minc leaves little doubt that any farmer who shows too much independence toward the authorities may be branded as "kulak," and thus stresses the political rather than economic objectives of collectivization.

The determination of carrying out rapid "socialization" was officially announced by Minc at the Fifth Plenum of the Central Committee of July 1950, devoted to the discussion of the revised Six-Year Plan. Investment in the Machine Tractor Stations was to be increased tenfold. At the end of the Plan the "producers' cooperatives" were to comprise from 20 to 25 per cent of the total cultivated area; together with the State farms the "socialist sector" would then cover about one third of the agricultural land.

The first vigorous collectivization drive was started late in 1950 and lasted until the spring of 1951. The results were impressive: over 3,000 "producers' cooperatives" were founded, mostly in the Western Territories. Dizzy with success, the Party applied pressure on an increasing scale. Strong opposition ensued. The peasants embarked upon a kind of slowdown strike, consuming whatever they could themselves and delivering little to the government. The number of livestock began falling. Alarmingly diminishing amounts of food supplies began reaching the free market, where there was little to be got in exchange. Although the standard explanation on the part of the régime was to blame the drought, collectivization had to be slowed down.

Nevertheless, the drive was more cautiously resumed early in 1952 with similar results. As in the Soviet Union, the political objectives of collectivization were of paramount importance, overshadowing the purely economic goals of the process. Meanwhile the food shortage was growing acute and could no longer be explained away by bad weather.

As early as the Seventh Plenary Session of the Central Committee (June 14-15, 1952), Bierut, while promising the completion of the Six-Year Plan in five years, officially revealed symptoms of an agrarian crisis. Bierut accused the peasants of wilfully upsetting the balance of the whole economic program by their failure to fulfill their part of the Six-Year Plan. The report pointed out that agricultural production had fallen short of the targets set in the Plan, which resulted in insufficient reserves of food for the urban population. This led the government to introduce rationing of food in the towns and compulsory deliveries from the villages. Bierut revealed that a considerable amount of grain had to be imported from abroad. Moreover, he admitted that the management of the state and collective farms had been inefficient. During the debate, it was disclosed by another member of the Central Committee that during the past year the State farms had incurred heavy losses and were unable to deliver their quotas. The full scope of the failure was revealed later when a government periodical stated that after

¹¹For Lasting Peace, September 14, 1951.

¹²*Gospodarka planowa*, (Planned Economy), December 1953.

1950 agricultural production had not increased as it had been calculated in the Six-Year Plan, but had dropped by 0.9 per cent.¹² Since the population swelled during this period by about 1,500,000 and the export of food had to be stepped up to purchase abroad the necessary machines and raw materials, the country's standard of living, very inadequate even in 1950, dropped still further. At the same time an agricultural expert of the Party, J. Tepicht, admitted that the socialized sector of agriculture had produced less grain than the despised *kulaks*. As far as cattle breeding was concerned, small and medium farmers also led the way.¹³

The Plenum showed that the régime oscillated between the desire to speed up collectivization, thus strengthening its political control over the countryside, and the fear of aggravating the critical problem of food supplies, which would weaken its hold on the towns. The growing food crisis has imposed the middle way. *Kulaks* were to be restricted but still tolerated; collectivization was to be continued, although more cautiously. It soon became obvious that the slump in agricultural production was bound to cause a slow-down in the industrial sector, thus undermining the success of the Six-Year Plan and making the idea of fulfilling it in five years illusory.

The agrarian crisis, and especially the food shortage in the cities, has been a characteristic feature of the country's life since the launching of the Six-Year Plan. But only since the end of 1952 have these phenomena assumed serious proportions. The Party realizes full well that solving the crisis is a matter of utmost importance for the régime. This realization coincided with Stalin's death and the initiation of the so-called "new course" toward the farmers and the consumers in the Soviet Union, and ultimately throughout Soviet-controlled East-Central Europe.

The new course was embarked upon in Poland only in October 1953, much later than in other captive countries, and from the beginning has followed a much milder line. The policy was announced officially on October 29, 1953, at the Ninth Plenum of the Central Committee. At the Plenum Bierut proclaimed the necessity of raising the "material and cultural level of the living standard of the masses," and reiterated the régime's desire for the "persistent realization of the Socialist industrialization of the country." Admitting that the present standard of living was unsatisfactory, he explained it by the disproportionate development of industry and the lagging production of consumer goods and food. While the industrial output of the new Poland more than trebled that of the Poland of 1938 and since 1949 increased by 150 per cent, the agricultural production since 1949 rose only nine per cent. The Six-Year Plan, slightly overfulfilled in industry, was twelve per cent below the target as far as agriculture was concerned. To remedy this, investments in heavy industry were to be decreased by about six per cent while investments in other fields were to be increased by about twelve per cent. Nevertheless, said Bierut, "the goal of the new policy [of improving the living standard of the masses] can be

¹³*Trybuna ludu*, December 31, 1953.

achieved only by continuing our general line of industrialization which is directed toward strengthening our defense, increasing the basis of our industrial production, and further expanding our industrial base . . ."

Neither Bierut nor another main speaker, Jakob Berman, gave any indication that the past policies pursued in the countryside would be radically altered. "All the measures we are taking," said Berman, "are a bridge to Socialism, a bridge toward the collective economy."

To remedy the situation, Bierut submitted to the General Committee a lengthy ten-point program of measures intended to induce peasants to increase production. The program provided for:

1. Raising agricultural production;
2. Increase in investments and credits for agriculture;
3. Improvement in work of Machine Tractor Centers;
4. Improvement of branches of industry serving agriculture;
5. Lessening of disproportion between capital goods and consumer goods industries ;
6. Improvement in quality of consumer goods;
7. Improvement and extension of Socialist trade network;
8. Lowering prices of articles of mass consumption;
9. Expansion of housing construction;
10. Further improvement in transport service; development of cultural institutions (schools, hospitals, etc.).

Bierut's plan, unlike those applied in Hungary, Rumania and Czechoslovakia, included no far reaching concessions to the farmers. In addition to his ten-point plan Bierut promised that obligatory deliveries would not be increased along with the planned increase in production of individual peasants. This meant that if the farmer produced more he would be permitted to keep a larger share of his output and sell it on the free market. The second pledge was to increase the flow of consumer goods to the villages and thus to provide the only incentive the peasants could really understand.

The Ninth Plenum launched the new slogan of "rapid raising of the living standard of the masses," and announced the summoning of the Second Party Congress.

4. The Second Party Congress

The Second Party Congress (March 10-18, 1954) opened on the sixtieth anniversary of the First Congress of the Social Democracy of Poland and Lithuania (S.D.K.P. i L.) The Congress gathered over 1,200 delegates, each representing 1,000 members. The Soviet Union dispatched no less a man than N. S. Khrushchev, First Secretary of the C.P.S.U., one of the Kremlin's "Big Four," and, incidentally, the man that had been in charge of the Sovietization of the provinces annexed from Poland in 1939. There were also delegations from twenty-one Communist Parties from all over the world. The "immortal memory" of Stalin was honored by the

Congress who stood up for a minute in silence to commemorate his work.

The Congress was summoned under the slogans "Let's face the countryside" and "we must raise our standard of living," focused around three main speeches. These were given by Bierut, Minc and Nowak. Bierut submitted a report of the Party's Central Committee for the period following the Unification Congress of December 1948. Minc outlined the main economic tasks of the last two years of the Six-Year Plan, while Nowak surveyed the state of the country's agriculture. Much attention was also devoted to agriculture in Bierut's report and in that of Minc.¹⁴ Generally speaking, agriculture was the focus of the entire Congress.

After having proudly reviewed the industrial achievements of the régime and its political accomplishments, the outgoing Chairman of the Party's Central Committee and Premier turned to an analysis of the darkest spot of the panorama. In 1953 the State farms and producers' cooperatives covered less than nine per cent of the cultivated land, and their production per acre was lower than the corresponding average output of individual farms. Bierut admitted that "during the last years Poland was obliged to import a considerable and continuously increasing amount of grain." The number of cattle, on the other hand, rose since 1949 by twenty-three per cent. Cattle breeding (as is well known) is the domain of individual farmers. Bierut reiterated the Party's determination to press toward collectivization. He quite openly said that "In the next two years . . . special attention will be given to a more regular development of producer cooperatives, greater distribution of them to central and eastern provinces so that newly-formed agriculture cooperatives will embrace a greater proportion of the inhabitants of the villages and the old cooperatives will increase the number of their members."

In his speech Minc discussed the Six-Year Plan at length and the tenor of his speech was rather pessimistic. The annual production growth of Socialist industry for the preceding two years of the Plan was to be decreased from about 20 per cent to from ten to eleven per cent.¹⁵ Minc once more admitted that agriculture was lagging behind industry and was repeatedly failing to fulfill the Plan. Grain, previously one of the chief items of export, is now the main difficulty: "The expansion of agricultural production has not only failed to attain the tasks set forth in the Six-Year Plan, but over the past four years has witnessed a number of vacillations and breakdowns. One of the signs of this heretofore unsolved problem is the fact that during recent years Poland has had to import considerable and increasing amounts of grain. One should realize that without a solution of the grain problem . . . there can be no talk of an appropriate expansion of agriculture nor of the appropriate development of the entire national economy for the purpose of a speedier raising of the living standards of

¹⁴For their speeches see *Trybuna ludu*, March 11, 14, 16, 1954.

¹⁵At the Fifth Plenum of the C. C. of July 1950, extolling the "Bolshevik planning," Minc said that the "theory of a declining rate of growth in industry" is essentially bourgeois.

the people." Minc also added that the agricultural machinery and fertilizer industries were still insufficient and that the output of consumer goods "does not catch up with the demand"; moreover, the goods were often of inferior quality. According to the Plan, 25.5 per cent of all industrial investments was to go to light industry. There again the Plan was not fulfilled. In 1935, for instance, only half of the scheduled sums were spent on consumer goods investments.¹⁶ Minc stated that during the period 1954-5 these investments should be increased by 35-40 per cent of the actual investments of 1953. Should it be so, consumer goods investments in 1955 would still be less than two-thirds of what they should have been in 1953.¹⁷

Minc was rather pessimistic as for the chances of fulfilling the Plan as a whole. "An analysis of the present situation shows," he said, "that full achievement of the Six-Year Plan will not be an easy task; this very goal is even threatened, and the threat should be removed as far as possible." This amounted to the official abandonment of the idea of fulfilling the Plan in five years. As Minc pointed out twice, "the Plan is not a dogma."

As far as agriculture was concerned, both Minc and the principle speaker on the subject, Zenon Nowak, advocated a middle line between "Gomulkaism" and "leftist sectarianism." Unlike the situation in Hungary and in Czechoslovakia, in Poland there was, and there will be, no large scale retreat from collectivization. Long and short term credits were promised to all farmers but especially to "working peasants," while "containment" and gradual "elimination," not instant "liquidation," remained the key note of the Party's policy toward the prosperous farmers. Lip service was paid to the principle of voluntary joining of cooperatives, and compulsion condemned. Nowak pointed out that "[some] comrades do not understand that today without the output of individual peasants we will not be able to feed the country," but our task, he quickly added, "will be to build new producers' cooperatives and to gain new members for the already existing ones." The Party has to conduct a "relentless struggle against the kulaks" and "oppose the kulak's robbery." According to Nowak, "... collective farming . . . is a higher, more efficient form facilitating a better development of productive forces and individual capacities of every member than the highly split-up individual farms. . . . Producers' cooperatives provide larger supplies of agricultural produce, provide their members [with] a much higher degree of welfare than could be achieved in individual farming." Collectivization was strongly reaffirmed by Berman, who also stressed, however, that the task of fulfilling the goals set by the Congress to raise the living standard by 15-20 per cent during the following two years would require more energy than the Party alone could hope to muster. For the task all the nation must be mobilized. This implied a continuation of the policy of the "National Front" initiated in 1951.

The detailed measures to be undertaken to adapt the Six-Year Plan to

¹⁶*Inwestycje i budownictwo*, Feb. 1954, quoted by *Communist Party Congresses in the Soviet Bloc. II. Poland*, N.C.F.E., New York, April 1954, p. 27.

¹⁷*Ibid.*

the new situation were formulated in a lengthy final resolution of the Congress.¹⁸

External affairs occupied relatively little time. While furiously decrying "American imperialism," Bierut emphasized that "the German problem is the central question of European security" and that Poland, not unlike France, was vitally interested in its solution, Bierut went even so far as to suggest (certainly not without Moscow's advice) the renewal of the traditional French-Polish alliance. Poland's growing military potential was stressed by Marshal K. Rokossovsky.

The Party Rules of 1948 were amended by the Congress in sixteen points.¹⁹ One of the amendments officially introduced the principle of collective leadership ("collegiality" as it is called in Russia and her orbit). Article 20 of the revised Rules stated that collective leadership gives a maximum guarantee for a balanced party line and gives scope for the party activists to exercise "broad initiative." Commenting on this change, Bierut made the discovery that "the principle [of] collegiality is an inseparable part of inner Party democracy." Since the principle of collective leadership clashes with the practice of accumulation of posts, Bierut gave up one of his main offices. The post of Chairman of the Party Central Committee having been abolished, Bierut, who resigned from the Premiership, assumed that of Party's First Secretary. Thus, in line with Soviet practice, he still remained the key-man of the régime. He remains listed first, out of alphabetical order, among the members of the Politbureau. The only politically surviving former Socialist, Cyrankiewicz, again became Prime Minister, a post of relatively lesser importance since the Constitution of 1952, which made the Cabinet a rather technical administrative body. The division of power between Bierut and Cyrankiewicz is similar to that which took place in the Soviet Union after Stalin's death, and also in Hungary in the summer of 1953 when Matyas Rakosi relinquished the Premiership to become the leader of the Party. The new Central Committee was expanded from seventy-five to seventy-seven full members, of whom twenty-two were newcomers, while the number of deputies was cut from sixty-one to fifty, almost half of them new people. The new Central Committee elected the Politbureau composed mostly of the oldtimers: B. Bierut, A. Zawadzki, J. Cyrankiewicz, H. Minc, Z. Nowak, K. Rokossovski, E. Ochab, J. Berman, F. Mazur, F. Joźwiak, S. Radkiewicz, W. Dworakowski, A. Zambrowski. A. Rapacki, a Socialist prior to December 1948 and a former full member now became a deputy member. Dworakowski was promoted from Deputy to full member of the ruling oligarchy.

The growing emphasis on the importance of agriculture was also reflected in the decision to overhaul the local administration of the rural

¹⁸"Uchwała II Zjazdu P.Z.R.P. . . ." (The Resolution of the Second Congress of the U.P.W.P. . . .), *Trybuna ludu*, March 20, 1954.

¹⁹For the list of amendments and their interpretations see E. Ochab, "O niektórych zagadnieniach organizacyjnych i zmianach w Statucie Partii" (About Some Problems of Organization and Changes in the Party Rules), *Trybuna ludu*, March 17, 1954.

regions. Since March 1950, the administrative system of the country has been based on a pyramidal structure of People's Councils. As far as the villages were concerned the system consisted of two levels. Slightly over 40,000 village communes were organized into about 3,000 rural municipalities. Now, this dualism was to be discarded and a unified net of some 10,000 medium-sized village communes was to be introduced. This reform provides for closer Party control over the passive peasant masses. Bierut left no doubt about it when he commented on the impending reform: "The rural commune [consisting of from three to five villages] with a comparatively small area numbering from 1,000 to 3,000 inhabitants, will be an administrative unit linked far more closely than the present *gmina* [consisting of up to twenty villages] with the village population and problems of agricultural production. Rural communal People's Councils will have their own executive organ—a presidium—and standing committees which will make possible the attraction of the widest peasant masses to direct participation in exercising authority and in social supervision of all economic, social, educational and cultural activities in the area."

Thus, the administrative reform will also provide greater control over local Party cadres: village communes, the lowest rung in the administrative ladder, will be under the direct supervision of the District Party and State organs.²⁰

The so-called "blind spots" on the map, or the villages without Party cells (there were over 40 per cent of such localities), are to be removed. The number of officials is to be trebled with the trebling of the number of communes and the planned expansion of the Party organization in the countryside. The problem, "how many commissars can stand on the head of a *kulak*," is still to be solved by the Marxist dialecticians.

Thus, even the mild "New Course" line of policy initiated at the Ninth Plenum was toned down by the Congress. Taxes and compulsory delivery quotas have remained unchanged and investment plans for consumer goods have actually been decreased in comparison with those scheduled in 1950. On the other hand emphasis on collectivization and greater political control of the villages seems to indicate that the Party may be staging another offensive against the farmer, especially in Central and Eastern Poland where "producers' co-operatives" were least developed and the net of Party organization was most neglected.

The policy as laid down at the Congress contains at least two inherent contradictions which it would be difficult to resolve: first, how the pitifully low living standard of living is to be raised by 15-20 per cent within the next two years while the overambitious industrial program is to continue with small alterations? secondly, how agricultural production is to be stepped up while a quarter of a million of the most industrious and efficient farmers, the *kulaks*, are being "contained" and "eliminated"? They hold

²⁰In this respect see also the speech of E. Ochab on the changes in the Party Rules, *Trybuna ludu*, March 17, 1954.

only about fourteen per cent of the cultivated land but supply up to twenty-eight per cent of all the marketable food products.

It seems that the scaling down of the industrial goals of the Six-Year Plan as far as heavy industry is concerned, slight price reductions, additional credits mainly favoring collective farmers, and vague promises of the improved standard of living for the masses, do not represent an entirely new economic policy in Poland. This is not a new course but rather a "new look."

The position of the Party is admittedly very difficult. On the one hand, considerations of Communist doctrine demand a quick "Socialization" of rural economy; on the other hand, economic requirements suggest caution, and temporary appeasement of the peasantry since the régime indicates the fear of a breakdown of food production and the upsetting of long range economic plans. Hence the constant reiteration of the necessity of a "pliable and elastic" policy, of following a middle road between "narrow sectarianism" and "Gomulskist opportunism," hence lavish investments to increase the yields of the already existing "producers' cooperatives" and State farms. But once the "new look" policy succeeds, once a minimum supply of food is secured from the "Socialist sector," the régime would be made more independent of the individual peasants. Then the opposition of the hard core of the more prosperous farmers might finally be overcome.

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THE MONTENEGRIN *ISTORISKI ZAPISI* (1948-1953)*

by Wayne S. Vucinich

INTERRUPTED by the War, *Istoriski Zapisi* (*IZ*), organ of the Montenegrin Historical Society (*Istorisko društvo Narodne Republike Crne Gore*), reappeared in 1948 under the editorship of Jagoš Jovanović, Director of the High Pedagogical School at Cetinje. The *IZ* publishes articles on all periods of Montenegrin history, documentary materials, fragments from diaries and memoirs, reports on the activities of the Historical Society, and the Communist directives for the historical work and the "ideological struggle." The *IZ* also follows the historiographical progress in other Yugoslav republics.

Aside from brief studies on numismatics, archaeology, Montenegrin emigration to Zadar and Bribir, incunabula, the activities of Radič Crnojević, and the frescoes at Stolin, relatively little during the past five years was published in the *IZ* on the medieval history of Montenegro. The most valuable items in medieval history were a study of the medieval charters and statutes by Anton Milošević (III:1-2, 61-75; III:3-4, 183-200; III:5-6, 298-311) and the report on the discoveries made by Djordje Sp. Radojčić in the monastery Dečani of a prayer book and a fragment of a missal, printed by the Crnojević press and long since missing (VIII:1-3, 1-10). The Radojčić find reveals valuable "bibliographic rarities" pertaining to the medieval religious and political history of the Serbs, and the history of the Serbian press.

The modern period of Montenegro's history received more space in the *IZ* than did the medieval period, due largely to the availability of materials. A variety of topics were treated: the history of the Montenegrin and Serbian press, the piratic attack on the city of Perast, the Bašić money (14th century), the Crnojević family (15th century), the history of the *guvernadurstvo*, and the rule of bishop Danilo (1700-1735). Of somewhat greater importance than other published articles was a single study of the Montenegrin Church history by Ljubomir Durković-Jakšić, who examines the position of the metropolitanate of Montenegro after the abolition of the Peć Patriarchate by the Turks in 1766, and the relations of the Russian Church with the Patriarchate of Constantinople (IX:1, 61-89).

One of the burning historical controversies in recent years has been the interpretation of the juridical status of Montenegro in the Ottoman Empire during the sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries. The consensus of historians is that Montenegro in the sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries was a dependency of the Ottoman Empire, but that it enjoyed a wide autonomy. Momčilo Žeravčić contends that Montenegro was a sovereign state because it possessed the three necessary requisites: land, people,

*Volumes: I:1-6, 1948; II:1-6, 1948; III:1-6, 1949; IV:1-6, 1949; V:1-6, 1950; VI:7-12, 1950; VII:1-12, 1951; VIII:1-2, 1952; IX:1, 1953; IX:2, 1953; X:1, 1954.

¹Djurdjević, Branislav, *Turska vlast u Crnoj Gori u XVI i XVII veku*. (Sarajevo, 1953) p. 136.

authority (VI:7-12, 367-381). Branislav Djurdjev,¹ a very able young historian, holds that Montenegro was under Ottoman rule from 1496 on, that from 1499 to 1514 it was part of the Sancak of Scutari, and that the *timar-sîpâhi* system had been introduced in Montenegro. In the sixteenth century, from 1515 to 1570, the Turks were compelled under Montenegrin pressure to proclaim Montenegro an imperial *hâşş* with the *filurijis* (free peasants) which made it possible for Montenegro during the ensuing period—late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries—to acquire a large degree of autonomy and a full sovereignty before the end of the seventeenth century.

Djurdjev was supported in his historical conclusions by the now discredited Marxian theorist, Milovan Djilas, who reviewed Djurdjev's book in glowing phrases.² By following another approach and using different materials (including the unpublished materials of J. Tomić) many of the same conclusions, with minor differences, were reached by Gligor Stanojević.³ He argued, however, that there was no difference in the degree of autonomy Montenegro enjoyed in the sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries. As a matter of fact, Stanojević thinks the autonomy of Montenegro began to disappear just when Djurdjev thought it had begun to develop.

Djurdjev's principal critic is Gliša Elezović, a noted Yugoslav Turkologist,⁴ who criticized Djurdjev's historical method, scholarly integrity, and his conclusions. Unless Montenegro enjoyed a special status, why, asks Elezović, did the Turks officially refer to it until 1878 as *Kara Dag hat-imtiyazi* (the privileged region of Montenegro)?

The bulk of the material published in the *IZ* over the period of five years (1948-1953) is on various phases of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The nineteenth century was the century of Njegoš and also the century which brought Montenegro an undisputed political independence. Western ideas had permeated the country and the first attempts were made to establish a modern system of administration, law and education.

The largest number of articles in the *IZ* is devoted to the life and role of prince-bishop and poet, Peter II Petrović Njegoš. They deal with such topics as the controversy regarding his date of birth, his education, travels, relations with Russia, reforms, abolition of the *guvernadurstvo*, the building of Biljarda, and work on his classics, the "Mountain Wreath," "Slobodi jada," and "Kula Djurišića," and on scores of other episodes and events in the life of the great Montenegrin. None of the articles on Njegoš is an extensive and all-inclusive study; they are all brief and deal specifically with individual problems and developments. Yet altogether, they represent a considerable quantity of new materials that make possible a study of Njegoš and his period with some degree of finality. One entire issue of the *IZ* (VII: 7-9, 1951) was devoted to Njegoš on the occasion of the one-hundredth anniversary of his death.

²Djilas, Milovan, "Kraj jedne legende," *Nova Misao*, I (1954), 131-134.

³Stanojević, Gligor. "Crna Gora u doba kandidskog rata (1645-1669)," *Istoriski glasnik*, Nos. 1-2 (1953), 3-53.

⁴Elezović, Gliša, "Povodom knjige Branislava Djurdjeva," *IZ*, X:1 (1954), 256-282.

Aside from the great interest in Njegoš and his period, the *IZ* has published articles on Peter I, Prince Danilo, the origin of the tribe Bjelopavlići, the Muslims in Nikšić, the educational system, the impact of the revolution of 1848 on Montenegro, and on Dalmatia (*IZ*, X:1, 1954, 119-144), the activities of the *guvernadur* Jovan Radonić, the youth movement, and the development of the workers' movement.

In general, social and ethnic history has been neglected. The article by Risto Dragičević on the school system, based on archival materials, is especially valuable. There were, the author states, 1,575 pupils attending elementary schools in the 1883-1884 school year in contrast to 10,363 in the 1909-1910 school year (VIII:1-3, 13-35). Milenko Filipović's article on the origin of the tribe of Bjelopavlići contributes to the understanding of a complicated history of Montenegrin tribes (I:3-4, 168-178; I:5-6, 256-263). Other pieces of research included items such as the emigration from Montenegro and Hercegovina to Serbian Šumadija; the histories of the Montenegrin prison and sanitation systems; Filipović's study of collective mourning (V:1-3, 77-85); and Dragičević's investigation of the institution of the *barjaktari* (VII:1-12, 435-453). Because of its originality and scope, Dragičević's article on the history of Montenegro's sanitation and medicine in the nineteenth century and up to the outbreak of World War I is especially valuable (I:1-2, 54-59; I:3-4, 159-167; I:5-6, 306-319).

There is a conspicuous absence of any study of Prince/King Nikola, except those which involve the foreign relations and wars with the Ottoman Empire during his rule. Two items throw light on interesting episodes from Montenegrin history: the Prince's break with Marko Miljanov (VI:1-6, 66-68) and the participation of the Montenegrin gendarmerie in police action on the island of Corfu in 1897 (III:5-6, 292-297).

Several other subjects on the nineteenth century history were also treated: the visit to Montenegro by Saxon King Friedrich August, fragments from travelogues by distinguished persons, comments on foreign works dealing with Montenegro, and the rule of Prince Danilo—based on the Zadar archival materials. Single articles appeared on Vasa Pelagić, the nineteenth century Bosnian socialist (by Kosta Milutinović, VII:1-12, 425-434) and Valtazar Bogišić, a legal historian (by Rudolf Legradić, VIII:4-12, 201-219).

In the field of culture and art in the nineteenth century, only one article appeared and it dealt with the founding of the first theater at Cetinje in 1883. Far more attention in the *IZ* was given to the history of foreign relations than to the internal history of Montenegro, and to political rather than socio-economic relations.

The foreign affairs concern particularly Montenegro's relations with the neighboring Slav peoples, the Ottoman Empire, Austria-Hungary, and Russia. A series of interesting articles have appeared on the uprising of the Serbs in Bosnia-Hercegovina and on the conditions under which these people lived. A number of documents were published on the uprisings of 1878, 1879, 1882, and a collection of letters concerning the noted Hercegovinian revolutionary, Luka Vukalović. A few articles deal with such little

explored subjects as the Phanariot rule in Hercegovina, the disturbances of the Serbs in the vilayet of Kosovo in 1892, and the role of Montenegro in the Morean War (1684-1699) (*IZ*, X:1, 1954, 1-42).

The interests of Montenegro were as keen in the fate of the Serbs of Boka Kotorska as they were in the fate of the Serbs of Hercegovina. Today Boka Kotorska is a constituent part of Montenegro—an old dream come true. A few of the articles on Boka Kotorska concern the medieval and early modern periods of history, the government of the Republic of Kotor and of later Kotor, relations with the Turks and with Dubrovnik, the maritime schools at Kotor and Hercegovina, the activities of the *hajduci* in and around Kotor (X:1, 1954, 162-187; 188-210). Others are on the history of Kotor in the nineteenth century—the period of the Austrian rule—and deal with the revolutionary movements and uprisings against the Habsburg rulers (e.g., the revolutionary activities in 1848, the uprising of the sailors in 1918). One article deals with social and economic life in Kotor, based on baptismal and other church records.

Perhaps the most surprising thing is the absence of studies in the field of Serbian-Montenegrin relations. Until 1954 one article appeared on the subject and dealt with the agreement of 1866 (VII:1-3, 16-40). On the occasion of the 150th anniversary of the First Serbian Revolution (1804), celebrated throughout the country, *IZ* published only four short articles. These dealt with Serbian-Montenegrin relations at the time, reaction in Montenegro and Kotor to the Revolution, and the development of the judiciary system in Serbia (1804-1813) (X:2, 1954, 382-496). It is understandable, on the other hand, that there should appear only one article on the relations with Croatia—an article on the uprising of 1883 in Croatia, Slavonia and Dalmatia, and only a single article on relations with Vojvodina, or more specifically on Mihailo Polit-Desančić, a prominent son of Vojvodina.

In addition to many articles already referred to, which in one way or another concern Montenegro's relations with the Turks, a considerable space in the *IZ* was given to treatment of specific phases of relations with the Turks. The published material represents studies of individual events and controversial questions: the battles of Ostrog (1877), Nikšić (1877), Scutari (1913), and the wars with Mahmud Paša Bušatlija in the early nineteenth century. At least three items appeared on the controversial battle of Carev Laz. Two authors believe they have established the exact date on which the famous battle occurred (III: 5-6, 286-288, 289-291). Andrija Lainović examined the establishment of diplomatic relations with the Porte in 1883. In this connection he also analyzed diplomatic letters from 1885 pertaining to the Serbo-Bulgarian war and the question of the regulation of the Bojana and Lake Scutari (VII:1-12, 511-528).

On the relations with Austria-Hungary four articles were published. These discuss an Austrian attempt to annex Boka Kotorska in 1813, the uprisings against Austrian rule at Krivošije, Austro-Hungarian efforts to prevent the union of Serbia and Montenegro, and the question of the pro-

tection of Montenegrin citizens abroad and the dispute with Austria-Hungary over the issue (VIII:1-3, 124-128). But for the most part this aspect of Montenegrin history has been conspicuously neglected.

The subject of Montenegrin relations with Russia was popular with the historians and several items appeared in the *IZ*, covering the period since the sixteenth century. The relations between the two countries have been especially close since the ascendancy of Peter the Great, although they are not consistently harmonious. Montenegrin rulers found in Russia a national and religious protector. Russia found in Montenegro a friendly enclave which could be utilized in furtherance of its imperial interests in the Balkans. Jagoš Jovanović wrote a survey of the relations between Montenegro and Russia from the second half of the sixteenth century until recent times (II:3-4, 139-160; II:5-6, 248-258; III:3-4, 120-133; IV:1-3, 30-36). Jovan Radulović (II:5-6, 269-289) and Radovan Lalić (VII:7-9, 272-292) also wrote on the same subject. The remaining articles deal with specific issues, such as the visits of this or that Russian emissary to Montenegro, and the founding by the Russians of the Girls Institute at Cetinje in 1869 (IV:1-3, 130-151; V:1-6, 40-61).

Brief articles were published on the twentieth century. One article appeared on the Montenegrin exhibit in London in 1907, one on the question of Scutari in the first Balkan War, three articles on World War I—two of them on military activities and the other on the political situation, and three articles on Muhamed Mehmedbašić (two by Jovan Ivović, III:1-2, 35-49; I:1-2, 95-103; and one by Milan Popović, III:5-6, 280-285), who participated in the assassination of Archduke Francis Ferdinand in June, 1914 at Sarajevo. Mehmedbašić was the only one of the principal actors in the Sarajevo murder who managed to escape Austrian authorities, finding his way into Montenegro. Despite Austrian protests, the Montenegrins were able to conceal Mehmedbašić and he eventually joined the Montenegrin and later the Serbian army.

On the history of the twentieth century the subject most extensively treated in the *IZ* has been the National Liberation Movement (NLM), 1941-1945. It involves the organization of wartime resistance, general and specific military operations against the Axis and quisling forces, conflicts with the *četnici*, and the establishment of people's liberation committees. For the most part the materials represent eyewitness accounts, fragments from diaries and memoirs, and official documents. The published materials almost wholly represent the Communist side of the wartime history. The articles usually relate to individual incidents, battles, and throw light on tactics, logistics, and general conditions in wartime Yugoslavia. Savo Brković, among others, published portions of his diary over several issues, covering the period of National Liberation Struggle (NLS) from March 1942 to July 4, 1943. One entire issue of the *IZ* (V:4-6, 129-272) is devoted to the NLM. The development of the wartime (1942-1946) Communist legal and judiciary system, will be of some value to those interested in the Communist revolutionary tactics (by Pero Krstajić, X:1, 43-67).

Although several interesting articles have appeared on the history and wartime activities of the Montenegrin Communist Party, the amount of published material seems extremely small. The systematic study of Communism in Montenegro naturally should be made in the broader context of the development of Yugoslav Communism and the NLM with which it was inextricably linked. The *IZ* has carried several articles concerning Communist activities before, during and after the war. But none of these is of any consequence. They represent brief statements on the persecution of the Communists by the pre-war government, Communist work among the peasants, the founding of the Party congress, and the establishment of the Petrovac commune in 1918. The reader has the impression that aside from the wartime and postwar rôle of the Communist party, there is nothing of great importance and significance to record on the history of the Party in Montenegro.

Several final observations might be made regarding five years of *IZ*. The articles which have appeared in it are usually brief, and for the most part documentary rather than interpretive in character. The periodical is well edited, but the technical side of it leaves much to be desired. The *IZ* obviously is very selective in the material it publishes and the contributors, conscious of their duty to assess the Montenegrin past in the light of Marxian teachings, aim to fit their nation's history into a ready made formula. Considering these limitations, the *IZ* reflects a fairly careful scholarship. Until 1953 the technical make-up of the periodical was inferior, which was not the case with most other Yugoslav journals. Although a large number of articles have been published in the *IZ* the number of contributors has been small. A number of articles were written not by trained historians but by eyewitnesses of, or participants in, this or that military episode during World War II. The names of the same authors recur throughout the issues of the *IZ*. One might assume, therefore, that there is a shortage of professional historians in the field of Montenegrin history. It must be pointed out, however, that many students of Montenegrin history publish their works in other Yugoslav journals.

While most leading Yugoslav historical journals have favorably reviewed various issues of the *IZ*, a Montenegrin periodical, *Susret* (August-September, 1953, 509-518) assessed the "Five Years" of the *IZ* in a most critical and devastating manner. Reviewer Tomica Nikčević accused the *IZ* of publishing materials which were of little value and of accepting contributions which were devoid of "scientific" historical method. Risto Dragičević, expert on Njegoš, at whom the criticism was principally directed, replied, accusing Nikčević of being himself "unscientific" and un-Marxian. It was obvious that the conflict had transcended from the norms of scholarship into the realm of personal feud between the "Young Turk," Nikčević and the "elder historian," Dragičević. At this writing it is difficult to say which of the two groups enjoys official backing.

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REVIEW NOTE
THE PRUSSIAN ARMY AND POLITICS

by Gerhard Ritter

THIS book of Professor Craig¹ is surely—as seen from Germany—one of the most important recent appearances in American historiography since the end of the war. The problem of the much discussed German “militarism” that is treated here by an outstanding historian constitutes today not only the core of all debates on German foreign policy, but plays a central rôle in recent discussions among German historians as to a “revision of the German historical picture.”

Professor Craig prepared the way for his comprehensive presentation with a whole series of valuable source studies on special problems, and consequently has complete command of the modern technical literature, including the German. He shows himself to be such a master of the art of integrating masses of material that he brings everything important into consideration without becoming verbose. His presentation is succinct, precise, exceedingly clear and fluently written. I read it with even greater attention as it presents to a great extent a parallel to my own approximately contemporary works,² the continuation of which Craig, in his later chapters, rather anticipates. My attention developed quickly into delight that we are mutually complementary in the best sense. While I myself concentrated on a central problem, on the relation of political and military thought (*Staatskunst und Kriegshandwerk*), Craig furnishes us in the first half of his book a more extensive description of the history of the development of Prussian military affairs in general, which for non-German readers is certainly an advantage. Much of that is naturally already known in Germany, but Craig knows how to vitalize what is already known by his own views, insights and interpretations of continuity. He treats the Revolution of 1848 and its military aspects very much more exhaustively than did I, especially the rôle of the “anti-militaristic” instincts of the peoples’ rising in Prussia and the participation of the generals in the struggle against democracy. In the analysis of the Prussian army conflict of the ’60’s his and my presentations tend to run parallel. I had at my disposal the correspondence of King Wilhelm I with the Chief of the Military Cabinet, Edwin von Manteuffel (in the *Hohenzollern’sches Hausarchiv*), whereas the papers of von Roon were at the time of my archival research only partly available, due to their having been taken to places safe from aerial bombardment. Craig has been able to find and use them now among the *Captured German Documents* of the National Archives in Washington, so that his presentation here quite directly complements mine.

¹Craig, Gordon A., *The Policy of the Prussian Army, 1640-1945*. Oxford Clarendon Press, 1955. Pp. xi, 536. \$11.50.

²For the most part summed up in *Staatskunst und Kriegshandwerk: Das Problem des Militarismus in Deutschland*, vol. I: *Die Altpreuussische Tradition 1740-1890*, Munich, 1954.

But this community of work is not only external, it holds true also in surprisingly wide compass for the significance of relationships, and it is truly reassuring to see that for serious scientific research, even in matters of judgment of historical events, there apparently is not, nor need be, a separating ocean when on both sides one honestly applies himself to understand before he begins to judge and does not allow himself to be deceived in this objective understanding through political prejudices. To everything that Craig expresses about the political posture of the Prussian army up to World War I, I can unhesitatingly subscribe—apart from differences of opinion on some details into which it would here be unrewarding to go. Only one of these differences requires mention, because it concerns an especially important point: the von Schlieffen campaign plan of 1905.

I agree completely with Craig's opinion that Schlieffen was a typical "soldier only" (*Nur-Soldat*) who lacked almost completely any understanding of political questions, and I believe that through the publication of both his plans of 1905 and 1912 I will be able to make it still more clear from the wording of the text. Also I am at one with Craig that the march through Belgium was a political disaster, just as the fact that Bülow and Bethmann-Hollweg did not grasp at all the seriousness of this problem before 1914, and without further ado gave over to the professional soldiers the decision on a plan of operations with such important political implications. Still I see in this no convincing indication brought forth that another campaign plan would have offered a better strategical chance of success in case of a two-front war, and that without the march through Belgium it would have been possible in the long run to avoid the participation of France and England in the decisive struggle. Further, Craig rejects, just as I do, the thesis of Peter Rassow that the Schlieffen Plan of 1905 should not be understood as a theoretical study, but as a current plan for a preventive war against France, and that it was as such expressly so arranged with Baron Holstein, the "Grey Eminence" of the Foreign Office, by word of mouth. But Craig is convinced that Holstein at that time planned in all earnestness an aggressive war against France. This also I believe I must deny. Holstein did not want a war, but only the bluff of a brutal war threat in the entirely mistaken hope that Germany might thereby explode the French-English alliance then in preparation.

One sees that it is just a matter of nuance in the significance of the events, not of a basically different conception. Craig has indicated very clearly the dangers thus threatening German politics, that the General Staff by its military successes in the German wars of union had won prestige and authority among the German people that was still further strengthened by its *Immediatstellung* independent of, and not below, the Chancellor. Bismarck still knew how to match and even master this rival prestige; his successors did not. It was not, certainly, as if a war-mad General Staff had finally driven the Imperial Government into a war to conquer the world. (This coarsely simplified representation of the war propaganda of 1914-18 is also completely overcome by Craig). But it was true that the *maison mil-*

itaire of Wilhelm II possessed a political influence that developed more and more into a sort of auxiliary government and sorely crippled the political activity of the Reichs Chancellor in several decisive crises. Craig shows this especially in the example of the military attaché and their mixing into purely political questions in a section in which, it appears to me, he has well succeeded. I shall myself, on the basis of recent documentary studies of my students, be in the position to indicate the same for domestic politics under Bethmann-Hollweg. The participation of the *maison militaire* in the discharge of Caprivi, it appears to me, Craig overestimates; in general, however, he is surely right in his judgment that even long before the outbreak of war in 1914 the foundation was laid for that fateful preponderance of military advisors over the political; that then in the course of the war the increased moral authority of the successful generals led to the political *plenipotencia* of the Supreme Command and to the almost complete debility of political instances, and finally of the monarch himself. Craig has impressively, indeed dramatically, depicted this development. I agree with him in general and regret only that he has limited himself so narrowly to inner German relations. These would have undergone their proper elucidation only if Craig had ferreted out and shown the war politics of Germany's opponents; how their mutual connections on broadly set conquering goals and their entanglement in the war suffering of the peoples rendered the agreement policy of Bethmann-Hollweg practically hopeless.

The greatest number and most valuable of contributions to new source material Craig offers to the history of the *Reichswehr* and its relations to the republican state leadership in the Weimar epoch. They stem from the papers of Seeckt, Groener and Stresemann which he also had at his disposal in Washington. In the meantime much of it has been used also in the biography of Groener by his daughter, Frau Geyer, albeit in insufficient manner. The most important thing, indeed, it seems to me, is that which the Stresemann papers report on the political attitude of General Seeckt; it will have an alarming effect in Germany. In general, my own ideas on Seeckt, as I have presented in my book *Carl Goerdeler und die deutsche Widerstandsbewegung*, are validated and strengthened by the new findings. He was basically an enemy of the Weimar Republic who awaited his hour, no "political soldier." Nevertheless, I find the comprehensive judgment, ". . . the army acted sometimes in complete disobedience to the wishes of the responsible political leadership of the nation," (p. 469) exaggerated. It never came to real disobedience, despite all restraints; and also the various measures of Seeckt—searchingly depicted—to evade the stipulations of the Versailles Treaty damaged the foreign political credit of the young republic, without affording much practical military utility, but cannot, however, be pointed out as real "disobedience" against the Reich Cabinet.

On this point as on others I find the later chapters of this excellent book less satisfying, also in technique of source analysis, than the earlier

ones. Many of the sources used by Craig, like the radical pacifist journal *Weltbühne*, are apparently overestimated as to the reliability of their information. Excellent is his interpretation of Schleicher's policies: that he would have rejected and fought National Socialism, but first he wanted politically to extinguish or split the Social Democrats and thereby robbed himself of indispensable helpers. Meanwhile Craig sets the highly personal and complicated tactics of this unusual *intrigant* all too unhesitatingly on a plane with the attitude "of the *Reichswehr*" as such, and condemns him because he drew back from an open civil war in late autumn of 1932—a judgment that no one will share who himself experienced the state of the masses of German voters and the tremendous social tension during this year of crisis in Germany. Also the position of Hammerstein and Schleicher on 29 January, 1933, in the last moment before Hitler's seizure of power, is not entirely aptly depicted. The alleged plans of a *Putsch* in cooperation with the Potsdam garrison never seriously existed, and the insipid rumor-monger Werner von Alvensleben, who reported it to Hitler, did definitely not come at the instruction of Hammerstein or Schleicher. What Schleicher at this moment wanted was nothing else than his appointment to the Defense Ministry in Hitler's Cabinet as an intended counterbalance to Hitler—a rôle which he deluded himself into thinking he could play with better success than von Papen.

As source support the book by Wheeler-Bennett, *The Nemesis of Power*, is very often cited in these last chapters—a publication which I, with probably most of my German colleagues, find a political misfortune despite its brilliant literary form. For it feigns by its very extensive offering of source material a reliability in fact which it in no wise possesses and through political prejudice, indeed hatefulness, is closed to any rightful understanding of the German situation and also of the German generals in the time of Hitler. I have explained this several times in my book on Goerdeler and am very sorry that my writing (published 1955, third edition in preparation) was not yet at the disposal of Professor Craig when he composed his last chapter. His is a much too critical mind to accept Wheeler-Bennett's presentation without examination. Nor does he make, either, the basic mistake, like Wheeler-Bennett, of overestimating the "power" of the *Reichswehr* in the Weimar Republic and of regarding its catastrophe under Hitler simply as the "nemesis" for the misuse of this power. But he follows the English author in many places (as in the handling of the alleged "pact" between the *Reichswehr* and Hitler in June 1934), where Wheeler-Bennett depends upon completely worthless sources, even if he does make certain reservations. Above all, in the last chapter he does justice neither to the inner and external difficulties of the generals' opposition to Hitler, nor to the character of the members of this opposition, nor to their practical efforts toward the dictator's fall. Craig's concluding judgment (p. 479) I should not be willing to share; the army had always hindered all attempts to democratize Germany, it had thereby, "... deprived the Germans of the most effective defense that any people

can have against the excesses of absolutism and the whims of dictatorship"; it even "... sponsored the rise of Hitler to power in 1933." Therefore, it became doubly responsible for the fate of Germany, but it finally neglected its clear duty to do what the "fanatically militaristic" German people had a right to demand from it: "... to prevent Hitler from acting in a way calculated to destroy the national interest."

Now, I am far from disputing the co-responsibility of the military for the German misfortune; I consider it even an important task of contemporary German historical writing not to continue to write German military history as has all too long been the practice, as merely a panegyric of great soldierly heroism and great technical perfection. Instead of this it is proper to pose the question earnestly and soberly: how far reaching is the responsibility of the German military for the German catastrophe? Craig's book is an exceedingly valuable aid to such considerations. But the question posed is of a very complex nature. To answer it one must delve into diverse areas of life, and so the answer that Craig gives in the presently cited sentences appears to me to be much too simple. I should like to conclude with some counter questions: Is the hindrance to a timely democratization of Germany to be traced back to the operation of German militarists alone, or only to a considerable extent? Is it so certain that parliamentary democracy is an unfailing protective against the rise of modern totalitarian dictatorships? Does not the history of Europe from the days of Danton and Robespierre to Lenin, Mussolini and Hitler, show the contrary? Further, can one really say that the *Reichswehr* stood sponsor to Hitler's seizure of power? And, finally, was there really a practical possibility of the generals, in the years of the brilliant ascent of the Hitler Reich until 1941, to depose the dictator and conduct a "revolution from above" against the will of 80 per cent of the German people?

Once again, with these questions I do not wish to minimize the heavy responsibility of the German military for Germany's fate. But it would be contrary to justice and truth if one were to charge a single class with it. After all, it was not a military clique, but a very wide popular movement that brought the tyrants to the summit and held them in power so long. After all, (and to this Craig will certainly agree) it would not be valid to judge the history of the Prussian-German army solely or even primarily from the point of view of the final catastrophe of 1945.

FREIBURG IM BREISGAU

NOTES

Prasa i Książka, the official publishing house of the Polish government in Warsaw, announces the republication—in photoprint—of the capital *Bibliografia Historii Polskiej* of Ludwik Finkel. This careful, national bibliography of source, monographic and periodical material relating to Polish history from its origins to 1815 has long been out of print. It appeared at Lwów and Cracow between 1891 and 1914. A second edition of Volume I (pp. 1-564), edited by Karol Maleczyński, appeared in Lwów in 1937. The price of the reprint is \$50. Address: *Prasa i Książka*, Koszykowa 31, Warsaw.

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An interuniversity committee of scholars (Merle Fainsod, Harvard; Harold H. Fisher, Stanford and Hoover Library; Philip E. Mosely, Council on Foreign Relations; Geroid T. Robinson, Columbia University), with the financial support of the Ford Foundation, has initiated a Program for Research in the History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The *sedes operatoria* of the program is at 401 East 118th Street, New York 27, N. Y. Modest grants are available on pre-doctoral and post-doctoral bases, for pertinent projects that are well under way. A limited number of summer grants, for travel and subsistence to facilitate access to sources and completion of manuscripts already in an advanced stage of preparation, are also available. The Director of the Program is Alfred G. Meyer.

* * * * *

Professor Heinrich Felix Schmid, Director of the Institut für öst-europäische Geschichte und Südostforschung der Universität Wien, has written to inform concerning the work of East European studies in Austria. A note in the July, 1955 number of the *Journal* (p. 185) concerning the recently founded Forschungsinstitut für Fragen des Donauraumes prompted Professor Schmid's informative letter. He points out that there is an additional institute devoted to similar aims which is a private foundation: the Osteuropäische Arbeitsgemeinschaft für Kunde des Slawentums und Ost-europas, founded in 1951, of which Professor Schmid is himself the present presiding officer. This Gemeinschaft has a policy of arranging lectures, by both Austrian and foreign scholars, and of sponsoring the publication of substantial scientific monographs in this area.

In addition to these two private organizations, one at Salzburg and the other (the latter) at Vienna, there are several state supported institutes presently functioning. The oldest is the Institut für osteuropäische Geschichte und Südostforschung of the University of Vienna, of which Professor Schmid is the Director. It has been in existence for almost fifty years, with a sole, short interruption of two years, 1945-1947. The professorship of eastern European history is even older. The personnel of this Institut consists of one Ordinarius (Professor Schmid), two Extraordinarii (Associate Professors) and three Assistants. A total of 14 hours weekly of lectures and seminars is offered: on Russian history, Hungary, the Balkans and related disciplines. There are also, at the University, courses in other departments that treat Byzantine history and problems of the Danube area. The Institute has its own rich library, open to qualified guests. There is also at Vienna an Institut für Slavische Philologie, with its specialized library and publication: the *Wiener Archiv für Geschichte des Slawentums und Ost-*

europa. Austria has other offerings in East European studies: at Graz an Institut für Slavische Philologie with a Professor and two dozenten, at Innsbruck one dozent who teaches Eastern European history.

It is a pleasure to record thus in some detail the present situation of academic scholarly activity in Austria, so ideally located to understand and assess this complex area.

* * * * *

Word has just reached us of the death of Professor Zygmunt Wojciechowski of the University of Poznań. He was the vigorous and learned editor of one of the most active and inspired historical journals in post-war Poland, the Western Review (*Przegląd Zachodni*), and founder and Director of the Instytut Zachodni at Poznań. Related to a great historian of the pre-war era, Tadeusz Wojciechowski, he was in his early fifties, and, had he lived, would have amassed a prodigious output of historical work. His specialty was the western reaches of Poland and the relations of Poland and Germany through the centuries. His more recent works have been listed in the periodic bibliographies in the *Journal*. His *L'État polonais du moyen âge* (Paris, 1949), a few articles in French, and a part of the collaborative work, *Poland's Place in Europe* (Poznań, 1947) are about all that is available in western languages.

Wojciechowski spent much of the period of the German occupation in a concentration camp, but for part of the time he was active in the underground university at Poznań. After the war he identified himself with the Catholic party that accepted the régime, and continued his historical work. His passing is a grave loss to Polish historical science which is struggling to maintain its high standards.

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The Istituto per la Storia del Risorgimento Italiano, under the presidency of Professor Alberto Maria Ghisalberti of the University of Rome, is desirous of founding a section of the Istituto in the United States. Professor Howard M. Marraro of Columbia University is acting as liaison in the matter and would be glad to hear from any scholars interested in the possibilities of such a filiation of an active and useful organization in this country. The *Rassegna*, the library facilities of the Istituto in Rome, the stimulus to a long neglected field of history, these would be the compensation for support of the project.

BOOK REVIEWS

EHRlich, LUDWIK, *Paweł Włodkowic i Stanisław ze Skarbimierza. Kazanie Stanisława ze Skarbimierza "De bellis iustis."* Warsaw: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1954. Pp. 238. Zł 15.95.

EHRlich, LUDWIK, *Polski Wykład Prawa Wojny XV Wieku.* Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Prawnicze, 1955. Pp. 268.

The story of the protracted struggle of the Kingdom of Poland with the Teutonic Order has been often presented from the German side, less often from the Polish side. This struggle, which began within a few years of 1226, when Duke Conrad of Mazovia is supposed to have invited the Order (only recently requested to leave Hungary) to Poland to help him fight the Prussians, and to have promised them all the land they could conquer, reached its height as a European event at the Council of Constance (1414-1418). The Polish King Jagiello, with the help of some Czech Knights and a scattering of Prussian and Lithuanian warriors, had defeated the Order at Grunwald in 1410. The peace negotiations were drawn out, and eventually, under papal pressure, terms more favorable to the Order than its military defeat would ordinarily have dictated were accepted. The Polish King, resenting the injustice of the papal position, sent a delegation to the General Council at Constance to appeal for an understanding of Poland's position and a rectification of the injustice.

Two important members of this delegation were Paweł (Paul) Włodkowic and Stanisław of Skarbimierz. They were both professors of law at the recently (1400) revived University of Cracow; both had studied at Prague, and Paul in Padua; both had been rectors of the Cracow University twice, Paul in 1414 and 1415, Stanisław in 1400 and 1413. King Jagiello had decided on the conciliar position in the dispute incident to the Schism, and his representatives went to the Council in full sympathy with the reform party. From the negotiations at the Council, the hearings, polemics from the Poles and the representatives of the Order, and answers from both sides, a considerable mass of literature arose which, as Professor Ehrlich points out, has not heretofore been carefully read by Polish scholars, and has in large measure been studiously avoided by German students of this controversy. In the first of the works here noticed, Professor Ehrlich traces the dispute from its origins through the four years at Constance, step by step, examining the text of each of the pamphlets, sermons, *conclusiones* and books that the dispute produced. The entrance of a belligerent Dominican, Falkenberg, into the dispute, who charged the Polish king and the Poles in general with heresy, served as a precipitant for much of the fireworks, and particularly for some of the writings of both Paul and Stanisław. By this thorough survey of the course of the controversy, Ehrlich is able to set the scene for the proper evaluation of the originality of the thought of the two Polish legists.

The Order had charged the Polish King with allying himself with heathen against the Christian Teutonic Order. The Polish advocates have a two-pronged answer. The Order has acted like a conqueror of Christian peoples and has outlived whatever usefulness it ever had, because the Lithuanians, now the objects of their Order's aggression, have been christianized for thirty years. Secondly—and this is the burden of Ehrlich's work and the precise subject of the second of the books under review—Skarbimierz presents in a sermon "*De bellis iustis*" the first systematic treatment of the subject of the just or the unjust war.

The sermon does not mention the Order or Poland. It is an abstract discussion of war in a formal and legalistic temper. He quotes from the Scriptures, St. Augustine, Gratian, Raymond of Peñaforte, and St. Thomas Aquinas. A war of defense is just; a war of aggression has no Christian justification whatever. A heathen state has a perfect right to exist and retain its faith. In the course of elaborating these simple conclusions, a whole doctrine of international relations is presented, the first in this compass in western history.

Professor Ehrlich has, in his edition of the treatise, given in columns parallel to the text from the MSS, quotations from the authors from whom Paweł drew, and a polish translation. There is a Russian and an English summary of the treatise and the circumstances at the end of the edition.

University of Colorado

S. HARRISON THOMSON

ITTER, GERHARD, *Staatskunst und Kriegshandwerk. Das Problem des "Militarismus" in Deutschland*. Vol. I, *Die altpreussische Tradition 1740-1890*. Munich, 1954. Pp. 396.

Mr. Ritter has demonstrated a continuing interest in the problem of power. This book and a Goerdeler study are more recent contributions to this theme. His *Machtstaat und Utopie* and *Die Dämonie der Macht* revealed critical concern over the license of national socialistic force. He ended the war in a prison cell. Since 1945 his work also has opposed those interpretations which relate too much of German history to national socialism. His explanations defend German institutions and generally exonerate Prussianism from the Hitler taint.

In this book Ritter examines the relationship between military will and political decision in modern German history. The soldier tends toward aggressive security; the statesman sustains the higher mandate of peaceful existence and progress. He has ethical primacy and must harness the general. He must recognize war as the exception and avoid its idealization. Such idealization developed in imperial Germany and Bismarck's successors were to submit to military interests. Until then, however, the German soldier was subordinate to responsible statesmanship. Frederick II and Bismarck represented the opportunism and considerate restraint of the finest European diplomacy. They recognized the cultural-political unity of Europe and willingly competed within its framework. Their blend of aggressiveness and moderation was no embryo of twentieth century total war. According to Ritter such war was the spawn of the French Revolution.

The contemporaries of Frederick the Great did not brand him as an inveterate aggressor. That charge has been levelled by moderns who either misconstrue the character of eighteenth century diplomacy or who simply prefer to deny Prussian interests. Frederick's generation of optimistic rationalists believed war was a fast disappearing crudity. The harmless maneuvers of the 'Potato War' typified late Rococo conflict. That age of refinement and moderation ended with the French Revolution which returned Europe to furious ideological war. That, says Ritter, is the Revolution's most enduring legacy to the modern world. Since then the military has gradually usurped diplomatic leadership and lost it in turn to the incited, embittered public which righteously mistakes revenge for justice.

It was Napoleon who fostered the modern military spirit and began the transformation of the *Weltbürger* into a militant nationalist. Then Hegel, Fichte and Clausewitz delineated the virtue of national power. The latter was not the first to identify war as an extension of diplomacy but he was the first to warn that ideological war would expose the limitation of force as a theoretical absurdity. He

hoped the drift toward total force might be constrained by leaders of "clear intelligence." Metternich and especially Bismarck were men of such calculating clarity.

Bismarck and Moltke afford a classic example of the relationship between soldier and diplomat. Both represented their divergent *desiderata* with energy and mutual understanding. Moltke was a soldier-humanist who sensed both the agony and challenge of war. He was a platonic type who urged preventive war and iron peace. The dream of eternal peace offended his concept of human dynamism and the supposedly cool rationalist bristled with nationalistic distrust of Slav and Gaul. Bismarck, the imperious, instinctive vassal, better comprehended man's right to peace. He believed that only the most fundamental state antagonisms should be resolved by war and that the compulsion to conflict must seem valid long after peace is signed.

Bismarck stood a last watch against emotional diplomacy. His own people, possessed of an "either-or" spirit, were completing their shift to an exaggerated nationalism. And the master statesman made an exception to his own code when he conciliated military logic with the seizure of Metz. It was a lapse which bred French revenge and a passionate world war.

Ritter commands his position with a formidable display of research and analysis. Let the critic come well equipped.

Wittenberg College, Springfield, Ohio

HELMUT HAEUSSLER

VON HEHN, JÜRGEN, *Die baltische Frage zur Zeit Alexanders III. in Ausserungen der deutschen Öffentlichkeit*. Marburg/Lahn: Herder Institute, 1953. Pp. 69. DM 6.

This is only secondarily a book about "the Baltic Question" in the time of Alexander III (1881-1894). Primarily, it is a study of public opinion or, more precisely, some expressions of opinion in Germany about the efforts of the tsarist government to russify the Baltic provinces (later Estonia and Latvia). It is thus a very limited work, dealing with only one facet of the multi-faceted Baltic problem and doing it, moreover, with very little effective regard for even the rudimentary conventions of opinion surveying. The author, who has obviously examined a mountain of pertinent periodical articles in pursuit of expressions of opinion, rather cavalierly dismisses the need for examining the newspapers of the time, and says nothing of other sources of information about opinion. It is also abundantly clear that when he quotes "opinion" it is more often that of Baltic Germans writing in German periodicals than that of the authentic "deutschen Öffentlichkeit."

Within its very severe limitations the work has some merit. The author's main thesis seems to be that the German public was warned repeatedly of the "Slavic peril," but chose for its own reasons to ignore the warning. His excerpts from some of the warnings are extremely interesting in the light of more recent pressures upon European civilization from the "russisch-asiatischen Raum." Perhaps even more interesting are the author's judgments as to why the Germans of the 1880's and 1890's refused to crusade for their "brothers" beyond the border: The most important reason, it seems, was the fact that the newly established German empire needed peace and friendship with Russia and did not wish to put this in jeopardy for the sake of a mere two hundred thousand Baltic Germans. This consideration influenced the public as well as the government because the idea of the nation as a territorial entity was replacing the idea of the nation as a people. The author seems genuinely distressed that the very success of German unification resulted in

Germans beyond the border being increasingly isolated. He obviously believes that ties of blood and culture are more important than national boundaries. A second reason—or excuse—for leaving the Baltic Germans to their fate at the hands of the Russians, was the prevalent idea that any state had the right to force assimilation upon its minorities and that the tsar was only doing in the Baltic provinces what Germany was doing in Alsace-Lorraine, Posen, and elsewhere. Social Democratic opinion, meanwhile, held that the suppression of the privileged semi-feudal German position in the Baltic provinces was a necessary step toward socialism. Finally, there was opinion to the effect that there really wasn't very much oppression. The parallels with the present situation in Europe are obvious—as the author no doubt intended they should be.

It is, of course, impossible to do factor analysis on the basis of von Hehn's sources. Nevertheless, his judgments are worthy of attention. There, indeed, lies the strength of the work. It is a work full of judgments and insights by a man who has thought long and earnestly about various aspects of the Baltic question, the relationships of peoples, the rights of minorities, and the nature of civilization. As a consequence, many observations—never mind how they are arrived at—undoubtedly hit close to the mark. The unfortunate fact that this work, like most of those which it surveys, must be classified as basically another essay in the tradition of the Baltic German publicists, should not be allowed to obscure the real contributions which it does make.

California Institute of Technology

HEINZ E. ELLERSIECK

KRITOVOULOS, *History of Mehmed the Conqueror*, translated from the Greek by Charles T. Riggs. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1954, Pp. ix, 222.

Four Greek historians have left detailed accounts of the capture of Constantinople by the Ottoman Turks in 1453. The accounts of Phrantzes, Ducas, and Chalcocondyles have long been known, but that of Critobulus was discovered only in 1865 and survives in a sole manuscript preserved in the Seraglio Point Museum Library in Istanbul. It was published with numerous notes in 1870 by C. Müller in the fifth volume of his *Fragmenta Historicorum Graecorum*. P. A. Dethier prepared another edition for the *Monumenta Hungariae Historica*, XXI. 1, but, as far as I know, that volume was never published. A French translation made by the same scholar also remained unpublished, but a Hungarian version prepared by K. Szabó appeared in 1875; and in 1912 the work was published in Turkish by P. Karolides. It is now offered in English, a welcome addition to the increasing number of Byzantine historical works available in English. There now exist English translations of Procopius, Anna Comnena, the *Chronographia* of Michael Psellus, the *De administrando imperio* of Constantine Porphyrogenitus, and now of Critobulus.

The historical work of Critobulus is entitled in Greek *Historiae*, but the title, *History of Mehmed the Conqueror*, given to it by the translation is not unjustifiable; for the work is, indeed, an account of the career of Muhammed II covering the first seventeen years of his reign (1451-1468). "My object," writes Critobulus, "is to present the deeds of the now reigning great Sultan Mehmed, excellent as they are and in every respect surpassing those of his predecessors." Critobulus accepted the destruction of the Byzantine empire and wrote his history from the point of view of the conqueror. As a Greek, he was conscious that his choice to exalt the deeds of the conqueror might subject him to criticism and he begged the indulgence of his compatriots. "I beg of my compatriots," he writes, "both those now living

and those who in times to come may read this history, not to condemn me for either stupidity or perversity, if in place of grieving as others do over our nation, I choose to record and to openly hold up to ridicule and disparagement our own internal evils, which—in others' views—ought rather to be covered up as far as possible and by no means brought to the notice of the public." Critobulus chose Thucydides as his model and followed him slavishly, so slavishly indeed that the speech which he puts in the mouths of Muhammed at the time of the assault against Constantinople recalls to mind the funeral oration of Pericles. This slavish imitation of Thucydides makes his work somewhat shallow, but it does not reduce significantly its importance or trustworthiness as a historical document.

Charles T. Riggs, the translator, died in February, 1953 and as a consequence did not see through the publication of his translation. But since he signed the preface, his work must have appeared substantially in the form in which he delivered it to the publishers. As published, the work suffered from certain inadequacies. The translation is not always accurate. Not much is said about the author, not even his first name is given; there are no notes offering any explanations, pointing out where Critobulus agrees or disagrees with the other sources; there are no bibliographical references, and no index. In the present state of knowledge of Greek and Latin, translations of medieval historical texts are most desirable. In general, however, they are meant for the general student and reader and as a consequence they should be provided with adequate introductions or full explanatory notes in order to make their use more effective.

Rutgers University

PETER CHARANIS

Europe—Nine Panel Studies by Experts from Central and Eastern Europe. New York: Free Europe Committee, 1954. Pp. 146. \$1.00.

The Western European countries are aware that a sound economic development of supra-national bodies in line with the already functioning coal and steel community have certainly been numerous.

While Western Europe is exploring unification, Russia is busily integrating her satellites. She builds on German precedent. The pre-World War II Schacht Plan lead to a German domination which was first economic, later became political and finally military. The Soviets merely reversed the array. The military conquest came first, political infiltration followed, and presently the economic integration is being carried through under the aegis of what one might want to call the Molotov Plan.

We are thus facing two separate integration attempts which, no doubt, tend to divide East and West Europe even more thoroughly than the Iron Curtain does. In other words they lend economic substance to the Iron Curtain.

The State Department pursues therefore two types of policies—short-run and long-run. In the short-run the emphasis is primarily on West European integration using the Marshall Aid countries as a nucleus. The long run plans, which some people might consider as mere hopeful thinking, no longer envisage a West European, but rather a *European* solution. This is why exile experts from the captive countries felt justified in "preparing for their countries future participation in these plans" (p. 69).

The Free Europe Committee thus appointed nine panels to examine "the Post-Liberation Problem of the Position of Central and Eastern European Nations in a Free European Community." The panels discussed the Council of Europe,

the Coal and Steel Community, European Defense, Power and Energy, Transport and Tele-communications, Finance and Trade, Agricultural Integration, Public Welfare, Labor, and Social Security. The report discusses the conditions under which the satellites could, at an unspecified future date, join these organizations; changes which such adherence would entail in legal, economic and financial structures; mutual advantages entailed in such functional integration.

As a tentative outline of problem areas the Report will be a very useful information source for protagonists of integration. This will be even more true after the results of a great number of sub-projects currently in progress dealing with specific aspects of the topics will be made available. Unfortunately the number of concrete suggestions is so far very restricted. This is primarily a consequence of the intention to base any suggestions on the consensus of all participating experts. And as anybody knows, prominent exiles do not easily agree with each other. The Project no doubt tended to divert their attention from past divisions and focused it upon a common cause.

Although Eastern Germany is not discussed explicitly—a shortcoming of much of the previous work of the Free Europe Committee—it is at least admitted that “certain studies already undertaken in Western Germany with a view to the return of Eastern Germany may yield useful material” (p. iii).

To the reviewer “Europe” must be considered in the context of the good many recent publications dealing with the theme of One World, World Government, World Federation, United States of the World and a galaxy of other anonyms. The ideas have won large followings and inspired the organization of a number of clubs and associations in many cities. *Europe* does not advocate any world government, or even, for the predictable future, an all-European government. But it certainly falls within the frame of current discussions of the possibilities of international integration, and, as such, it might have an appeal to the thousands of devotees to this general principle, even though it may not satisfy the appetites of the more starry-eyed Utopians.

Cornell University

FRANK MEISSNER

ERHARD, LUDWIG, *Germany's Comeback in the World Market*. (With the assistance of Dr. Freiherr von Maltzan. Edited by Dr. Herbert Gross. Translation by W. H. Johnston). New York: Macmillan, 1954. Pp. 276. \$4.50.

Professor Erhard, Minister of Economics for the German Federal Republic, personifies the spectacular economic recovery of his country since 1948. In this book important for both its author and its subject, Dr. Erhard describes the means whereby the Germany of 1946, defeated and occupied, and completely prohibited from engaging directly in foreign trade, regained by 1953 her leading position in European trade, becoming virtually a full and equal member of the Western international free economy, integrated into most of its essential institutions and patterns.

Dr. Erhard attributes the remarkable revival of German trade to two factors: first, the strong initial injection of American aid. “For every German it is therefore axiomatic, a fact forming a permanent element in his historical consciousness, that it was the United States whose foreign aid put into our hand the chief key to open the gates to world markets.” Second, the adoption by Germany of a well-considered liberal economic policy involving, on the international level, a belief in “a free exchange of international goods, in healthy competition among the producers and traders of all countries, and in the increase of productivity through the interna-

tional division of labor." This philosophy he places in contrast with the Schachtian scheme of autarky which distorts rates of exchange, erects protectionist walls and indulges in power politics of which the "final result is the co-existence of a number of hermetically closed groups in which production is pursued regardless of cost, accompanied by so-called full employment and inflation." The essential domestic component of economic liberalism was the monetary reform of mid-1948. "Hitherto there had been a premium on stagnation. . . . It was the initiation of the market economy that awakened entrepreneurial impulses. The worker became ready to work, the trader to sell and the economy in general to produce. In this way alone the conditions making possible a genuine foreign trade were provided."

Emphasis is placed in this book on opposition to a policy of *dirigisme*. Nevertheless the reader will observe that adroit intervention by the German government in the post-war period did establish a framework, not entirely liberal, within which market forces were permitted to operate. Thus importation of raw materials necessary to support export industries was favored, whereas foodstuff imports beyond minimum requirements were curtailed. Several types of "measures to promote exports" were employed which were in fact subsidies, albeit it is argued by Dr. Erhard that these "can be regarded as entirely moderate." One plan, abandoned because of criticism by the International Monetary Fund, even involved partial and discriminatory devaluation of the D-mark vis-à-vis the dollar.

The regional structure of the foreign trade of Germany is clearly outlined and trade relations with specific countries are discussed in detail. Some of Dr. Erhard's conclusions follow: too high a proportion of post-war German trade has been conducted with Western Europe, primarily because of easy entry through the "wide gates" of the European Payments Union and the Organization for European Economic Cooperation. British and German trade are similar and competitive, yet complementarity is possible through partnership in the sterling area. Partial internationalization through such organizations as the Coal and Steel Community threatens Europe's overseas trade position. Despite obstacles "it should be possible to expand trade with" Eastern Europe; "the West is far from holding all the trumps."

Dr. Erhard, looking to the future in his closing chapter, stresses the need for eliminating Germany's favorable balance of payments with the European Payments Union by increasing her dollar-saving imports from that area. He also recommends in dealing with the underdeveloped regions a policy of stimulation of visible imports and capital exports.

Although this book does not blaze new trails for the economic theorist and is too systematic and detailed to enchant the general reader, it possesses interest and significance for the serious student of international affairs.

University of Colorado

CARL MCGUIRE

THE RESEARCH STAFF OF FREE EUROPE PRESS, *Satellite Agriculture in Crisis*. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1954, Pp. 130. \$3.50.

Engels once outlined the general principle behind communist farm policies by stating: "We say frankly that . . . we can bring the peasants to our side only by making promises which we know beforehand we shall not be able to keep." (p. 13). One must credit the Bolsheviks for having lived up to this precept inside as well as outside of Russia. This book tells how it has been done.

Chapter I reviews The Historical Precedent created by Soviet Russia. The evaluation of the significance of the developments is extremely refreshing. The

utility of the collectivization lies clearly in its efficiency as a device which aids the state in attaining economic and political control over the peasant. Without this tight control a rapid industrialization of Russia seemed impossible. Unfortunately Stalin could not have the cake and eat it too. The gain in the intensity of control—the primary objective—was therefore attained at a shockingly high cost in human misery and loss in efficiency of production. To the extent that industrialization was facilitated, one could show that Soviet farm collectivization “succeeded.” In Chapter II the pre-Communist “peasant ecology” is described.

With this general setting in mind Chapters III and IV discuss the gradual transfer of the system into the Bolshevik pattern. The variations on the collectivization theme, as practiced by the individual satellites (Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and Rumania), are documented with whatever statistics are available. The figures are cautiously interpreted, and sufficient warning is issued as to their reliability.

Chapter V gives a most interesting discussion of the implications of the post-Stalinian New Course. This recent “*modus vivendi* between the peasantry and the Communist regimes is precarious and unstable, at best an uneasy truce between essentially antagonistic social forces.” (p. 125) That this forward looking appraisal, or prediction if you please, of the New Course was correct has already been shown by the policy declarations issued at the Czechoslovak and Hungarian Party congresses, in June 1954. The Communist VIP’s were worried about the failure of the farmers to solve the food supply problem. The New Course has apparently not proved the panacea that its authors no doubt hoped it would be. And so, when Rakosi and Zápotocký stressed the “extreme importance” of the medium farms, their speeches were not of a kind that would inspire the peasants with confidence that it is the primary intention of the régime to increase agricultural production. On the contrary, there is again a perhaps somewhat bashful but nevertheless strong emphasis on further consolidation and strengthening of unified agricultural co-operatives, i.e. collectivization.

One wonders whether the use of the word “crisis” in the title of the book is not a bit unfortunate. Are the present events really “a turning point in the progress of an affair . . . [a] sudden or decisive change in the course . . . ,” as Funk and Wagnall’s College Standard Dictionary defines the term? The connotation of a dilemma, which in the foreseeable future might be fatal to the régimes, is easily read into the title. This certainly could not have been the original intention of the authors. On the contrary, an effort is made to show that the satellites have taken many a leaf from the Russian experience, and thus have been able to avoid many mistakes committed by the “Soviet pioneers.” The reviewer would have referred to use the more neutral title “Satellite Agriculture in Transition!” *De gustibus non disputandum est*. One feels grateful to the staff members of Free Europe Press—most of whom are prominent refugees from Communism—that they so clearly stated the premises from which the whole Soviet farm policy developments have to be viewed. People, who derive their salaries partially from State Department funds, must be in possession of a considerable amount of courage when, in the United States, i.e. in 1954, they dare to express the opinion that Russian collectivization was, judged from the Bolshevik point of view, “successful.”

Since the Free Europe Committee is presently preparing several other publications on Satellite countries, a few constructive criticisms of the present volume might prove helpful:

- 1) Very little reference is made to relevant Western literature, which has

recently appeared in reputable scientific journals. Interested readers, most of whom probably have not mastered any of the satellite languages, might like to investigate some of the topics in somewhat more detail. The dozen or so English books which are quoted might not be sufficiently up-to-date.

2) Considerable difficulty was encountered not only in choosing the illustrative statistics but also in construction of appropriate titles for the tables and figures. Revisions were apparently made after the book had gone to press. The list of errata is consequently rather extensive, and thus slightly irritating.

3) There is neither a subject nor a name index.

4) The appearance of the majority of the charts leaves much to be desired, from an aesthetic point of view, that is.

5) The comprehensiveness of coverage is gravely decreased by the ostentatious omission of Eastern Germany. Whatever the emotional justification of such action by the members of the Free Europe Press, to this reviewer it just does not make much sense. For all intents and purposes Eastern Germany is a satellite, and ought therefore to be included in the study.

6) The fact that Albania is left out as well is extremely unfortunate. Albania gets little publicity in the first place—a very regrettable fact considering the strategic importance to Moscow, which she suddenly acquired upon Yugoslavia's defection from the Cominform.

The publishers of the series, *Russian History and World Communism*, (of which the latest volume is No. 13) and the able editor of this "collective authorship" ought to be congratulated on a good job. The book provides a relatively comprehensive review of the last five decades of development. The style is sober and matter-of-fact. The frequent inter-country comparisons of events illustrates the correctness of the "history repeats itself with variations" philosophy. Those who are seriously interested in the *facts* behind the Communist conspiracy would benefit greatly from studying the book very carefully.

Cornell University

FRANK MEISSNER

BLACK, C. E., ed., *Challenge in Eastern Europe*. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1954. Pp. 276. \$4.00.

The twelve pieces forming *Challenge in Eastern Europe* were written by eleven distinguished authors and were presented as lectures at the Institute of Public Affairs and Regional Studies of the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, New York University, in the summer of 1953. The essays are grouped evenly under three headings: 1) The Politics of Eastern Europe; 2) The Development of an Agrarian Society; 3) The Search for Regional Security.

The title of the book and the headings do not stress specifically the fact that most of the ground covered is essentially that of pre-World War II. (Effectively, two-thirds of these lectures deal mostly with that period and only four essays turn resolutely to some of the postwar problems.) As Eastern Europe completes now ten years of postwar upheavals, one has, however, the feeling that perhaps this later period should have received most of the attention in the series of lectures grouped under such an arresting title as *Challenge in Eastern Europe*.

The eight pieces which focus on the prewar period range in subject and approach from (a) a *general historic analysis* (e.g., "Eastern Europe in Historical Perspective" by C. E. Black) to (b) *specific political problems*, also in "historical perspective" (e.g., "The Liberal Tradition" by Ripka, "Authoritarian Forms of Government between the Wars" by Zurcher, "Peasantism" by Pešalji), to (c) *power*

politics analyses and problems of regional equilibrium (e.g., "International Relations between the Wars" by Roberts and "Problems and Prospects of Federation" by Deutsch), and to (d) *economic analysis* ("Land Reform" by Feierabend and "Industrial Policies" by Teleki).

While space prevents us from commenting on each one of these varied essays, we should like to note that as far as the political past is concerned, one does not perhaps get the explanations, which he might have expected, concerning the well-known shortcomings of democratic rule in that part of the world (except Czechoslovakia) before World War II. Notably in the study on "Peasantism" one fails to discover why each and every peasant party (except for Czechoslovakia) has run into defeat and impotence while their leaders were assassinated and the countries were taken over, one after another, by royal *camarilla* dictatorships.

On the economic plane, the two studies presented—those of Feierabend and Teleki—combine for their part quite fortunately into a vigorous over-all analysis of the economies of prewar Eastern Europe. The studies sketch a clear picture of both the material and human resources of the region, and underline the limitations and the drawbacks of most of the prewar economic policies of the various countries of the area.*

The four pieces concerned essentially with the postwar period are: " 'People's Democracy' in Theory and Practice" by Mikolajczyk, "Industrial and Social Policies of the Communist Regimes" by Wszelaki, "The Structure of the Soviet Orbit" by Hoptner, and the concluding piece of the volume, again by Black, "Eastern Europe and the Postwar Balance of Power." These four lectures take up in turn, (a) a *political problem*, (b) an *economic problem*, (c) a *diplomatic and political problem*, and (d) the last one a group of questions related both to *power politics* and the policies of "containment" and "liberation."

The essay of Mikolajczyk is thought-provoking and very well constructed. However, it seems somewhat to miss much of the point by attributing the creation and utilization of the term "people's democracy" (instead of that of "dictatorship of the proletariat") only to a machiavellian device of the Kremlin designed to lull public opinion in the West. While this is probably partly true, it was certainly not the only motive. It can be said with no less reason that the term was used in order to stress the subordinate positions of these countries *vis-à-vis* Soviet Russia, and in order to underline the *pre-eminence* of the latter. Furthermore, it must be noted that in fact the term applied up to 1948/49 to a specific society with a structure of ownership and government distinctly different from that of Soviet Russia itself. The piece by Wszelaki turns its attention precisely to these structural changes in the social and economic body of the region. Wszelaki restates in this connection the already familiar thesis that the long-range economic plans of these countries "have been synchronized with one another and with the Soviet master plans." This contention does not commend itself to us as it does not seem to square with the fact that all these plans are running on *parallel lines* of development.

On the whole, however, the book, carefully edited and "integrated" by Black, is interesting and certainly "challenging" for the East European specialist as well as for the public at large.

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NICOLAS SPULBER

*While Feierabend also discusses some postwar aspects of land reforms and collectivization, his study remains essentially centered on the prewar period.

DEUTSCHER, ISAAC, *The Prophet Armed, Trotsky: 1879-1921*. New York and London: Oxford University Press, 1950. Pp. 540. \$6.00.

When Machiavelli wrote that "all armed prophets have conquered, and the unarmed ones have been destroyed," he could hardly have composed a sentence more apposite to Mr. Deutscher's needs in setting forth his interpretation of Trotsky's career. In this work the author's literary gifts find a more congenial subject, and thus he has produced a better book than his *Stalin: a Political Biography*. Likewise he makes a greater contribution, for it is the story of Trotsky, more perhaps than that of any other single man, whose suppression best illustrates the magnitude of the distortion which may flow from exercise of the more devious weapons of the totalitarian state.

Beginning with Trotsky's boyhood in Yanovka and youth in Odessa and Nikolayev, the book analyzes the formation of his Westernizing and Marxist views, their literary expression in *Iskra* and their practice in the St. Petersburg Soviet of 1905. Following the years of exile, largely spent in Central Europe, Trotsky returned to Russia in 1917. The remaining half of the book discusses his activity in the October Revolution and Civil War, including his part in the insurrection, his term as Foreign Commissar through the signing of Brest-Litovsk, and his War Commissarship. But the decisive step of Trotsky's career at least up to 1921, in the author's opinion, came with his adoption of "disciplinarian" economic policies by which he sought to utilize, in the arena of economic planning and mobilization of labor, the military methods so successful during the Civil War. Thus Trotsky "urged the Bolshevik party to 'substitute' itself for the working classes," beginning a chain of events which he himself had predicted would end only when "a single dictator would substitute himself for the Central Committee." In Deutscher's view, this step had the coloring of classical tragedy: "Placed as he was he could hardly have avoided it."

At this juncture, the author believes, the Russian proletariat, "having exhausted itself in the revolution and the civil war, . . . had almost ceased to exist as a political factor." The implication is that if the proletariat had been capable "of exercising its own dictatorship," all would have been well. One may place such hypotheses in the realm of Marxist mythology and yet accept the author's conclusion that in response to the situation actually existing, Trotsky developed many of the policies and arguments which Stalin used with staggering consequences a decade later.

Nevertheless, the established fashion of concentrating on selected Bolshevik personalities when writing the history of twentieth-century Russia has hampered the composition of this book. It is not accurate, for example, that Plehve "dispersed" the *zemstvos* (p. 107), which held national congresses throughout his ministry; nor is it proven that "nearly all Ostyaks and Zyrians" were (before the Revolution) "constantly drunk"; nor is it true to say that "with the *coup* of 3 June autocracy was fully re-established" (p. 174); and though it is technically correct that "the Cadets had been constitutional monarchists" (p. 339), they were always democrats and by 1917 (the period in question) openly republicans, so that part of the analysis which follows is vitiated.

Despite the fact that Mr. Deutscher operates within a rather limited framework of assumptions, he has done much to elucidate the fate of some of the nobler aspirations of early Bolshevism. The reason for the ruthless resort to arms by the Bolshevik prophets was forecast by Trotsky in 1905, when he wrote that after the seizure of power "two major features of the proletarian policy, its *collectivism* and

its *internationalism*, would meet with [the peasants'] opposition" (quoted p. 158). In the preparation of the Communist offensive against Russian individualism and nationalism, Trotsky's role was, as the book shows, a decisive one.

University of Washington

DONALD W. TREADGOLD

PETERSON, EDWARD NORMAN, *Hjalmar Schacht: For And Against Hitler. A Political-Economic Study of Germany 1923-1945*. Boston: Christopher Pub. House, 1954. Pp. 416. \$5.00.

In this book the author gives a very complete description of the economic and political changes which were brought about in Germany by World War I, and he shows how in every economic crisis in the years between the wars the name of Schacht appeared. In and out of office he became a legendary figure who wielded great influence. He derived his authority from a number of personal achievements: the successful stabilization of the inflationary German currency in 1923, his books, articles and lectures (among them 40 lectures at U. S. universities), and his perfect command of English and French, and, last not least, his ability as a negotiator at international conferences.

As director of the Reichsbank he steered the financial course of Germany through post-war chaos, bankruptcy, Dawes and Young plans. He procured foreign loans which started with 100 million Marks in 1926, and increased to 20 billion in 1931. Being a conservative banker, he objected to the speculation and credit inflation rampant in Germany at the time, and ordered them stopped.

He lured and coerced the Western and Balkan countries into trade agreements by sternly pointing out what irreparable damage would result from a loss of public confidence in currencies and investments. Firmly standing by his principles, Schacht repaid loans even after the crash of 1929, and publicly expressed his disapproval when Hitler and Goering defaulted on loans.

The alarming number of unemployed which rose to 6 million (out of a total of 16 million workers) between 1929 and 1933, had almost disappeared in 1938, a fact the author ascribes to Schacht's intricate and clever financing of Germany's export and public works programs. The expenditure for rearmament for the years 1931-1937 amounted to only 3-14 per cent of the total. Money in circulation amounted to 6.6 billion Marks in 1936, but after 1937 when Goering forced Schacht from all key positions except the Reichbank, Goering inflated the currency to 7.8 billion by March, 1938, to 10 billion by the time of the Munich crisis, and finally to 54 billion in January, 1945.

Schacht, who insisted on being considered a banker, not a politician, is described by the author as competent and hard working, but at the same time as a man obsessed by a driving ambition and a desire always to be right. In his never-ending arguments with government officials he seems to have shown remarkable moral courage, publicly denouncing certain Nazi policies.

The book reveals an intricate knowledge of the economic problems of that time, but some readers will take issue with the author's appraisal of the groups that wielded political power in Germany, e.g. his claim that the industrialists of the Ruhr did not interfere with political decisions prior to 1930, when in reality German heavy industry, often in collaboration with the army, had clandestine but effective ways of influencing major political decisions. It may be correct to say that most German industrialists did not finance Hitler outright, but the fact remains that tremendous sums were extorted by the Nazis from German industry in the

form of so-called voluntary donations, sums which do not appear in statistics and budgets because the Nazis were adept at bypassing the Ministry of Finance.

Schacht emerges from the pages of this book as the contradictory figure he is: competent as a banker, a sarcastic critic, self-righteous, a courageous fighter. In the end Schacht survived Republic and Nazi Third Reich, Gestapo and concentration camps, was acquitted by the Nuremberg Tribunal and German denazification courts. He seems to have emerged from these ordeals unchanged, as querulous and ambitious as ever.

Vassar College

ALMA M. LUCKAU

HERRE, PAUL, *Kronprinz Wilhelm: Seine Rolle in der deutschen Politik*. Munich: C. H. Beck, 1954. Pp. 280. DM 15.

William, Crown Prince of Prussia, who died in July 1951 at the age of sixty-nine, lived in revolutionary times. He experienced the glitter and power of Wilhelmian Germany, the upheaval of World War I, the fall of the monarchy, the establishment of the Weimar Republic, the dictatorship of Hitler, the defeat and collapse in World War II, and the occupation and partition of Germany. Neither as Crown Prince nor as claimant to the throne after the death of William II, did he exert a decisive influence upon the events which shaped his destiny and that of the German nation.

Based upon the Prince's private papers, contemporary records, memoirs and diaries, Professor Herre has produced a critical study of the role of the Crown Prince in German political history. Only a Hohenzollern partisan could disagree with his judicious interpretation of the Crown Prince's personality, character, and abilities as manifested in his political actions.

Educated for the nineteenth rather than the twentieth century, steeped in the tradition of the Prussian *Obrigkeitsstaat*, intelligent but superficial, and easily influenced, he became identified in the public mind at home and abroad with reactionary, militarist and Pan-German elements and won for himself the abiding distrust of German working class and middle class liberals. Opposition between king and crown prince was traditional in the Hohenzollern house, and Prince William was no exception. He was critical of his father, his ministers and cabinet secretaries and their policies. In consequence, with William II's passive consent, the ministers isolated him from the business of making and executing policies.

As commander of the Fifth German Army on the western front, Prince William occupied for the first time a completely responsible position. It evoked and deepened all his best personal qualities and won him the respect and regard of his associates and supervisors. William II was, therefore, more inclined to accept advice from the Crown Prince and tolerate interference in political and constitutional issues that arose during the war.

But even in the years 1916-1918, when the Crown Prince's political weight and activity were greatest, his influence was not decisive, nor was it always used in support of the wisest policies. He supported Tirpitz against Bethmann-Hollweg in the submarine warfare issue and played an unenviable role in Bethmann's dismissal, as well as in the fall of Valentini, chief of the Emperor's civil cabinet. In the issue of modernizing the Prussian constitution and establishing responsible parliamentary government in the Empire—a necessity if national cohesion were to be maintained—he contributed to the postponement and delay until the country was ripe for revolution. In these decisive events Prince William was not acting always on his own judgment but was frequently the spokesman, or intermediary, for the

military panjandrums—Hindenburg and Ludendorff—in their invasion and conquest of the civil power.

After the fall of the monarchy in 1918, the Prince did little to restore the prestige of the Hohenzollern dynasty. He followed his father into exile when he should have remained in Germany; and when he returned, to appear again as a public figure, he made the fatal mistake of aligning himself politically, for a brief period, with Adolf Hitler and the Nazis. The measure of his mistakes and lack of political judgment is shown by the contrasting conduct of Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria, also a field commander and claimant to a throne.

One cannot praise Professor Herre's contribution too highly. It is distinguished by mastery of complex political events to which the Crown Prince was a party; by judicious evaluation of sources; by judgments derived from evidence, and not from bias or preconceptions; and by tactfulness in treating a difficult theme. We can indeed praise the book, while withholding praise for the subject.

University of Virginia

ORON JAMES HALE

HAINES, C. GROVE, ed., *The Threat of Soviet Imperialism*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1954. Pp. 402. \$5.00.

Despite its rather formidable title, this book is not simply a handbook of propaganda or a call to action. It is, on the whole, a sober and frequently brilliant analysis of the premises, the apparatus, and the activities of communists and communism throughout the world.

The book is composed of twenty papers and discussions presented at a conference in Washington in August, 1953. The conference was sponsored by the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, and the general theme was "The Problem of Soviet Imperialism." It is understandable that the editor felt that the prevailing climate of opinion necessitated a slight alteration of the title.

Much of the inherent value of the book is due to the galaxy of experts who prepared the papers and who led the discussions. Despite the presence of persons who might, by some criteria, find themselves in opposition, the area of disagreement was surprisingly small. George F. Keenan, Mose L. Harvey, Frederick Barghoorn, Cyril Black, and Nicholas Timasheff, Harry Schwartz, S. Harrison Thomson, A. Rossi, and K. A. Wittfogel—only to cite at random a few of the contributors and discussants—could agree that there was a threat; it was real, and it was immediate.

In a section entitled "The Soviet Posture Toward the Non-Soviet World" three long papers deal with the ideological and geo-strategical mainsprings of Soviet policy and action, which, considered together, lend little support to those who attempt to interpret Soviet action by any single pet theory. History plays a part, ideas have their function, the realities of power and the dynamics of an ongoing revolution must all be considered. The objective has been, and remains, the sovietization of the world. As Mose L. Harvey stated, "There is no place in the Marxist-Leninist outlook for genuine compromise, for any reconciliation of differences. Struggle against the capitalist enemy is the law of life" (p. 59). Simple logic—forever the great enemy of history—would seem to dictate anticipatory action by the free world, but none of the authors subscribe to that theory. They insist that against the posture of Soviet and communist power there must be a countervailing force of military, political, economic and ideological power.

In the second part of the book several authors describe the technique of Soviet subversion, and concentrate particularly upon the instruments of trade, ideology,

diplomacy and force. They indicate the degree to which each serves the ends of the Kremlin, and give some insight into the delineation of alleged and real intentions. Frederick Barghoorn suggests, "There are good reasons for believing that the process of decay of Communist ideology is already under way," but he concedes that the era of danger is far from past. Most of the authors point out that the year 1947 marked a turning point in American policy *vis à vis* the Soviet Union. They might have added that the following year, 1948, saw a considerable defection of European sympathizers from the Communist cause.

The evaluation of Soviet capabilities to effect Kremlin policy constitutes the third section of the book. In the economic, the scientific, the political, and the military areas there is ample data to support the position that Soviet power is more apparent than real. However, the impression remains that a régime which has survived so many hardships has demonstrated an amazing capacity to survive. Any extrapolation of current data into the future would suggest that the real threat of Soviet imperialism lies a decade or two in the future. The comments by Raymond H. Fisher on the fine paper by Harry Schwartz seem particularly pertinent to this reviewer.

The book closes with an analysis of the impact of communism upon western Europe and Latin America, Asia, and Africa. The several papers deal competently with the pattern as found in several countries, and the sober recounting of what has taken place in such scattered areas as France, Kenya, Indonesia and China serve to give considerable perspective to the problem of Soviet imperialism. But there is little pessimism about the future. The tide can be stopped, and even forced to recede, providing effective U. S. leadership is felt in critical areas. Paul H. Nitze surmises that, "Far from being on the Soviet side, time and history are on our side if we but live up to the potentialities and opportunities of our position and keep alive our sense of urgency." With that statement this reviewer is almost persuaded.

University of Nebraska

ALBIN T. ANDERSON

MEISSNER, BORIS, *Russland, die Westmächte und Deutschland. Die sowjetische Deutschlandpolitik 1943-1955*. Hamburg: Nölke Verlag, 1953. Pp. 372. DM 12.

This is the only comprehensive account published in Germany thus far dealing in great detail with Soviet Foreign policy toward Germany in the decade after Stalingrad. The author is well known as an authority on Russia through his contributions to such periodicals as *Aussenpolitik* and especially *Osteuropa*. Of the latter magazine he is a contributing editor. Mr. Meissner is at present a higher official in the German Foreign Office.

The treatment of the material is at times somewhat uneven, chronologically as well as in terms of the larger framework in which Soviet foreign policy toward Germany in the post World War II period has to be understood. The three war-time conferences, i.e. Teheran, Yalta, Potsdam, are covered in the first 76 pages. The remainder of the book—almost 300 pages—is devoted to the period 1945-1952 (not 1953 as the title page indicates) and closes with an analysis of the Soviet proposals for a peace treaty with Germany which accompanied the Soviet note to the three Western Powers of March 10, 1952, and a discussion of the 19th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in October of the same year. In the center of discussion and analysis throughout most of the book are the meetings of the Foreign ministers of the four Great Powers during the period indicated. Each

conference is treated in the same order, namely: 1. General soviet goals. 2. Special goals concerning Germany. 3. Questions pertaining to boundaries, division of Germany, federalization. 4. Occupation policy, democratization, denazification. 5. Disarmament, demilitarization, Ruhr control. 6. Political unity, central government, central administration. 7. Economic unity, level of industrial production, reparations. 8. Peace treaty and end of occupation. This strict and exact organization of the material makes it easy to trace any one specific aspect of the problem through the entire period. This and the comprehensive bibliographical references in the 1150 footnotes, including always Russian printed material, constitute the value of the work as a reference book. As a story, it makes most tedious reading. Its style and make-up remind one of a doctoral dissertation which has not yet been transformed into a book. At times the quotations from speeches and documents are so lengthy that the work becomes a collection of sources, linked together by short comments from the editor. Also, the book is unnecessarily repetitious. True enough, the same arguments were used, the same issues hashed over again and again at those conferences, but the reader might well be spared part of it or told about it in a more condensed way. Mr. Meissner himself stresses the preliminary character of his treatise which is intended first of all as a preparatory work to a later major opus in international law, dealing with the legal problems raised by the Soviet "interventionist occupation" of Middle Germany, the annexation of the territory east of the Oder-Neisse line by Poland and the Soviet Union, the legal aspects of a peace treaty with Germany and the structural changes of the European State System.

The most interesting parts of the book are, since the material used is all printed even if sometimes not easily accessible, the not too numerous comments and interpretations of the author. A word of caution is in order here, though. These comments are not as clearly distinguished from the well documented other parts of the book as one could wish and one wonders how Mr. Meissner knows so surely the general Soviet goals at a given conference or, e.g., what motivated Stalin and Molotov after Yalta to take the course they embarked upon before and at Potsdam. This reviewer considers Mr. Meissner's explanations as to Soviet goals and motivations essentially correct, however, and his criticism pertains only to the occasionally somewhat dogmatic way in which they are presented. Interestingly enough, Mr. Meissner sees a change beginning in Soviet foreign policy, from an offensive to a defensive strategy, with a desire to liquidate the cold war and stress peaceful co-existence, already in the Fall of 1952, at the time of the 19th Party Congress, that is while Stalin was still alive.

This is a competent and valuable treatment of the topic for reference purpose and in the limits of what material was available to the author until the end of 1952. Needless to say, a more comprehensive and streamlined account can only be written from greater historical distance and after the end of the story is at least in sight.

Cornell College

ERIC C. KOLLMAN

RITTER, GERHARD, *Carl Goerdeler und die deutsche Widerstandsbewegung*. Stuttgart. Deutsche Verlagsanstalt, 1954. 630 Pp.

No righteous man need hope for a better biographer than the dean of German historians, Professor Gerhard Ritter of Freiburg/Breisgau; and certainly Carl Goerdeler, the Oberbürgermeister of Leipzig who might have become Chancellor of the government which might have succeeded Hitler's if the July 20, 1944, attempt

on Hitler's life had been successful or if Hitler had been otherwise deposed, was a righteous man.

Many questions concerning Goerdeler remain unanswered; but only Professor Ritter, who was associated with him in the resistance movement, was imprisoned while he was, and saw him led away to his execution the day before the bombing which destroyed the People's Court and many of its files—a bombing to which the author and his Freiburg colleague Professor Constantin von Dietze, now president of the laymen's organization of the German Evangelical Church, are providentially indebted for their own survival—knows the answers to as many of those questions as anyone now living. Even where motivation is involved, the author's priceless combination of historian's imagination and intellectual integrity enable him to interpret faithfully and convincingly even those acts of Goerdeler which he judges to have been unwise, and views with which he disagreed at the time.

Goerdeler at one time thought it possible, for example, to overthrow Hitler's government without assassinating him; Ritter doubted that. After the failure of the assassination attempt, Goerdeler thought Hitler might be brought to see the error of his ways and induced to end the war. Ritter knew better. The historian knew that Goerdeler's ideas of the kind of peace terms Germany could expect even in 1944 if Hitler were deposed were fantastically unrealistic. Goerdeler's testimony before the Gestapo was not helpful either to Ritter or to von Dietze; yet both speak of him, and of this fact, without bitterness. Both are beyond bitterness. So was Goerdeler.

Why did Goerdeler testify so freely? His biographer does not believe that he was drugged or tortured—except as his whole prison experience and endless questioning were a torture to him. He seemed, at first, to have been impelled by an unbounded faith in the power of reason. If he could only show his questioners that right, reason, true patriotism, and the intellectual and spiritual elite of Germany were on his side, the Hitler régime must be overthrown and right must prevail. So he named his associates proudly—when he knew they were already accused and in custody. (About four hundred officials were busy with the inquisition, and seven thousand persons imprisoned.) Later, he tried to make himself seem indispensable to the inquiry, then to spin out the process and so prolong the lives of the accused until the war should end—as he nearly did. Toward the end, suffering by then from “imprisonment psychosis,” he had visions of himself as personal mediator with Hitler.

Goerdeler was one of many who forfeited their lives—and many others risked their lives—not so much in the exercise of a theoretical right to revolt as in recognition of a patriotic duty to resist. All honor to them!

University of Wisconsin/Bad Godesberg

CHESTER V. EASUM

SONTAG, ERNST, *Korfanty—Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der polnischen Ansprüche auf Oberschlesien*. Kitzingen-Main Holzner, 1954. Pp. 213.

At last the inevitable has happened. From the Göttingen Circle, as a contribution to the Year-book of the Königsberg University in exile, there has come a serious monograph by a well-informed German state-official on the life and work of the man whom the Prussian authorities of fifty years ago (and still more than fifteen years later!) regarded as the chief trouble-maker in Upper Silesia—Adalbert (Wojciech) Korfanty. They knew him before the turn of the century as a rising young

¹(See also Gerhard Ritter “Carl Goerdeler und das Ende des deutschen Widerstandes,” *Der Monat*, February, 1955, 387-401.)

journalist, then as Polish deputy to the *Landtag* and to the Imperial House in Berlin, next as leader of the national rising and as Plebiscite Commissioner (appointed by Warsaw) during the post-war days, and finally as leader of the Opposition in the Silesian Diet, virtually disowned by his own Polish countrymen, and even subjected to personal indignities in 1930 at Bereza Kontuska. Dr. Sontag rightly says that the Germans did not love Korfanty; but he is also right in saying that even they did not treat him as badly as did the post-1926 government in Warsaw. It was certainly not to the credit of this "new order" that not a single street in an Upper Silesian town was named for the man who had done more than anyone else to awaken the national sentiments of his fellows for their Polish motherland. How far Korfanty was himself to blame for this the reviewer has attempted to explain in *The Drama of Upper Silesia* (1935). It is perhaps significant that Dr. Sontag nowhere mentions this book; possibly because his own was written before the English edition appeared in London in 1936.

The work before us is based on first-hand knowledge and on careful study of materials. Of course it supports the German point of view, which was that the Upper Oderland owed everything to German money and German enterprise; and that the native-born "Wasserpöhlchen" had no real affinities with the Polish nation over the border. Much is made of the way Polish leaders, including Pilsudski, cared little about the fate of this ugly, though wealthy, industrial area; and the Germans are held to have lost it only because of the international situation.

Not that the author descends to the level of some of the cheap diatribes against everything Polish published (even in English) between the wars. He knows that the common people of Upper Silesia had real grievances—in particular against the Bismarckian *Kulturkampf*, and in subsequent years against the grasping régime of the big mine and foundry owners. He also knows how what had been a growing cultural and economic conflict ripened into an open political and national one just before and during World War I; but he does not realize that, while these people were not drawn to Imperial Russia as an alternative to the *status quo ante*, they were bound to be drawn by a thousand ties to a rehabilitated Poland. Not even the seemingly adverse verdict of the 1920 plebiscite could alter the fact that half-a-million votes went for union with the land of their fathers.

Korfanty suffered throughout from vaulting ambition, which over-leaped itself. He could have become Governor of the new Polish province, but he had visions of larger things and ran into opposition that proved too strong. When the reviewer got to know him in the early thirties, he was Editor-in-chief of *Polonia*, and was preaching the "Thomist" philosophy of life—something very different from his practice of a dozen years earlier. The fates had gone against him, and he was to die just before the storm broke in 1939. But it could have been some comfort to know that when the Nazi troops overran Silesia the headquarters of *Polonia* were ransacked, looted and burned, while the office of *Polska Zachodnia* (the government organ) was hardly touched. This book will provoke Polish replies, and some day we may have a reliable book on Korfanty in English.

The University of British Columbia

W. J. ROSE

KOHN, HANS, ed., *German History: Some New German Views*. Boston: Beacon Press, 1954. Pp. 224. \$4.00.

Except for Friedrich Meinecke, Veit Valentin, Johannes Ziekursch, and a few other scholars, German historians after 1918 continued in the pre-war historical tradition, exalting power, glorifying the national state and justifying war as an in-

strument of national policy. Their view of the past encouraged renunciation of the Weimar Republic. It inspired hostility toward the West. It thus contributed to the Nazi victory in 1933 and to the German débacle in 1945. A good many contemporary German scholars are determined that this shall not happen again. Since 1945 they have been conducting the most serious reexamination of German historical assumptions since the days of Ranke. It is still too early to know how much influence they wield over the teaching and writing of history in Germany. But thanks to Hans Kohn and the translator of these essays, Herbert H. Rowen, British and American students of Central European affairs can readily determine the depths of the soul-searching in which the leading German revisionists have been engaged.

Three leitmotifs sound throughout these essays, which were originally published separately: the need to revise historical concepts, the problem of militarism, and the role of Bismarck in German history. Five essays, those by Friedrich Meinecke, Alfred von Martin, Johann Olbrecht von Rantzau, Walther Hofer, and Hajo Holborn, criticize the previously predominant conceptual approaches in German historiography. All agree that Ranke's influence should be diminished. Meinecke urges a rediscovery of the humanistic history of Jakob Burckhardt, and Holborn more specifically insists that German historians must acknowledge "the freedom of human action in the struggle with historical necessity"; Hofer and von Martin are in agreement with von Rantzau that their fellow historians should learn to "study problems in a supra-national spirit."

Three essays deal directly or indirectly with the influence of militarism upon the domestic and foreign policy of Germany. Karl Buchheim and Hans Herzfeld show how it has bolstered authoritarianism and curbed the rise of the "Civilian Spirit" in Germany. Ludwig Dehio is more specifically concerned with militarism in the twentieth century. Dehio views the two world wars as phases in four centuries of struggle for hegemony in Europe. German unification upset the balance of power in Europe by making Germany the strongest power on the continent; as such, she "could not help but seize hegemony in Europe." This smacks more of a traditional view of a German history than a new one, despite Dehio's muted call for "ruthless recognition of the frightful role which we have played as the last and therefore the most demoniacal hegemonic power of old Europe in decline." Unconsciously, it would seem, most of Dehio's important essay is written in the spirit of apology, rationalization, resignation, and renunciation of responsibility which caused German intellectuals to accept Hitlerism as inevitable.

All of the essayists represented in this volume acknowledge some degree of unique German responsibility for the troubles of the twentieth century. Most of them look to Bismarck in seeking to understand the unfortunate development of Germany in the twentieth century. Franz Schnabel repudiates not only the Iron Chancellor's methods but also his goal, German unification under Prussian leadership. Schnabel's protest is only in part an echo of the *grossdeutsch* Catholic criticisms of the 1860's; it also expresses the conviction that the national state idea is a *reductio ad absurdum*. Karl Buchheim is more concerned about Bismarck's influence upon German domestic politics. He contends that Bismarck, led by "a mad lust for power," thwarted "the natural growth of the democratic forces in Germany." But Alfred von Martin suggests that these democratic forces were not very strong even in Bismarck's own generation. His conclusion: neither a demoniacal spirit of the age nor the psychopathic urges of single personalities explain the Ger-

man problem; that problem is inherent in the German national character itself, older than Bismarck and outlasting him and Hitler.

Dehio with his conservative approach and von Martin with his bitter oversimplification of the German problem represent the poles between which the other scholars represented in the volume vary. The soundest approach to the history of Germany, it would seem, lies between the extremes and comprehends them both. It is an approach equally valid for Germans and non-Germans. It is the approach which Meinecke wisely prescribed in 1948 when he concluded: "We must rediscover ourselves by throwing light upon the historical transformations of our own character and the interweaving of our guilt and our fate."

Tulane University

JOHN L. SNELL

LEVERKUEHN, PAUL, *German Military Intelligence*. Translated from the German by R. H. Stevens and Constantine Fitz-Gibbon. London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1954. Pp. 209. 16s.

A scholarly history of the German Intelligence service (*Abwehr*) must be based on documents now held in Washington. Herr Leverkuehn, not having access to them, relies on memoir and memory, his own and those of obliging fellow-workers in the *Abwehr*. As their identity is not revealed, the quality of these sources cannot be ascertained. We simply read, to quote but once: "The Intelligence Officer of the Hamburg station responsible (*sic*) has given the following account . . ." (p. 83). This is the kind of toying with cloak-and dagger secretiveness which, presumably, is to enhance the appeal to the general reader for whom the book is written.

Herr Leverkuehn makes much of his personal experience. He was "Chief of the Istanbul Station and also of the branch of the intelligence service called the Near East War Organization" from 1941-44 (p. 2). It is difficult to see how any one so far removed from the center of activities during those crucial years could have gained a comprehensive knowledge of *Abwehr* activities. Nonetheless he claims to have had "ample opportunity" to observe activities in the headquarters at Berlin.

German Military Intelligence does not even approach comprehensiveness. Herr Leverkuehn writes whereof he and his associates are familiar. He first relates the high-lights of his career in Istanbul. This account is neither very exciting nor impressive. Then follow two chapters on the organization of the *Abwehr* and the scope of its activities. Although available elsewhere, this information is clearly presented and useful. The main body of the book deals with intelligence activities in the several theaters of war. The treatment is impressionistic and haphazard. The final chapter pays homage to Admiral Canaris, Chief of the *Abwehr*.

The author, though an intelligence officer, lays open his biases. He believes that the German minority was "badly treated" by the Czechs (p. 44). When Bulgaria was invaded by the German army in 1941, "every Bulgar" bade it a "friendly welcome" (p. 145). The *Abwehr* in France conducted its struggle in a decent and honorable manner"; however, the "intrusion of the Communist territories gave it, on the French side, a totally different character" (p. 111). It is preposterous to insist that the terrorist activities of the resistance were solely communist-inspired. Besides, there are many intelligence activities which cannot be conducted in a spirit of decency and honor.

There are illustrations, some of which are less than interesting. The transla-

tion is pedestrian, sometimes awkward, at times even hair-raising. ("... the friendly inclined Bulgarian military establishments," p. 142.)
University of Colorado

GERHARD LOOSE

COLE, G. D. H., *Marxism and Anarchism, 1850-1890*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1954. Pp. 482. \$6.00.

Marxism and Anarchism, which is Volume II of Professor Cole's comprehensive *A History of Socialist Thought*, presents a thorough, illuminating and extremely well written account of a crucial phase in the development of the Socialist movement. The author's achievement is all the greater because he was hampered by his "linguistic limitations—by knowing no Russian, very little German, and practically no Spanish or Italian" (p. vi); and the principal socialist leaders with whom Mr. Cole deals were, of course, Germans and Russians.

While much of the ground traversed by Mr. Cole will be, of necessity, familiar to many of his readers, his study provides valuable information on some of the less well known figures in the Socialist movement (for instance, Baron Jean Hippolyte de Colins, inventor of "Rational Socialism"), and his comments on the better known leaders are penetrating and thought-provoking. Mr. Cole aptly quotes Herzen's observation that "Communism is Russian autocracy turned upside down" and Benoit Malon's reference (in his *History of Socialism* published in the 1880's) to the fear in the West "that Russia might impose on Europe some sort of despotic Communism" (p. 45). The incisive chapter on the Paris Commune is a brilliant piece of historical analysis and should be read by all who wish to understand this much misrepresented and, in retrospect, vastly important event.

Marx and Engels naturally loom large in Mr. Cole's picture as do the Anarchists: Bakunin, "who was always a good deal of an ass as well as a volcanic force" (p. 193) and the "essentially lovable" Prince Kropotkin (p. 351), to mention only two.

Mr. Cole's interpretations are never commonplace or trite. "The *Communist Manifesto* had been a clarion-call to action, not a systematic treatise . . .," he writes. "During the actual period of the revolution, it had been almost without influence on the course of events: with the Revolution's eclipse it looked like being altogether forgotten. . . . It is fair to say that no contemporary observer guessed, or could have guessed, that a century later the most living and often-quoted document of the European revolutionary uprisings would be this pamphlet, issued by a small and obscure German sect, of whom most people—even most of the revolutionaries—had never even heard" (pp. 12-13). Mr. Cole, needless to say, does not attempt to deny or minimize the place of Marx in the history of Socialist thought. Yet his analysis of the Marxian theory of value leads him to the conclusion that "to call such a theoretical structure 'scientific' is really an entire misnomer. It is in truth a gigantic metaphysical conception, quite unrelated to any statement or hypothesis that can be tested or verified" (p. 288).

The chapters dealing with the Socialist movement in the United States, England, Belgium and Italy may appear somewhat blurred and lacking in sharpness, but for this failing, if failing it is, the author is hardly to be blamed. Contradictions, confusion, and uncertainty are inherent in the history of Socialism, especially in its formative stage.

Columbia University

MICHAEL T. FLORINSKY

SHANAHAN, WILLIAM O., *German Protestants Face the Social Question*, Volume I, *The Conservative Phase, 1815-1871*. Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1954. Pp. 434. \$6.75.

In the period from 1815 to 1871 Protestants did not face the social question. This is Professor Shanahan's claim, presented on the basis of thorough research and in considerable detail. At first preoccupied with theological discussion and later involved in the struggle for German unity, German Protestants largely ignored the new problems which were the result of the industrial revolution and the rise of an urban society.

The author clarifies a number of confused issues. He shows that the social development in Germany was not a Lutheran development, as has been frequently asserted. For "German political history . . . conspired against the free development of Luther's social teaching. Its critical elements were suppressed while its conservative features were exaggerated" (p. 6). Evaluating Ernst Troeltsch's analysis, Shanahan states with abundant justification, "Troeltsch confused Lutheranism with Germany," (p. 45). In the Scandinavian countries and in Slovakia the Lutheran Church took an entirely different position. In Germany, Protestantism at first ignored the social question, but when this attitude was no longer possible the question was approached in superficially moralistic terms. The plight of the proletariat was seen largely as the result of alcohol and laziness. Wichern and Bodelschwingh, in spite of their tremendous practical accomplishments in alleviating suffering and need, operated with a rather superficial understanding of the economic sources of this need, a weakness shared by even the great charitable movements of the nineteenth century. Since the political energies of Protestantism were soon channeled mainly into the Conservative party, the economic solution suggested by Protestants was to return to the good old days of a corporate society dominated by agriculture. There was no genuine confrontation of the social question on the part of Protestants as a group until their feelings about the subject had been reinforced by facts. Shanahan points out that this did not occur until university professors had joined the Inner Mission movement and focussed the vague feelings of the leadership into concrete social action. The author suggests that Adolf Wagner, professor of political economy at the University of Berlin, who shared the platform with Wichern at the congress of the Inner Mission of 1871, was this kind of spokesman. By the end of the period under investigation this participation of experts promised that Protestantism would leave the realm of generalities in its dealings with social questions and propose a more concrete and realistic program.

Professor Shanahan has collected and expertly presented a great deal of important information which has not previously been available. Yet the book raises many questions. The title leads one to believe that the social-ethic of Protestantism would be examined; the book, however, only touches upon these problems and, ignoring the theologians, concentrates heavily on the thought of politicians who often were only "accidentally" protestant. In fact, the characteristic of the nineteenth century Protestant politicians in Germany was that they depended basically upon Roman Catholic rather than Protestant sources in their efforts to order society. Many of the philosophers of Protestant conservatism operated with notions that were borrowed from Roman Catholic political theory rather than from the Reformation. Shanahan mentions the resemblance between Friedrich Julius Stahl, the intellectual leader of orthodox Protestant conservatism, and Molina, and traces the influence of Roman Catholic social thought through Johann Adam Möhler (p. 252). This makes the earlier observation about Stahl that "no other German political theorist under-

stood Luther so well . . ." appear questionable (p. 250). It is significant that earlier spokesmen for the conservative point of view, Adam Müller and Carl Ludwig von Haller, had actually been converted from Protestantism to Roman Catholicism as a logical consequence of their social views. And Ludwig von Gerlach, one of the main spokesmen for Protestant political thought during the period discussed in this volume, eventually chose to sit with the Roman Catholic Center party in parliament because he believed that in Bismarck's *Kulturkampf* this party defended Christian values and institutions (p. 415).

All this indicates that German Protestantism did not develop social ethics on the basis of its own fundamental insight, namely the doctrine of the universal priesthood of all believers and the understanding of work as "calling." Instead it borrowed Roman Catholic notions of the "Christian state" and thus thoroughly confused the functions of Law and Gospel which Luther had attempted to keep separate. It appears that nineteenth century German Protestantism was effectively cut off from Luther's penetrating insights into the nature of society and the Christian task in society, for Luther had long ago become merely an abstract symbol. The Luther who could have helped German Protestantism face the social question in the nineteenth century was not re-discovered until Karl Holl began to publish his pioneer work in the twentieth century.

State University of Iowa

GEORGE WOLFGANG FORRELL

MCNEILL, WILLIAM HARDY, *America, Britain, and Russia: Their Co-operation and Conflict, 1941-1946*, London: Oxford University Press, 1953. Pp. 819. \$15.00.

McNeill's impressive account of inter-Allied relations is a part of the six-volume *Survey of International Affairs, 1939-1946*, a general history of the Second World War, prepared under the editorship of Arnold Toynbee. It is based entirely on published materials, including some consultation of the contemporary press. It is thus in no sense an "official" history, and foreign office archives were not consulted nor were the major surviving participants interviewed. At the same time it is more than a mere summary of published materials, for the author contributes at many points his own judgments and conjectures. It has moreover benefitted from the research facilities and experience of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, under whose auspices it was prepared with the assistance of Fulbright and Rockefeller grants.

McNeill's narrative is organized in three main parts. The first takes the story from Pearl Harbor to the Cairo and Teheran conferences at the end of 1943, when the planning of Allied strategy was the main problem; the second carries the story to the Yalta conference, a period in which the discussion of post-war problems became prominent; and the third part concludes with a discussion of the breakdown of Allied co-operation from Yalta to the third session of the Council of Foreign Ministers which was held in New York at the end of 1946. In a much briefer Part IV, McNeill presents his "Reflections and General Observations." A chronology of the major Allied conferences and meetings, and a valuable essay on Lend-Lease by Sir David Waley are also included. Six maps depict the military situation in Europe and Asia at critical stages of the war; and three world maps have been added to illustrate Toynbee's thesis that the arena of international affairs has now been expanded to include three-quarters of a sphere, with only the South Polar circle remaining untraversable.

In view of the co-operation of an American scholar with a British research institute, and of the relative abundance of published materials, it is not surprising

that the treatment of Anglo-American relations is the most valuable part of the book. McNeill is particularly successful in interpreting the complex relationship between Churchill and Roosevelt. He notes that British policy was of necessity subordinated ultimately to that of the United States, and describes the strains resulting from this unequal relationship when fundamental differences of opinion occurred. The British—and incidentally, the Russian—tendency to subordinate military to political aims underlay most of these differences, for Roosevelt and his colleagues always thought primarily in military terms. McNeill reviews with admirable objectivity the major strategic decisions, reached only after difficult and at times heated negotiations, and says about all that can be said about them on the basis of existing materials. Roosevelt emerges as an idealist with a typically American blindness to many of the realities of European politics. McNeill correctly notes with more than customary emphasis the great significance for inter-Allied relations in 1944 of the decline of Roosevelt's health and the distraction of the presidential election. He also notes the President's persistent belief that the American public would not support an active policy in Europe after the war. Indeed, Roosevelt went so far as to inform Stalin both at Teheran and at Yalta that American troops would not be available for occupation duty in Europe for more than a short period after the war.

McNeill's account of the Russian side of this triangular relationship is much less illuminating, if only because of the dearth of materials. Moreover only translated publications were used, and such clues to Soviet policy as might have emerged from a close reading of the Soviet press are therefore missing. Yet the loss is probably not significant, for the fact remains that very little source material has been published. McNeill's account of Soviet policy is moderate in tone, and makes good use of the limited information available. It gains in particular by forming part of a more general narrative, and thus provides an understanding that is lacking in accounts devoted exclusively to Soviet policy. At the same time, in a subject where the author must rely to a large extent on speculation, there are a number of judgments that will be questioned. There is, for instance, frequent mention of the role of Marxism in Soviet policy, but without serious discussion of Soviet theory as it has evolved under the aegis of Lenin and Stalin. The relationship between Russian national interests and theoretical considerations in the formation of Soviet policy deserves more consideration in an account of this sort. This lack of theoretical background is reflected in the author's view that Soviet policy made no serious attempt in 1943 to carry out a revolutionary policy: yet in that year the Soviet government took steps with regard to Poland, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, to mention only one sphere of activity, which were directly connected with post-war Communization. One may also question the view that Stalin honored his commitment in the Anglo-Russian division of Eastern Europe into spheres of influence. The Soviet government retained in the Communist Party and the EAM powerful instruments of policy in Greece which bore no comparison with such elements of Western influence as existed in the countries to the north, and the attempted revolution in Athens in December, 1944, cannot be attributed primarily to local initiative. One may also question the apparent equating of Soviet control over a group of Eastern European satellites with the relationship of the United States to the Latin American republics: the differences are certainly more significant than the similarities.

The account of the negotiations for peace in 1945-46 is likewise presented with comprehensive balance, although published source materials are much less com-

plete and the subject itself certainly lacks the grandeur of the wartime period. On one issue, however, the interpretation is open to serious question. The discussion of the negotiations in Eastern Europe implies that the Western governments really did not know what they were doing in supporting free elections and at the same time anticipating governments friendly to the U.S.S.R. The reasons advanced for this view are that "democratic government . . . like that of Britain or France or the United States" had not struck roots in Southeastern Europe, and that freely elected governments would almost certainly have been hostile to the Soviet Union. This is to say that there was no middle ground between the Soviet goal of complete domination and the Western aim of encouraging political freedom, and such a view reflects a misunderstanding of the situation. It was not necessarily a question of expecting Western political forms to flourish in this narrow sense, as McNeill suggests, for the Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe referred only in general terms to "democratic institutions," and called more specifically for "interim governmental authorities broadly representative of all democratic elements in the population and pledged to the earliest possible establishment through free elections of governments responsible to the will of the people. . . ." The rule of law was not unknown in Eastern Europe, and this formula did not involve a sharp break with political traditions. Moreover there are many ways of guaranteeing Soviet security in Eastern Europe short of Communization, and a government does not have to be "friendly" in a subjective sense to meet the requirements of the situation. On both of these issues there was a broad middle area between the two extreme positions, and the available evidence suggests that the Soviet government was a good deal less eager than the West to explore this area. Illustrative of the possibilities is the position of Finland: located in a strategic position most vital to the U.S.S.R., practicing its own form of representative government, subjectively quite hostile to Russia, yet "friendly" in the formal sense and willing to provide security guarantees acceptable both to the U.S.S.R. and to the West. Many shortcomings in imagination and vigor can be attributed to Western statesmen in this period, but at least they knew what they were trying to do.

In his conclusion, McNeill sets forth as the enduring consequences of the Grand Alliance the impetus that it gave to five already existing trends: the development of supra-national administration, a subject on which this volume offers many original comments; the changed relations between Britain and America; the changed scale of international politics, and especially the relative decline of Europe's rôle; the formulation of the myth, associated primarily with Roosevelt, that "an era of international peace, prosperity, freedom, and justice could be inaugurated" in the foreseeable future; and, finally, the promotion of social revolution in the sense of "the growth of the conviction that social and economic relations were at least potentially subject to rational control and conscious management." There is of course much that can be said about these broad themes, but in his brief comments McNeill avoids the major pitfalls of generalization at this level and maintains the judicious balance that characterizes the rest of this interesting and scholarly narrative.

Princeton University

C. E. BLACK

CALVOCORESSI, PETER, *Survey of International Affairs 1951*. N. Y.: Oxford University Press, 1954. Pp. 505. \$10.50.

With this volume the *Survey of International Affairs* returns with notable improvement to its annual basis. The seven parts of the survey are titled: The North

Atlantic Alliance, Western Europe and Germany, The U.S.S.R. and Central and Eastern Europe, Yugoslavia, The Middle East, China and Japan, and Far Eastern Wars and Security. Mr. Calvocoressi, with the assistance of Mr. Konstanze Isepp and with the collaboration of Professor R. G. Hawtrey, Dr. F. C. Jones, and Mr. George Kirk, has in this volume of the Chatham House postwar *Survey* made an impressive contribution to contemporary world history. Miss Denise Folliot sub-edited this survey and edited the accompanying volume of *Documents, 1951*. Three maps of the world showing political boundaries, relative distribution of population in settled areas and physical features are appended to the volume. Their object, as Arnold Toynbee clearly points out, is to visualize the alteration of the arena of international affairs since 1940, and to explain that each of the two surviving alignments of powers is now threatened by the other power group on three fronts.

Included in this book are the Anglo-Persian dispute over oil, the Anglo-Egyptian conflict in the Suez Canal Zone, the signing of the Japanese Peace Treaty, British and French difficulties and reverses in Malaya and Indo-China, and the enlargement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization by the accession of Greece and Turkey. The Treaty for a European Steel and Coal Community was signed in 1951, and plans were made to establish a European Defense Community. The German problem continued to divide the major powers, while attempts to convene a meeting of Foreign Ministers and to secure approval of a plan for all German elections resulted only in disaster. Franco-German relations clearly indicated opposition to the American plan for the European army. Stalin's February 16th pronouncement on foreign affairs set off in the west a search for the Marshal's hidden motive, which soon became the "parlour game" of Western European diplomacy.

The viewpoint of any contemporary historian of world affairs in 1951 was of necessity dominated by the diplomatic and military stalemate in Korea. Stalin's foreign policy was aided by this general stalemate, which was apparently more acceptable to Russia than a more vigorous form of aggression. As for the western powers it was Mr. Calvocoressi's conclusion that they "seemed more inclined to wait upon events than to fashion them. "An analysis of this volume of the *Survey* reveals that the author has relied on official statements or documentary publications of governments, government propaganda, reports of the wire services, dispatches of press correspondents of leading world newspapers, and some personal memorabilia. Since the basic documents covering the international relations of the world powers in 1951 will not, in all probability, be available for many years, the author has had to construct his narrative with only a fraction of the key sources which will ultimately illumine the 1951 international arena for posterity.

The irresolute parts of this survey of international relations are the two accounts of American foreign policy, first in relation to the Korean War and second to the North Atlantic Alliance. The developments leading to the downfall of General MacArthur and the repudiation of his policies by his superiors in Washington are presented in a fashion which omits salient points obviously known to the experts at Chatham House. The author states that this dismissal "undoubtedly came as a relief to the British government," but adds that the "downfall" and the "repudiation" were "far from ending the Korean problem."

This problem was complicated by the hardening of American opinion" and the continued British "fear of war by American mismanagement." This lack of confidence in American policy caused "a consequent loss of strength to the North

Atlantic Alliance." "American influence, as opposed to American power, declined in 1951."

Stanford University

RALPH HASWELL LUTZ

BRANDIS, GRAF CLEMENS, *Österreich und das Abendland in der Wende des XIX. Jahrhunderts*. Innsbruck: Inn-Verlag, 1953. Pp. 143. Sch. 48.

This essay is primarily concerned with Europe from the Congress of Vienna to the great year of revolution, 1848, but there are occasional excursions in time backward to the French Revolution and forward to the present. It is not intended to be, and is not, a systematic or chronological history, but is rather observations and speculations on the political and social forces that shaped nineteenth century Europe.

The growth of nationalism, viewed here almost as a sudden, new development in Europe, is lamented. And, not surprisingly, the demise of "supra-national" Austria at the hands of that "new" nationalism is regarded as a senseless and most unfortunate turn of events. Without regard to time or conditions, and with a tinge of nostalgia, Brandis suggests that what Austria once was, on a small scale, Europe must now become on a large scale (p. 7). He portrays Metternich in sympathetic shades, assigning the responsibilities for the repressive régime to underlings, but he criticizes Metternich's short-sightedness in not realizing the readiness of the people, led by the middle class, to act as national state builders.

European historical development in the nineteenth century was decisively influenced by the rapidly maturing, politically liberal middle class imbued with, and acting as the agent of, national sentiment. The ruling class of eighteenth century Europe had been united in the cultural influence radiating from the French court and was in occasional political concert as at Vienna, but that class was too unbending and lacking in foresight to forestall the upsurge of the energetic, economically powerful, nationalistic middle class which brought about an *Auseinandersetzen* in Europe.

The national problem differentiated internal political developments in the various West European states. The absence of an appreciable national problem allowed the French middle class to focus its efforts toward establishing liberalism. In Germany, with only a small non-national minority, in the struggle between German unionist and particularist, liberalism abdicated in favor of the strong hand needed to forge a united Germany. The Italian middle class could rally all to the task of expelling intruding Austria and incorporating the Papal States into a national state without sacrificing political liberalism to internal dissension. Austria consumed all her energies in attempting to hold several nationalities under her with only her German minority as a ruling instrument.

His tacit belief in German cultural superiority prevents Brandis discussing the Slavic areas of the Empire. He dismisses the Czechoslovak Republic with the unhappy appellation "*Missgeburt*." (p. 30). There are several other points at which the reader might raise a questioning eyebrow. World War I would have been *lokalisierbar* but for Russian interference (p. 33); Clemenceau was responsible for the fall of Austria, the only counterbalance to Prussia on the continent (in 1918!) (p. 17); the provinces took no part in the French Revolution (p. 45); the ideas of the French Revolution had no effect outside France until 1848 (p. 77); the United States was once on the brink of becoming linguistically and culturally German (p. 99).

Withal Brandis' book is interesting and provocative. He is at his best when

dealing with events in the German area and in analyzing the shortcoming of his own Austria, especially her failure in Italy. His considerable research and understanding of the situation are evident in his account of the *Risorgimento*.
University of Colorado

WILLIAM E. WRIGHT

MÜLLER, JOHANNES, *Kantisches Staatsdenken und der Preussische Staat*. Jahrbuch der Albertus-Universität zu Königsberg. Kitzingen/Main: Holzner Verlag, 1954. Pp. 80.

MOMMSEN, WILHELM, *Stein, Ranke, Bismarck: Ein Beitrag zur Politischen und Sozialen Bewegung des 19. Jahrhunderts*. Munich: F. Bruckmann, 1954. Pp. 304. DM 14.80.

As the years since 1945 pass and their vision becomes more stereoscopic, the more independent and vigorous spirits among German historians are breaking through to a realization that there exists a reciprocal relationship between a critical classification of the immediate German past and a re-examination of its more remote nineteenth century antecedents. Both of these studies bear witness to the necessity and clarifying effect of such an approach. Both of them are courageously critical and revisionist studies and both seek to clear away the web of erroneous assumptions, long become venerable and sacrosanct, that has gathered around certain phases of modern German history. Both of them, incidentally, once more raise the question, without seeking a final answer, wherein precisely the Prussian tradition consists.

In the first of these studies Johannes Müller, equipped with the philosopher's capacity for clear statement and the critical tools of the historian, re-examines what he regards as the mistaken identification of Kant with Prussia and Prussianism, traditional among German philosophers and historians, though scarcely among foreign scholars. Müller's pungent essay of eighty pages is issued as a supplementary volume to the now well established *Jahrbuch der Albertus Universität zu Königsberg*, published under the auspices of the Göttingen group of former East Prussian scholars. This essay performs a task that has been long overdue. It contains beside a brief analysis of the political thought of Kant and Frederick the Great, a description of Kant's conflict with the Prussian state over his essay on natural religion in 1794, and concludes with a passage on Kant's influence on the reformers of the Stein-Hardenberg era.

Obviously, Kant was not in the first instance a political philosopher, and he never developed a consistent body of political doctrine. His political writings have always stood in the shadow of his principal critical works, and, as such, they contain manifest contradictions which he did not think through to their final logical consequences. He shared, moreover, many limitations of his age and of his immediate Prussian environment. Because of the numerous encomiastic comments in his writings about the Philosopher of Sanssouci, who after all allowed him to write and publish what he pleased, contemporaries generally took for granted the Prussian orientation of Kant's political thought. Later historians also saw only the superficial similarity between the rigorous discipline of the Prussian state and the unrelenting severity of the Kantian categorical imperative. Yet, if Frederick the Great demanded the subordination of the individual to the state, Kant reversed this relationship. To Kant the state was not an end in itself; its supreme function was rather to serve man and to guarantee the free and untrammelled assertion of human rights and the dignity of the individual. Although Kant criticized the natural rights theory in its eighteenth century form, had no use for the contract theory

of government and refused to sanction the right of resistance, he was still deeply rooted in that theory. Actually, Kant's doctrine of the inviolable rights of man, his principle of self-determination which is not possible in isolation but only in a society of equal men, and his doctrine of consent in matters of legislation which in turn postulates a constitution, were incompatible with the bureaucratic mechanism of the Prussian state and also with the patrimonial and patriarchal outlook of Frederick the Great. To be sure, Frederick II in his own limited way did set up the rudimentary scaffolding of a *Rechtsstaat*, especially in his *Kammerjustiz-Deputationen* in which he allowed the public the right of appeal against the decisions of his grasping bureaucrats. But the *Rechtsstaat* as the philosopher Kant thought of it is a very different thing from that of his sovereign. Kant saw more clearly than his sovereign did that the inviolability of law, involving, as it did, its equal incidence on all men without distinction, was incompatible with the class structure of Prussian society. Basically, even the most enlightened despotism was unacceptable to Kant, for "no one can force me to be happy after his own fashion." It is true, of course, Kant was no twentieth century democrat, but neither did he share the nineteenth century German idealization of enlightened despotism. He who wishes to search for a philosophy of the old Prussian State will find it not in the works of Immanuel Kant, but rather in the *Oeuvres* of Frederick the Great.

At first glance, the vastly more significant volume by Wilhelm Mommsen on *Stein, Ranke, Bismarck* appears to be a collection of essays on these prominent nineteenth century figures. Actually, it is nothing of the sort, since it presupposes a general familiarity with the lives and the literature on these men. Mommsen has singled out these three leading Germans for a close examination of their opinions and attitudes on the problems of central Europe, on German unification, and on the social issues of the nineteenth century. A reasonably complete critical apparatus enables the reader to follow the scope and depth of the author's investigation, which in the case of Ranke and Bismarck is impressive. In what the author regards as his most important and final chapter, he presents a large synthetic view of these three crucial aspects of nineteenth century history. Since the several sections of the volume were written at different times, the structure of the book can scarcely be said to be cast into a single mold. If this makes for difficult reading and a certain loss of lucidity, it has added richness and variety to its substance. In spite of all its defects, its obviously fragmentary character which the author readily admits, Mommsen's volume will be welcomed as a stimulating and courageous effort to re-examine some of the foundations of nineteenth century German history.

Mommsen's methodological approach is simple enough. He proposes to take the principles of historical perspective seriously. He charges the older German historians, even those of Ranke's school, with having read into the generations before 1871 problems which did not yet exist and with having found answers to these problems which are possible only in the light of the events of 1866 and 1871. His central and controlling proposition is that the Prussian-German state of 1871 came as an unexpected surprise to all political parties and groupings. Even Prussian leaders envisaged a united Germany with a completely different structure from the one which Bismarck gave it in 1871. Bismarck, to be sure, aimed at a greater Prussia and, regarding all German problems from his Prussian *locus standi*, sought in the first instance the expansion of Prussian power by means of a direct or indirect control of the German North which was essentially Protestant. Hence Mommsen finds that the generations before Bismarck approached the German

problem with a completely different set of assumptions from those which were accepted as commonplace after 1871.

Mommsen thus arrives at the following conclusions. Both Stein and Ranke, notwithstanding their difference in outlook, were more at home in the political world of Goethe than in that of Bismarck. When Stein thought of "Germany" he thought neither of Austria nor Prussia but of the remaining German states, the third Germany. The concept of a German national state was entirely alien to Stein, and he certainly desired no organized German *Machtstaat*, believing along with the historian Heeren, that a powerful single monarchy in central Europe was unacceptable to the Great Powers in 1815. Similarly, Ranke, with his rooted reverence for the upshot of history, desired no powerful unified and national Germany. Both in his histories and in his political writings Ranke never accepted the inherent and necessary connection between cultural nationalism and the state. Far from being, as Meinecke calls him, the forerunner of Bismarck, Ranke was actually opposed to the Bismarckian solution of 1871. Not only did he disapprove of the suppression of the Guelph dynasty in 1866, but he feared that Bismarck, by compromising with liberalism in his universal suffrage law, had called up forces which he could not control. Both Stein and Ranke accepted the co-existence of the two German Great Powers, Austria and Prussia, as the perfectly natural and self-evident result of German history. There is no evidence that they regretted it. Above all, before 1866, Treitschke notwithstanding, Germans generally thought of the dualism of Prussia and Austria as one of friendly and more or less harmonious co-operation. In German affairs it was not either Austria or Prussia but the harmony of both that Ranke desired. Nowhere has this reviewer encountered a more satisfactory discussion of Ranke's politics. Even Bismarck, monarchist and legitimist that he was, regarded the continuance of this pacific dualism as one of several possible solutions to the German problem. It was only after 1866 that he came to look upon this dualism as an unavoidable struggle for hegemony in Germany. Indeed, this military solution became necessary only when, in the midst of the mounting German pressure for unity, Bismarck simultaneously embarked on a policy for the expansion of Prussian power. In a word, Mommsen contends that the dynastic and particularist tradition was so overwhelmingly dominant in the Germany of 1866 that only a scattered few desired a radical alteration of its political geography. There was not one political party or group that actually demanded a German *Machtstaat*. Such a state, however, was the inevitable result from the fateful moment in 1866 when Bismarck conceived the German problem in terms of Prussian power politics.

Having committed himself to the above statement in this sharply pointed form, Mommsen is compelled to subject Bismarck's policy, especially his foreign policy toward Austria, to a thorough critical analysis. He does this in a series of chapters on 1848, 1867, 1879, that are among the most searching and convincing of the entire volume. His point of departure is a critique of the traditional German Bismarck biography which revolves around the pivotal question when Bismarck ceased to be a Prussian and became a German statesman, when he advanced from a purely Prussian to a German national base in his thinking, finally to pursue, as Schüssler contends, a *gross-deutsch* and even a central European foreign policy. Mommsen finds this traditional approach, still reflected in the recent biographies of Erich Eyck and A. O. Meyer, to be mistaken. He pursues to its logical end the road, first embarked upon by Thimme and Stadelmann, which emphasizes the essentially Prussian character of Bismarck's entire policy. To Mommsen Bismarck's policy, even after 1871, must remain unintelligible unless its roots in the Frederician tradition

and in the power of the Prussian state are fully understood. It was not *gross-deutsch*, certainly not *gesamt-deutsch*, and *deutsch-national* only in the same sense that Bismarck persistently identified German with Prussian interests.

Hence, when Mommsen comes to discuss the decisive motives which guided Bismarck in the conclusion of the Austro-German alliance of 1879 he can discover no evidence to substantiate the belief that Gagern's plan for a more restricted federation combined with a wider one played any discernable role. International politics, not national, let alone ethnic German, considerations presided over the formation of this alliance, an alliance like any other and no more fundamental than a treaty with any other power. If in his memorials to the Emperor, who at first opposed this alliance, Bismarck appealed to the old *Bund*, which he had done everything in his power to wreck, it was for tactical reasons only. He sought to convince the Emperor that this alliance would provide a substitute for the guarantees of the old *Bund* and to demonstrate to Russia that this alliance involved nothing more than the historic association of Austria and Prussia. If he wanted this alliance ratified by the various national parliaments—an extraordinary proposal coming from Bismarck—it was chiefly because he desired a guarantee that would make it difficult for the anti-Prussian and clerical elements in the Hapsburg Monarchy to denounce it. Mommsen is thoroughly convinced that this alliance involved no "opting" in favor of Austria-Hungary against Russia. Indeed, he contends that Bismarck never departed from the guiding principle of his policy which he expressed as early as February, 1871, when he stated that "our relation to Austria-Hungary is essentially determined by our relation to Russia." For Bismarck the disintegration of Austria-Hungary from within was never an issue, and he was determined to prevent its disruption from without because its survival was essential to the European balance of power. The disruption of Austria-Hungary he felt, would unduly increase the power of Russia and in the end compel him to annex German Austria. But Bismarck desired no *Anschluss* and called any German Chancellor who seriously contemplated it a madman, because it would only serve to increase the anti-Prussian and Catholic elements in his Protestant Empire which already had too many internal enemies. Mommsen thus makes short shrift of any presumptive Bismarckian plans for a *Mittel-Europa*.

The remaining sections of the book, though they contain a wealth of brilliant and profound observations, are less original and less impressive. Mommsen's volume has, in fact, another dimension, that on the rôle of the masses; but it is not discussed here because he deals more at length with this issue in his book on the German middle classes. The only serious criticisms which this reviewer has to offer on this splendid volume are two. An author who devotes such meticulous care and thought to the semantic use of such words as "people," "Reich," "nation" by Ranke and Bismarck might be expected to use the term "Prussianism" with some approach to precision. Yet Mommsen's use of this word reflects a whole variety of meanings. Again, an author who is capable of writing a refreshing, stimulating, and original book such as this is also capable of molding his study into presentable shape with a clear and perspicuous organization which this book clearly lacks.

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KUBIYOVYCH, VOLODYMYR and ZENON KUZELA, *edd.*, *Entsyklopediya Ukrayinoznavstva* (Ukrainian Encyclopaedia) 3 vols., Munich—New York: Schevchenko Scientific Society, Inc., 1949. Pp. 1230.

This extensive compilation of Ukrainian "knowledge" constitutes the largest

amount of information on all matters relating to the Ukrainian people which has as yet been made available to Slavists and to other people interested in Ukrainian affairs. Its appearance, therefore, is of more than casual interest to scholars and publicists alike. It is unusual in many respects. Unlike most encyclopaedias it has had to be produced outside the area with which it is chiefly concerned. The careers of its editors reflect the rugged conditions of scholarship under which the work was completed.

This reviewer met the late Professor Zenon Kuzela more than twenty years ago. At that time he was a scholar in exile from his native home in Galicia. He had received his education in the Universities of Lwów and Vienna. His special field of training has been in Slavic philology, but his lively interest in Ukrainian affairs had extended to literature, history, and ethnography, the last being perhaps his most cherished preoccupation. He served in no less than four European Universities. In spite of the repeated frustrations of a scholar in exile he never lost his zeal for learning or the warm love for humanity which radiated his personality. Having spent some thirty-seven years in exile he died in France in 1952 in his seventieth year. At the time of his death he was president of the Shevchenko Scientific Society.

At this time the General Secretary of that Society was Dr. Volodymyr Kubiiovich, a younger scholar, also from the Western Ukraine. Dr. Kubiiovich was trained in the natural sciences and had held the chair of Geography in the University of Cracow. In 1937 he had published the *Atlas of Ukraine and Adjoining Countries* which had been recognized as a standard work. The events of the Second World War set him adrift along with dozens of other Ukrainian scholars and scientists who had to recreate their scholarly life anew in a few hospitable centers west of the Iron Curtain. The difficulties were terrific but in the midst of the almost overwhelming problems there was the one consolation that they could write freely without fear of censorship or police. They not only created new institutions but made use of those already established, notably the Free Ukrainian University, transferred from Prague to Munich, and the Shevchenko Scientific Society.

It was this latter institution which sponsored the Encyclopaedia. The Shevchenko Scientific Society is one of the outstanding institutions of learning, research and publications which emerged as part and a promoter of the nationalist revivals of Central Europe in the late nineteenth century. Its foundations were laid in 1873 in Lwów and until its liquidation by Stalin on January 14, 1940, it was a veritable beacon of Ukrainian learning. It resumed its activities in Munich in March, 1947, a majority of its members, Board of Directors, and former President, having managed to escape the Communist clutches. Among the many tasks which it now undertook was the publishing of this Encyclopaedia. The task was enormous, involving the cooperation of a large number of scholars, the securing of printing facilities, the collecting of enough money to begin the project, the setting up of a meagre sales organization, and, above all, the task of coordinating and arranging the material available. It is a tribute to the devotion, energy and skill of the editors and their collaborators that within two years the work began to appear in sections. The three volumes of Part I are now completed. Part II which will contain the index is still to come. An adaptation of the work written in English is also planned.

The completion of this work in such a short time would not have been possible had there not been previous works containing some of the basic material. In 1935 there had appeared a work in three volumes entitled, *Ukrayins'ka zahal'na entskyl'opediya* published in Lwów, Stanislaviv and Kolomyia. This was arranged alphabetically and covered all subjects. The items dealing with Ukrainian biog-

raphy, history and culture were particularly useful. The third volume alone had more than six hundred pages dealing with Ukraine. This former Encyclopaedia is now very difficult to obtain. The present work deals exclusively with Ukrainian affairs. It is arranged not alphabetically but according to subjects.

The subjects are dealt with in twenty sections. In charge of each section was one or several editors having specialized knowledge in the field. Altogether some one hundred and twenty authors collaborated in this enterprise. The list is an imposing roll call of the free scholars of the Ukraine in this generation.

The sections deal with the outstanding phases of national and cultural life, geography, history, ethnography, language, religion, art, music, science, education, etc. Not the least valuable part of the articles are the bibliographies appended to each section. Indeed, these bibliographies are indispensable for students in the Slavic field beginning their studies in any phase of Ukrainian affairs, for librarians who wish to begin, build up, or complete their Slavic sections, for book collectors who have, or wish to obtain, rare copies or books out of print, or for that unique craftsman, the general or specialized bibliographer, who feeds on lists as bees feed on flowers.

In reading these sections one is impressed by the wide training and the deep scholarly interest of the writers. It is evident that they hoped to maintain a high level of objectivity and the best traditions of scholarly presentation. At the same time it is evident that they were conscious of the continuous efforts made to distort and to destroy the Ukrainian national tradition and that they wrote with a sense of urgency and mission. It is only fair also to acknowledge that the Ukrainian tradition is complex and some subjects are inherently controversial even among the Ukrainians themselves. There is for example the history of religious institutions, or the relative importance of the Eastern or Western Ukraine. Some of the writers will not be able to escape further discussion and argument within their fields.

To sum up, the publishing of this work was a heroic undertaking and a notable achievement. For Slavists it is the best single source of information concerning the second largest community of Slavs. For those who wish to assess the reality, nature and strength of the Ukrainian tradition and the dynamic of Modern Ukrainian Nationalism it constitutes evidence which cannot be ignored. Because of this Encyclopaedia some of our Encyclopaedias including Britannica should be shamed into bringing some of their articles touching the Ukraine up to date.

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GEORGE W. SIMPSON

KENNETH INGRAM, *History of the Cold War*. Setchworth, G. B.: Philosophical Library, 1955, Pp. 233, \$5.00.

In attempting to review *History of the Cold War* by Kenneth Ingram I must, perhaps subjectively, concentrate on the two problems with which I was intimately connected—Yugoslavia and Poland, in this order of precedence. After carefully reading Mr. Ingram's most interesting book I feel that the fundamental part of it is the introduction, where I find certain divergences from my understanding of the facts which took place in the pre-war and post-war diplomacy of the United States.

It is, however, most encouraging to find authors of the courage of Mr. Ingram to point out, which should be done repeatedly, that the Soviet Union under the Atlantic Charter had sought "no aggrandizement, territorial or other." My readers will not be too naive to understand the irony thereof. It is also heartening to note that the inevitable truth has been boldly told regarding the effect (page 11) of the

withdrawal of United States troops from Europe. All of us in the United States Embassy in Warsaw saw the effect of this in Poland when the attitude of the Communist-controlled Polish Government changed adversely toward us once it was understood that because of the pleading of bleeding mothers our troops were being withdrawn from occupation duty in Europe.

While Mr. Ingram is undoubtedly striving his best to be objective in his report, he in my opinion misses one critical point in his analysis of the cold war. My point of view may be clouded by too close an association with the situation involved. Yet even after ten years of dissociation I believe it is a vital issue. Briefly, it is this: The United States has no right, constitutionally or morally, to throw other peoples into slavery. The principle of freedom is so inherent in our make-up that we would be committing a crime and a blot on our heritage if we should betray that trust that has made us the greatest of peoples. When we agreed at Teheran, Yalta and Potsdam to the enslavement of the Polish and Yugoslav peoples, we belittled ourselves and destroyed our prestige in the so-called satellite nations.

It is regrettable that Mr. Ingram does not bring up more succinctly some of the horrible massacres that were committed by the Communists before and during the war, such as the Katyn massacre and the butchery of tens of thousands of persons in the Ukraine merely because those persons wished to have liberty.

Also it is regrettable that because of his evident desire to be objective, Mr. Ingram seems to feel that the United States and Great Britain may have been unfair in not wishing to pass over to the Communists the secrets of the atomic bomb. The revelations of Mr. Gouzenko in Canada (the former code clerk in the Soviet Embassy), which enabled the United States Government to know of the Soviet apparatus to destroy the United States, as revealed in the trial of Alger Hiss, indicate far more clearly that I can describe the actual danger with which we were faced in the development of this terrible weapon.

Any student of post-war diplomacy will agree with Mr. Ingram in his statement that "Western suspicions of Soviet designs before the end of the war were deepened more seriously over the Polish issue than on any other count." The former Secretary of State, the Honorable James F. Byrnes, makes this abundantly clear in his volume *Speaking Frankly*, recounting the developments at the Yalta Conference. But what is not stated, either in Mr. Byrnes' volume or in the volume under review, is that partisan politics played a predominant part in swaying the votes of American citizens of Polish descent. President Roosevelt deliberately deceived the voters of Polish blood with respect to the formation of a free and independent Poland in 1944, when as a matter of fact he had already agreed, at Teheran in 1943, in his first meeting with Stalin, to the emasculation of Poland, at the imposition of a Communist-controlled government. Mr. Roosevelt was willing to perpetrate this injustice in exchange for the very considerable political advantage of the Polish-American votes from the industrial centers in key states, such as Illinois, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Michigan and upper New York State.

In chapter 2, Mr. Ingram raises a question—I think for the first time—regarding a situation with which I was personally involved in 1945; namely, the admission of Poland and Argentina into the United Nations. There was a divergence of opinion in the Department of State at that time as to whether Argentina, under its then form of government, was eligible. On the other hand, once it was understood that the United States supported the candidacy of Argentina, Mr. Molotov argued that the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity, or, as it was then called, the Lublin Government, should be admitted. These two divergent issues

almost wrecked the first meeting of the United Nations, of which, let us recall, Alger Hiss was the Secretary General.

Mr. Ingram refers to the formation of the Polish Government in 1945 but he is inexact in stating that Professor Lange of Chicago University was included in the "broadening" of the Lublin Polish Government. Dr. Lange was indeed appointed as the first post-war Polish Ambassador to the United States and representative to the United Nations, but he was never a member of the Communist-dominated Polish Government. Abetted by advice from the former Ambassador to the Soviet Union, the Honorable Joseph E. Davies, Lange appeared, from my conversations with him, to feel that he was doing a service to the United States, of which he was then a citizen, in promoting the cause of the Communist Government in Poland.

Reference is made in Mr. Ingram's book regarding Stalin's justification to Mr. Harry Hopkins that the transfer of Eastern German territory to Poland was needed for reasons of "lines of communication." During the summer of 1945 the reasons for these lines of communication were obvious to any resident of Warsaw. The horse-drawn hordes carrying loot from East Germany and Poland to the Soviet Union were clear to almost everyone. Obviously, the practical transfer of East Germany to Poland, from which nine million Germans had to be deported under barbaric conditions, added up to the grim reality of reducing the Polish people to enslavement.

The seventh chapter of Mr. Ingram's book—"The Yugoslav Schism"—is perhaps the most interesting, and especially to a person who has lived in Yugoslavia and knows its people. This reviewer, however, cannot agree to the parallel suggested by Mr. Ingram that it relates to the conflict of Henry VIII with the Papacy. In evaluating relations between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, one must realize that fundamentally it is a matter between the Serbs and Russia, or "Mother Russia," as the Serbs always affectionately called their big neighbor. "Mother Russia" came to the aid of Serbia in 1914. Serbia, as distinguished from Yugoslavia (Croatia and Slovenia being apathetic regarding the *coup d'état* in 1941) expected the same support, which was not forthcoming because in 1941 an unholy alliance existed between Stalin and Hitler. It was not until June 22, 1941 that this alliance was broken. It was later that Marshal Tito emerged from his unknown past as the leader of Yugoslavia—supported by Randolph and Winston Churchill and the President of the United States (in that order).

The factual account of the Trieste agreement, which is described on pages 98 and 99, may perhaps better be documented by what the former Italian Ambassador to Poland, Signor Reale, a Communist, recounted to me in May 1946. He had, so he told me, been received by Mr. Molotov in Paris. Mr. Molotov, he continued, had told him that if the Italians wished to have Trieste they should show a more cooperative attitude toward the Soviet Union. He was reminded by Molotov that Tito had been extremely cooperative and consequently the Soviet Union wished to give Tito every consideration.

In this account from an avowed Communist, prior to the split between Tito and the Kremlin, I believe the secret of the so-called schism between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia lies. Nationalism, of course, comes into the picture but the essence of relations between these two Communist governments depends on material interest and on little else.

It is regrettable that the author of this highly interesting book does not draw his lesson, which should be explained to the American people, officials and non-

officials alike, that the United States must not support Communist governments, whether they be of the Stalin, Bukharin or Tito stripe. A continuation of self-infatuation with the Geneva atmosphere could well lead to our own destruction.

Washington, D. C.

ARTHUR BLISS LANE

SHORTER NOTICES

POLIAKOV, L., *Harvest of Hate: The Nazi Program for the Destruction of the Jews of Europe*. New York: Syracuse University Press, 1954. Pp. xiii, 338.

M. Poliakov presents the reader with a remarkably detached and, one is almost tempted to say, impartial account of the official murder, within a span of no more than five years, of more than six million of his co-religionists. Whenever possible he lets the murderers themselves do his narrating for him by means of copious quotations from captured German documents. One is plunged into an incredible atmosphere in which Ernst Kagan's *SS Staat* is unchecked by the conventions of even such a questionable morality as that of Buchenwald. But this book is not merely another horror story, or cry in the wilderness, depending on one's point of view. M. Poliakov has set his sights higher. He attempts both a teleological consideration of the German plan for the extermination of the Jews and an analysis of the question of "responsibility" for this, the most systematic act of genocide in recorded history. His treatment of the first question is the less satisfactory. While he broaches the subject, he actually says little to explain how anti-semitism, always a chronic but relatively harmless aberration in Central and Western Europe, could within a very few years become what some observers have called without too much exaggeration the mainspring of the late New Order. On the other hand, the present reviewer finds himself in almost complete agreement with M. Poliakov's answer to the second question. The latter holds that the extermination of the Jews would not have been possible without the acquiescence, or at least complete indifference, of the great majority of the non-Jewish population of the countries occupied by the *Wehrmacht*. And indeed, in Italy and Bulgaria, where the population was not indifferent to the fate of the Jews, a great majority of these survived. Further, he holds that the non-Jewish population of Germany, insofar as it did not approve of the destruction of the Jews, was not only indifferent, but criminally indifferent, as it must have had more than a vague notion of the fate of the Jews being deported to the East. This accusation is regularly denied by almost all Germans confronted with it. Except in rare cases, these denials lack the ring of truth.

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RAUPACH, HANS, *Die Agrarwirtschaft der Sowjetunion seit dem zweiten Weltkrieg* (The Agricultural Economy of the Soviet Union Since the Second World War). Tübingen: Arbeitsgemeinschaft für Osteuropaforschung, 1953, Pp. 59.

SCHILLER, OTTO, *Die Landwirtschaft der Sowjetunion, 1917-1953* (Agriculture of the Soviet Union). Tübingen: Arbeitsgemeinschaft für Osteuropaforschung, 1954, Pp. 108.

An intelligent layman has often a hard time orienting himself in the labyrinth of Soviet politics in general and farm policies in particular. To be sure, there is authoritative literature on the subject. Jansy's 1949 standard text on "The Social-

ized Agriculture of the U.S.S.R." is still a classic. There is also Volin's "Survey of Soviet Russian Agriculture," published in 1951 by the U. S. Department of Agriculture. Then there is a virtual flood of articles in current issues of scientific as well as popular magazines.

It is hard to make head or tail out of the maze of information, but, finally, there seems to be a way out. Raupach and Schiller present a concise, yet comprehensive, introduction to Soviet Agriculture since the October Revolution.

Schiller, who has spent much of the interwar period as Germany's agricultural attaché in Moscow and who was in charge of the de-Kolkhozation attempts of the *Wehrmacht*-occupied Ukraine during World War II, starts with Stolypin's agrarian reforms in the second half of the 19th century. He takes us swiftly through the periods of War Communism (1917-21) the New Economic Policy (1921-28) and collectivization (1929-35). From then on, he concentrates on the institutional aspects of a socialized agriculture and on production statistics.

Raupach's monograph could be viewed as a postwar symposium of farm policy fads. First it was the re-Kolkhozation, then there was the consolidation into giant collectives (Agrogorods). In farm management, it was first Lysenko's genetics, then grass-forage rotations, then Stalin's wind-breaks to conserve moisture, then irrigation. Each and every fad was for a time presented as the panacea to Soviet agriculture's trials and tribulations, but subsequently dropped out of public sight. The millenium has not arrived.

Perhaps it is an inherent attribute of leaders in a totalitarian system that they are emotionally unstable. This would explain the on and offs of panaceas. It is just a question of time until somebody will confess that the opening up of Central Asia was not the real McCoy after all; or that corn will not solve all the ills, the Iowa-imported intelligence notwithstanding.

Be that as it may, Schiller and Raupach provide excellent overviews of Soviet agriculture. They are concise, which is truly remarkable, considering that the essays flowed from German pens. Excellent references to literature are also included. It might be a good idea to have the two monographs translated into English, and consolidated into one volume. This would constitute an excellent introduction to Soviet agriculture for readers who have not mastered the German language well enough to benefit from the reviewed monographs.

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FRANK MEISSNER

SERAPHIM, PETER HEINZ, *Ostdeutschland und das heutige Polen*. Braunschweig: Georg Wiskemann, 1953. Pp. 25, 86 illustrations.

MEYNER, E., *Sudetendeutscher Atlas*, Munich: Arbeitsgemeinschaft zur Währung sudetendeutscher Interessen, 1954. Pp. 56 and 28 maps.

The German expellees quite understandably retain a deep interest in their homelands. Their leaders wish to impress their younger generation who are now more at home in the Reich than in a land they left ten years ago, with the nature, extent and resources of the country to which they hope to return in happier days. These two elaborate publications are the result of that wish.

Professor Seraphim's assemblage of diagrammatic maps takes into consideration a wide range of interest and presents social, economic and cultural changes that have supervened since 1938, in graphic form. The Poland he is concerned with is that of 1938 and he disregards those parts of Germany placed under Soviet or Polish administration at Potsdam. The implication, of course, is that these areas are properly German. The graphic and schematic maps are interesting and suggestive, but at times surprising. The map to illustrate the ethnic constituency of the area ca. 800 B. C. and in the first century does not show familiarity with recent Polish and Czech archeological findings. The 1919-1939 map is inaccurate in several important details. The *Waldbestand* is more artistic than correct. The representation of the Germans in Poland 1925-1931 (maps 19-20) is misleading in

its minimization of the extent of the Polish population in Allenstein and the so-called Corridor.

Zwangsarbeitslager of 1952 (map 37) should have facing it, a map of the 365 *Vernichtungslager* the Germans maintained in Poland from 1939 to 1944. The representation of the *Stadtzerstörungen* errs in two directions: the destruction in Warsaw, wrecked by the Germans, is minimized and in Breslau, bombed by the Soviet forces, it is magnified.

The *Sudetendeutscher Atlas* is a more pretentious and scientific work but unmistakably Sudeten German in its orientation. The maps are more detailed, the explanations more discursive. There is about the same amount of nonsense, such as (p. 14) "Almost all the towns were founded by Germans, except the town of Tabor." On p. 49, K. Oberdorffer speaks of the "many-sided . . . educational system [in the first Republic] which the Sudeten Germans created and which they had, for the most part, to maintain alone." The statement does not conform to the truth. The Czechoslovak government appropriated more money, per capita of student, to German education than to the Czech and Slovak students. And German cultural institutions received identical financial support. The section on "German influences in Art in Bohemia and Moravia-Silesia" is imaginative rather than descriptive. It is not difficult to agree that the work was composed at some distance from the sources.

S. H. THOMSON

KENSER, CICH, ed., *Staats-und Verwaltungsgrenzen in Ostmitteleuropa. Historisches Kartenwerk*. Herausgegeben vom Göttinger Arbeitskreis, in six parts. Teil I: *Baltische Lande*, DM 8.40; Teil II: *Das Preussenland*, DM 12, Munich. Oldenbourg, 1954.

The indefatigable Göttinger Arbeitskreis has begun an ambitious, if logical, series of linear geographical maps. The plan is to show in fairly clear detail, 1:1,650,000, the boundary changes that have taken place on Germany's eastern frontier. To that extent the title is not quite accurate. The five sections that are to come will cover Pomerania, Poznanian, Silesia and the Sudetenland. This will eventually give a picture of the political and territorial changes that have affected areas in which Germans lived or over which Germany, at one time or another, exercised control.

A brief historical description of the maps precedes the purely map section, with a short selected bibliography. The portfolios contain 7-10 maps, 11 by 13 inches, chronologically arranged, from early times (twelfth to the fourteenth centuries) to the post-1945 demarcations. The maps, adequately provided with the conventional devices intended to make their meaning clear, seem to be in general quite accurate. The complete work will be a most valuable aid to anyone studying the history and surface geography of this troubled area.

T.

FLENLEY, RALPH, *Modern German History*. New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1953. Pp. 406. \$6.00.

Here is a concise summary of German history from the Reformation to the beginning of the Six Years War, with a very brief introduction dealing with pre-Reformation Germany, and an even shorter philosophical conclusion on the occasionally daemonic character of German leadership and national behavior. It is written with commendable restraint and without expression of bitterness, suffering principally from compression which is a necessary consequence of the space limits the author evidently imposed upon himself.

Professor Flenley displays an admirable grasp of the history of the German people, and a fine sense of balance in assigning space to periods and aspects of it. Within the pre-imposed page limits—which must have caused him serious concern

—he pays due attention to literary figures and the history of certain phases of German cultural history, noting military campaigns and developments principally for their effect on the structure of government and society and consequent influence on international relations and thus on the course of events.

The weakness of the book seems to this reviewer to be that it is only a summary, not likely to be very useful as an introduction or guide to its subject. To realize its value, one needs to know already more about the subject, from context, than the ordinary American undergraduate student or layman probably will know. The advanced student, on the other hand, will seek a more compendious reference work than this.

The bibliography is arranged by chapters, but is neither alphabetized nor generally annotated.

University of Wisconsin

CHESTER V. EASUM

LUKAS, RICHARD, *Zehn Jahre Sowjetische Besatzungszone*. Deutscher Fachschriften-verlag, 1955, Pp. 215.

This is an attempt to present a short history of the Soviet Zone of Germany from 1945 to 1954. Both the space and care devoted to each of the sections on politics, parties, economy, culture and law are quite uneven. Some subjects, e.g. social structure, trade unions, secret police and rearmament are barely mentioned; many other important factors are only dealt with by stringing quotation upon quotation with further analysis. The result is more a survey than a systematic treatment, which, however, by its use of primary sources, is quite reliable as a handbook for quick information.

Where an attempt at closer analysis is made, such as the description of the events preceding the forced merger of the Social-Democratic and Communist Parties and the policy of the "bourgeois" parties, the author succeeds very well in illuminating a process not yet well understood in the West. But occasional "digs" at the official U. S. newspaper *Neue Zeitung* and the West-German Social-Democratic Party for their criticism of opportunists in the ranks of the non-Communist parties in the Soviet Zone are hardly justified. If the author's view were to prevail, it would ostensibly follow that nobody but a few selected arch-villains in a totalitarian society could be criticized. The dilemma involved in differentiating between the "opportunists" and the collaborators who preserve their moral integrity is a real one. In Western Germany this issue is apparently becoming a political football between the Social-Democrats and the center parties.

University of California, Berkeley

HORST DUHNKE

FEUCHTER, GEORG W. *Geschichte des Luftkriegs; Entwicklung und Zukunft*. Bonn: Athenaem-Verlag, 1954. Pp. 441. DM 18.80.

At a time when there is considerable debate as to the relative balance of the air, naval, and land forces, which make up the national military establishment, this is a welcome book. Although it does not add anything startlingly new to what is already known about the development and deployment of air forces in the first and second world wars, its careful analysis of German mistakes in planning, development and commitment of the Luftwaffe is extremely useful, as similar blunders tend to repeat themselves elsewhere. Similarly, the author's emphasis on the critical importance of technical or scientific advances to the tenuous balance of "air superiority" in both times of peace and war is fully justified by current developments.

The author divides his task into three parts: first, a brief historical sketch of the development of aircraft as an instrument of war from World War I to the beginning of the second World War; second, the air warfare and its decisive importance during World War II; third, an evaluation of present developments and future prospects. Technical appendices to the two historical sections contain useful tables of comparative air order of battle strengths, and an appendix to the third part gives

in summary form the vital statistics of the bewildering variety of current airplane and guided missile types.

In spite of the author's attempt to confine himself to an objective presentation of fact, his enthusiasm for the air arm as such leads to certain overall errors of evaluation or judgment which are perhaps unavoidable in the writings of partisans of either air, naval, or ground forces. Thus, with respect to the 1940 German campaign against France, Belgium, and the Netherlands, the author contributes to the myth that "the unexpectedly rapid advance of the German ground forces was due *only* to the circumstances that they were powerfully supported from the air during all their operations, while the ground troops of the allies for the most part had to fight without tactical air support, and hence could not withstand the German attack." Actually in many front areas effective resistance had collapsed *before* either German tanks or planes had been committed. Similarly, allied strategic bombing is credited with having been *decisive* in bringing about German defeat, although, as the author demonstrates, Germany was being invaded and occupied on the ground before the final bomb damage to transportation and fuel supply could make itself fully felt. The author also fails to draw the obvious inferences from the fact that both in England during the blitz and later in Germany strategic bombing failed to break the morale of either public concerned. At a time when "massive retaliation" is regarded in some circles as a sort of strategic panacea, such contradictions and omissions are all the more unfortunate.

The third section of the book is the most stimulating and thought-provoking. The author establishes a striking parallel between the growing obsolescence of the dirigible after World War I and the development of guided missiles, which, as a new family of weapons, promise to render the strategic bomber similarly obsolete.

Although the author presents an effective case for the present offensive superiority of the jet bomber over interceptor craft or other defensive instruments, he carefully avoids drawing any political or strategic conclusions from this situation. Any consideration of the factors introduced by atomic or thermonuclear payloads is likewise excluded. These omissions lend an air of unreality to an otherwise excellent chapter. With compelling logic the author argues that the race for air superiority in the future will be decided in the guided missile field, and that the key to victory lies in the area of long-range electronic control, or electromagnetic warfare, which includes the capability of effectively disrupting enemy missile control, radar, and other systems.

Falls Church, Virginia

PAUL W. BLACKSTOCK

THOMAS ELLWEIN, *Das Erbe der Monarchie in der deutschen Staatskrise*. Munich: Isar, 1954. Pp. 499. DM 17.80.

Ten years after the total defeat of Nazi Germany, the Bundesrepublik forms an integral part of the Western defense community. The miraculous recovery of the German economy, the political stability of the Bonn Republic and the personal prestige of Konrad Adenauer almost extinguished the memory of Imperialist and Hitler Germany. It is only too frequently taken for granted that this time the experiment of establishing a truly democratic government in Germany will succeed without major crises.

In his book on "The Heritage of Monarchy and the Crisis of the German State" Thomas Ellwein warns us against an uncritical over-optimism. The author analyzes the basic distinctions between a democratic government of the Western type and the realities of "Der Staat" as it developed in Germany in the course of the last two centuries. Ellwein's main concern is the question as to why parliamentary form of government did not develop in pre-Weimar Germany. His answer is that German Liberalism never tried seriously to interfere with, or at any rate to supervise, the activities of the executive branch of the government. Foreign policy, the army—and most important—administration remained the undisputed domain of

the monarch and his agents. The interests of Liberalism was restricted to the problems of "society" (including municipal self government). All matters that belong to "the state" were deemed to be sacrosanct. The existence of a hierarchically organized, well trained and integrated bureaucracy enabled the monarchy not only to keep the strong position which it had established for itself during the period of absolutism but even to strengthen its position by assuming new economic and social functions. The monarchy, the army and the bureaucracy formed a unit which identified itself with the mystical entity called "Der Staat." The self-identification of the civil service with the state survived the fall of the monarchy. The appointment did not seriously affect the power of the bureaucracy of parliamentary ministers under the Weimar regime. The Bonn Republic has still to find an answer to the question as to how this "heritage of monarchy" can be reconciled with a functioning democracy.

It is to the great merit of Mr. Ellwein to have raised this crucial question of present-day German government. The author is well-read in German political theory and constitutional law. He lacks, however, a deeper understanding of what he calls "Western democracy" and expresses (to say the least) most unorthodox ideas on English government. Although his study is to a large extent concerned with comparative government, he uses almost exclusively German material. The author hardly can conceal his longing for the "good old times" when the monarch acted as a "neutral force" in political society and the civil service performed the functions of a disinterested agent of the "state" unrelated to the selfish quarrels of the members of "society." This old bureaucracy was so deeply determined to stay "above the parties" that it was wholly unable to understand why its impartiality was questioned so frequently. Mr. Ellwein is a true exponent of this type of thinking.

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ERNST FRAENKEL

E. TSCHERNIK, *Die Entwicklung der Sorbischen Bevölkerung von 1832 bis 1945*. Berlin: Akademie-Verlag. Veröffentlichungen des Instituts für Slawistik Nr. 4. 1954. Pp. 158. DM 21.00.

This is a demographic study devoted to the Lusatians Sorbs, a Slavic minority group in Germany. The author chose 1832 as the starting point because from that year he had fairly reliable reports concerning the numerical strength of the Sorbs as well as their distribution in Upper and Lower Lusatias. In order to give a comprehensive survey of changes which took place between that date and 1945 he examined critically not only official statistics but also estimates made by Sorbian scholars, Jan Arnoš Smoleř (Schmaller) and Arnoš Muka (E. Mucke). Some studies of the Sorbs by Polish and Czech experts were also consulted to supplement information obtained from German and Sorbian sources. A map drawn in 1905 by Adolf Černý, the Czech authority on Lusatia, was of great help as it showed that from 1886 to 1905 some of the Sorbian territory was irretrievably lost to the advancing Germans. The maps and statistical tables have in this book a far greater importance than the text which serves only as an introduction to analytical sections. The list of towns and villages inhabited predominantly or at least partly by the Sorbs takes a good deal of space (pp. 50-138), and it is a product of painstaking study of Muka's works, especially of his map from 1886. It appears from Tschernik's table (p. 43) that Muka's estimate sharply differed from the official census. The total 166,000 given by Muka was reduced to 146,000 by Adolf Černý in 1905, and to 110,000 by the Polish scholar O. Nowina, writing in 1938. Tschernik's book evidences an increased interest in the Sorbian minority which under the Third Reich seemed to be doomed to extinction.

University of Pennsylvania

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